Saturday, November 10, 2012

The Accelerator and Say’s Law by WILLIAM H. PETERSON


ECONOMISTS like women, are not immune to the dictates of fashion. One such dictate in vogue among post-Keynesians is the accelerator, which enjoyed similar popularity in the early Twenties. At least a partial reason for the renewed popularity of the accelerator is that it forms an integral part of the General Theory2.
The acceleration doctrine holds that a temporary increase in consumer demand sets in motion an accelerated “derived demand” for capital goods. This action, according to adherents of the doctrine, explains at least part of the causation of the business cycle. As evidence supporting this theory, accelerationists point to boom-and-bust feast-and-famine conditions prevalent in capital goods industries.
A typical illustration of the acceleration principle follows. Assume a “normal” annual demand for a certain consumer good at 500,000 units. Production is accomplished through 1000 durable units of capital goods; capacity of each capital unit: 500 consumer units per year; life of each unit: 10 years. Then assume a 10 per cent increase in consumer demand. Thus:


Annual Consumer
Demand
Capital Goods
Annual Captl. Gds. Demand (“derived”)


“normal year”
500,000
1000
100 (replacements)


next yr. + 10%
550,000
1100
200 (replacements plus new)


3rd yr.-new “nor.”
550,000
1100
100 (replacements)


Conclusion: 10% increase in consumer demand led to 100% increase in capital demand in same year but to 50% decrease in capital demand in following year.
The argument against the acceleration doctrine simply shows so many unreal assumptions and a vital non sequitur as to nullify any validity in the doctrine whatsoever. An analysis of these objections follows:
1. Rigid specialization in capital goods industries. Accelerationists pose their doctrine on the basis of a given capital goods industry supplying equipment for a given consumer goods industry and no other. Thus a decrease in consumer demand or even a falling-off in its rate of growth immediately cuts off part of the capital goods market, and the “famine” phase of the capital goods industry begins.
Yet where is the capital goods industry so rigidly specialized as to preclude its serving other markets, with or without some conversion of its facilities? Are we to presume that businessmen under the pressure of overhead and profit maximization will twiddle their thumbs waiting for their consumer demand to “reaccelerate”? It is clear that accelerationists deny or ignore convertibility of facilities and substitutability of markets.
Within many capital goods industries, trends of diversification and complementarity are evident. Examples: A machine tool manufacturer which has undertaken lines of construction and textile equipment; a basic chemical producer which has engaged in the manufacture of home clotheswasher and dishwasher detergents. These trends break down the “industry” classifications, upon which the accelerator is based.
2. No unutilized capacity in the consumer goods industry. Holders of the acceleration doctrine assume the consumer goods industry is operating at the extensive margin of production and no intensive possibilities for greater production exist.
But very few consumer goods industries, typically, operate at constant peak capacity. To do so is generally to operate beyond the point of optimum efficiency as well as beyond the point of maximum profit. The usual case then, other than during wartime, is that an industry operates with some unutilized capacity, some “slack.” Normally this unutilized capacity is to be found among the marginal and sub-marginal producers, and it is these producers which could and probably would absorb any increase in consumer demand—without, of course, the purchase of new equipment.
Yet even the successful and efficient producer would likely consider other means of absorbing higher consumer demand before committing himself to more equipment and greater overhead. For example, he could expand the existing labor force, resort to overtime, add one or two additional shifts, sub-contract work in overloaded departments, and so on. That such alternatives are feasible without more equipment is evidenced by the experience of even the most efficient firms in the utilization of their capital equipment. Examples: A West Coast airplane manufacturer found his gear-cutting equipment in use only 16 per cent of the time; a New York newspaper plant utilized its presses only 11 per cent of the time. The concept of 100 per cent utilization of all capital equipment is not tenable.
3. Automaton role for entrepreneurs. Accelerationists share the danger common to all holistic and macro approaches to economic problems—namely, the submergence of individual and entrepreneurial decision (human action) to a constant factor within a pat formula. Such treatment implies on the part of entrepreneurs irrationality or sheer impulsiveness. Boulding described this situation thusly:3
The picture of the firm on which much of our analysis is built is crude in the extreme, and in spite of recent refinements there remains a vast gap between the elegant curves of the economist and the daily problems of a flesh-and-blood executive.
Accelerationists argue that a temporary rise in consumer demand automatically calls into being additional capital goods. If this were true, it follows that entrepreneurs in capital goods industries witlessly expand their capacity and thereby commit themselves to greater overhead without regard to future capital goods demand.
True, entrepreneurs can and do err in gauging future demand. But the concept of automatic response to any rise in demand, on the order of the conditioned reflex salivation of Pavlov’s dogs, is not warranted. Increased capacity is less of a calculated risk in response to increased current demand than it is to anticipated future demand. This anticipation, in turn, is likely to be based upon market research, price comparison, population studies, cost analysis, political stability, etc., rather than upon impulse.
4. Static technology. It is not surprising that the accelerator perhaps reached the zenith of its popularity when professional journals were replete with terms like “secular stagnation” and “technological frontier.” (Nowadays the term is “automation.” Apparently we have moved from the one extreme of too little technology to the opposite extreme of too much.) Such heavy-handed treatment of technology does not coincide with experience. Science and invention do not hibernate during depressions. Du Pont introduced both Nylon and Cellophane during the Thirties.
Adherents of the acceleration principle must either minimize or ignore the impact of technology on rising productivity, for, after all, a strict ratio of capital goods to consumer goods output must be maintained to substantiate the action of the accelerator. Technology, however, can and does obviate such ratios. Technological advances not only serve to increase the unit-volume of given capital goods through superior technical design but also through the improvement of fuel, the refinement of raw materials, the use of time-and-motion studies, the rearrangement of layout and production /low, and so on.
While the growth of technology is somewhat irregular, there can be no question of its progression. Progression tends to “accelerate” the obsolescence component of depreciation and thereby crimps the acceleration model, which, ceteris paribus, ignores the unpredictable dynamics of technology.

5. Arbitrary time periods. Accelerationists must use time as a frame of reference for their doctrine. The most frequent time period used is a year. Such a time period, however, implies an even spread of the increase (or the decrease) of consumer demand in the time period. Thus a spasmodic strengthening and weakening of demand within the time period could distort the artificial taxonomies of the accelerator.
For example, a January-December period may carry one peak demand, whereas a July-June period may yield two peak demands. An accelerationist may read the first period as having an 8 per cent increase and the second as having a 10 per cent increase, which, in the long run, may average out to 9 per cent or some other figure.
Moreover, within a time period, the accelerationist assumes a fixed relationship between consumer goods and capital goods. Let alone the problem of technological advances, were such a fixed relationship to exist it would necessarily mean that the cycles of production for both sets of goods were perfectly synchronized. This, however, is rarely the case. Consumer goods generally have a short cycle; capital goods, a long cycle. Thus, current capital goods production may be based on orders originating in an earlier “period.” Two consecutive increases in consumer demand could conceivably be followed by a decrease, which may well mean that the latest order for capital goods would be cancelled. The flow of goods from the capital pipeline is not irrevocable.
6. Implicit denial of Say’s Law. Previous objections to the acceleration doctrine were of the “other-things-are-not-equal” variety. In short, with so many independent variables ceteris paribus would not hold.
This objection—the implicit denial of Say’s Law of Markets—is more fundamental. If it is valid, it would strike at the heart of the acceleration principle and reduce it to a non sequitur.
According to Say’s Law, the source of purchasing power lies within production—i.e., supply creates its own demand—and therefore generalized overproduction or underconsumption is not possible. Barring external distortions to the economy, such as war or drought, Say’s Law is operative under two conditions—the flexibility of prices and the neutrality of money. Thus it is not astonishing that a major accelerationist like Keynes who shunned price flexibility and upheld inflation should attempt a refutation of Say’s Law and resurrect the dead body of underconsumption, rebaptized as the “consumption function” or “the propensity to consume.”
If it is true, as accelerationists claim, that a rise in consumer demand will thereby create a demand for capital goods, then it must be explained what causes the rise in consumer demand in the first place. Should accelerationists concede that the rise is due to capital—or as Böhm-Bawerk put it, “the technical superiority of roundabout production”—they would then be forced to admit, logically, that they have put the cart before the horse, that the growth of capital preceded the growth of demand.
Indeed, if demand could arise without prior production to give it effectiveness, then we should witness the overnight industrialization of India, where such astronomical “consumer demand” exists as to induce the full flowering of the accelerator.
Say’s Law not only points to the fallacy of the accelerator but to its corollary, “derived demand.” There is a germ of truth in “derived demand”—“primary” consumer demand does affect “secondary” capital demand. But the consecutive sequence should be reversed. The effect of consumer demand upon capital is not demand for capital per se. Capital is always in demand as long as time-preference exists—as long as capital yields the reward of interest. Rather, the effect of “derived demand” will be, if strong enough, merely to change the form of capital goods, no more. If not otherwise impeded, capital will always flow to the most urgent of the least satisfied demands. The point is that capital accumulation—saving and investment—must come before “derived demand.” So-called derived demand merely shifts already existing productive resources from present applications to alternative but more rewarding applications.
Insofar, as the acceleration explanation of the business cycle is concerned, accelerationists view deceleration with equal alarm to acceleration. The dilemma was stated by Samuelson:5
It is easy to see that in the acceleration principle we have a powerful factor for economic instability. We have all heard of situations where people have to keep running in order to stand still. In the economic world, matters may be worse still: the system may have to be kept running at an ever faster pace just in order to stand still.
To maintain such an argument, Samuelson and other accelerationists must discount the fact that a cut in consumer demand in one line releases consumer demand for other lines. Thus, the change in the composition of consumer demand releases factors engaged in certain suspended lines of capital goods production for new lines of endeavor. That this would cause frictional unemployment of factors is not denied, but frictional unemployment is far less of a problem than generalized unemployment. The notion of ever-accelerating consumer demand to achieve stability within its related capital goods industry thus loses sight of the interchangeability of factors. The essence of capitalism, as in life, is change. While some industries may be in decline, others will be in ascendancy. Capital is not eternally fixed; it can be liquidated and “recirculated.” Nor does capital idly wait for consumer demand to “reaccelerate.” Disinvestment and reinvestment, business mortality and business birth, industry expansion and industry contraction, constantly adjust the supply and form of capital to the demand for consumer goods. Samuelson overlooks the dynamics of capital in his essentially static, timeless acceleration thesis.
Say’s Law places production as the controlling factor over consumption. The accelerator reverses this order. Thus accelerationist Keynes sought to accelerate consumer demand by having the unemployed uselessly dig holes or build pyramids, the important thing being to put “purchasing power” in the hands of spenders. Productionless “purchasing power,” according to Say’s Law, is a contradiction  in terms; it is nothing but inflation. In short, the false premise of “derived demand” in the acceleration principle has led to other false premises.
Conclusions. Four findings spring from this article. One, the accelerator is groundless as a tool of economic analysis. Two, Say’s Law has yet to meet an effective refutation. Three, acceptance of the acceleration doctrine leads to false conclusions in other areas of economics. And four, accelerationists must look elsewhere for an answer to the business cycle.
While there is evidence that capital goods industries do suffer wide extremes of business activity during the course of the business cycle, it is also true that consumer goods industries undergo much the same cycle, even if their amplitudes are smaller. That there is correlation between the two phenomena is not denied. But correlation is not causation. This is the heart of the error in the accelerator.




On Freedom and Free Enterprise: Essays in Honor of Ludwig von Mises

Friday, November 9, 2012

The Yield from Money Held by W. H. HUTT


MY AIM in this essay is to attempt to carry the tenor of Mises’ teaching a step further in the field of monetary theory. A feature of his great contribution, Human Action, is its insistence that all goods and services have the same scarcity significance, i.e., that they all stand in an identical relation to human choice and exchange. It seems to me that money and monetary services ought to be included under this principle, in a manner in which Mises himself has not argued. In this field all economists have shared, I feel, in a hindering tradition which, had the logic of his approach been extended, Mises would have thrown off. I refer to the notion that money is “barren,” “sterile,” “unproductive,” “offering a yield of nil.” This view is held today by economists of all schools. Yet practically without exception they talk of the “services” rendered by money or the “utilties” derived from money. It is in this respect that we find the clearest justification for Wicksell’s confession that in the field of monetary theory, “diametrically opposed arid sometimes self-contradictory views are defended by the most famous writers.”1 To the best of my knowledge the doctrine of the sterility of money has so far been subject to explicit challenge only by T. Greidanus.2 The latter has, however, not yet explained the full significance of his “yield theory.”3
In three articles published since 1952,4 I have discussed an ambiguity in the concept of the “volume of money.” We have to distinguish, I have suggested, between the idea of the aggregate amount of money measured in actual money units, like pounds, dollars, francs, etc., and the aggregate amount of money assets measured in “real terms,” i.e., measured in units of constant value in terms of “things in general.”5 The former, I regard as “containers” of varying amounts of the latter.6
The notion that money has a “yield of nil,” i.e., that it differs from other assets in that it is “dead stock,” persists, I think in part owing to the above-mentioned ambiguity. For one of the usual explanations of this supposed peculiarity of money relies on the fact that an increase in its “quantity” does not mean that there is any increase in “wealth” or “welfare” or “total utility.” But this is true only of the number of money units or “containers” and not of what is contained in them. It is not true of the aggregate amount of money assets measured in real terms. Money so conceived is as productive as all other assets, and productive in exactly the same sense. And the fact that the number of “containers” (units) may be varied whilst the aggregate amount of what is contained in them may remain constant (or vice versa) in no way affects the truth that money assets offer prospective yields just as the rest of the assets possessed by individuals, firms, banks or governments. As objects of investment, they are chosen for the same reason that other objects are chosen. Thus, if their marginal prospective yield at any time is below that of other assets, it will pay to part with some of them, and if it is above, it will pay to acquire money assets up to the point at which the marginal prospective yield has fallen to the rate of interest. Now Mises himself, and several other economists, maintain explicitly that the amount of money which individuals and firms decide to hold is determined by the marginal utility of its services.7 Yet for some reason they have not made the next small step needed to recognize this prospective yield (of “utilities”), which invites the holding of money, as the normal return to investment.
The prospective yield from investment in money assets consists, I suggest, (a) of a prospective pecuniary yield, in which case the money assets are producers’ goods;8 or (b) of a prospective non-pecuniary yield in personal convenience, in which case the money assets are consumers’ capital goods;9 or (c) of a prospective “real,” i.e., non-pecuniary, speculative yield, in which case the assets are producers’ goods, whether held privately or in the course of business. In the case of (a) and (b), the yield is derived in the form of technical monetary services of various kinds, which permit the most economic acquisition of other factors of production or goods for consumption. In the case of (c), the yield is derived in the form of the greater command over non-money assets which a unit of money is expected to have at some later period. As we shall see, these statements are all implied by Mises’ teaching, but never expressed by him in terms of prospective yield. In the following pages, I shall try to support my thesis that it is logically correct, and appropriate from the standpoint of exposition, to refer to the prospective yield or return from the holding of money assets, just as one does from the holding of non-money assets. I shall do so through an examination of the principal arguments which have been used by economists since the earliest times to explain why money has no yield, pecuniary or otherwise.
I am inclined to think that the tradition which I am questioning arose originally through the influence of Locke upon Adam Smith. The latter’s description of “ready money . . . which a dealer is obliged to keep by him unemployed,” as so much “dead stock, which . . . produces nothing either to him or to his country,”10 gave influential emphasis to a bad precedent. Locke had three times used the very same words of money, “produces nothing.” Unlike land, which produces something valuable to mankind, said Locke, “money is a barren thing”; and yet it was, he argued, subject to the same laws of value as other commodities.11
But the idea is ancient. Several writers have attributed it to Aristotle,12 for he condemned usury on the grounds that “the birth of money from money” was “the most unnatural” mode of making money.
Edwin Cannan insisted that it is by no means certain that Aristotle thought money was barren, but merely that he thought it ought to be.13 Wicksteed pointed out that Dante, following Aristotle, emphasized the unnaturalness of money breeding money, by expressly associating usurers with sodomites!14 Bacon (who argued for the toleration of usury) said, “They say that it is against nature for money to beget money,”15 but did not explain whether “they” meant that it was immoral or impossible. Shakespeare, in the same context of the controversy over usury, made Antonio, in The Merchant of Venice, refer to “a breed of barren metal.”16 We can hardly blame Shakespeare for what he made one of his characters say; yet through this passage, Bonar agreed, “a wrong twist” was probably given to Aristotle’s meaning.17 And Bentham, facetiously18 ridiculing what Aristotle was supposed to have held, alleged that the “celebrated heathen” philosopher described money as barren because he “had never been able to discover, in any one piece of money, any organs for generating any other such piece.”19
Now although this discussion of the legitimacy of usury continued to be clouded by the confusion of the concept of money with that of capital (all money is capital, but not all capital is money), it appears to have been responsible for the continuing and still current fallacy that “money does not mulitply itself,” as do other forms of productive capital. And we must, I fear, blame either Locke, whose failure to throw off the ancient and barren notion of “barren metal” thereby perpetuated it, or else Adam Smith, who was too uncritically indebted to Locke (or Aristotle directly) and propagated the insidious fallacy.
Locke’s influence was all the greater by reason of the impressive, rational treatment which he devoted to the role and functions of money. He had a remarkably modern grasp of the tasks which money has to perform.20 Indeed, he perceived clearly what we call today the “institutional” factors determining the demand for money.”21 And most interesting of all, he saw that money had “the nature of land,” the interest on land being but the rent.22 In using these words, he seemed to come very near to stating the very truth for the recognition of which I am now pleading; for, he said, the “income” of land is called “rent” and that of money, “use.” (See page 216) A little later on, however, he apparently remembered Aristotle (or Antonio!) and wrote: “Land produces something new and profitable, and of value to mankind; but money is a barren thing and produces nothing.”23 In part, the confusion here seems to be due to the narrow view of what constitutes productiveness; although, as I have said, the old confusion between the concepts of money and capital seems mainly to blame. He thought of money lent as productive to the lender, but presumably not productive to the borrower. Yet there is similarly no direct pecuniary return from land unless it is hired out to someone else. Does that mean, then, that our land brings us no return, pecuniary or real, when it is not lent? Obviously not. Of course, if one finds that the whole of one’s cash balance is unnecessary (i.e., if some part of the balance offers no speculative or convenience yield valued at above the rate of interest), and one then fails to make other use of the redundant sum, or to lend it to someone who can, the surplus will remain “barren,” just like unutilized land. A trader’s stocks of anything may be wastefully large. There is nothing unique about money in this respect. It was owing to Locke’s failure to make the small further jump necessary, and to state that the productiveness of money does not differ in any material manner from that of land, that we may have the origin of the root fallacy which has confused monetary theory ever since. The subsequent tradition has been to regard money as having “resource value” or capital value, but no “service value.”
Between Locke and Adam Smith, various writers perceived the usefulness of money, e.g., Cantillon and Hume, but they failed to see that “usefulness” is a mere synonym for “productiveness” or “yield.”24
Adam Smith’s contribution on the point, although obviously inspired by that of Locke, differed slightly from it. At times, he regarded money as “the instrument of commerce,”25 but at other times he denied that it was “a tool to work with.”26 “Gold and silver,” he wrote elsewhere, “whether in the form of coin or of plate, are utensils . . . as much as the furniture of the kitchen.”27 But he would not have described furniture as “productive.” This “dead stock,” he said of money, “is a very valuable part of the capital of the country, which produces nothing to the country.”28 His acceptance of such a paradox can probably be explained, as with Locke, by the narrow conception of “productivity” of his day. “The gold and silver money which circulates in any country may,” he said, “very properly be compared to a highway, which, while it circulates and carries to market all the grass and corn of the country, produces itself not a single pile of either.”29 To some extent he was, I think, misled through his desire to refute the fallacies of the Mercantilists. He wanted to show the folly of accumulating money in the belief that it represented “wealth,” and was accordingly led to the assertion that, whilst it “no doubt, makes always a part of the national capital, . . .” it is “always the most unprofitable part of it.”30
It is surprising that, as the eighteenth century view of productivity was abandoned, the essential yield from money assets did not come to receive explicit recognition. But as Greidanus has pointed out, Ricardo failed to recognize that money is needed, not only for payments but to be kept on hand.31 Senior recognized that money was “of the highest utility”32 but contended that its use gave “no pleasure whatever.” He added, “its abundance is a mere inconvenience” because we should have to carry more of it.33 Obviously, he was here thinking of what I have called “money units.”
J. S. Mill’s insight was not very much deeper. He recognized that money assets had a task, he referred to “the quantity of work done” by them, he even spoke of their “efficiency,” and he fully understood that the demand for such assets was a function of the amount of traffic which they facilitated.34 But he confused the notion of “rapidity of circulation” with that of “efficiency.” He did not realize that, certis paribus, if units of money circulated more slowly, that would be due to there being more work, not less work, for them to do. (See below, pp. 213, 214.)
Cairnes (like Adam Smith) was led astray through an attempt at easy refutation of mercantilist ideas.35 He wanted to answer Tooke, who had discussed metallic money as though it were, in itself, a source of productive energy, and who had argued that “an addition to the quantity of money” was “the same thing as an addition to the Fixed Capital of a country”—as equivalent in its effects to “improved harbours, roads and manufactories.”36 But to deny that the acquisition of specie is necessarily a wise form of investment is not to deny that money is instrumental capital. Nor does the fact that it may take a wasteful form (e.g., gold coin, when convertible paper would serve equally well) imply that money assets as such do not provide a flow of valuable services.37
Böhm-Bawerk was surprisingly contented with the naivety of Aristotle, whose argument he summed up as follows: “Money is by nature incapable of bearing fruit.”38 And yet he recognized that interest “may be obtained from any capital, . . . from goods that are barren as well as from those that are naturally fruitful.”39 The explanation of the paradox again appears to lie in the dogged persistence of the crude notion of productiveness, a notion which was responsible for Böhm-Bawerk’s rejection of the “use theories” of interest. He twice quoted the same trenchant passage from Hermann in which it was pointed out that “land, dwellings, tools, books, money, have a durable use value. Their use . . . can be conceived of as a good in itself, and may obtain for itself an exchange value which we call interest.”40 But this repeated quotation was merely for the purpose of refutation. To Böhm-Bawerk, “use” meant “physical” or “material” services only.41 “For any ‘use of goods’ . . . other than their natural material services,” he said, “there is no room,  either in the world of fact, or in the world of logical ideas.”42 It is “theoretically inadmissible to recognise relations as real goods.”43
Von Wieser mentioned various reasons why holdings of ready money were indispensable or speculatively profitable;44 but he thought that the “advantage in value” is only realized by such holdings when the object is ultimately acquired for which the money was accumulated.45 And although he used phrases which at first suggest that he had perceived that money units are useful or necessary for reasons of the same economic nature as other productive assets or durable consumption assets,46 and although he clearly regarded money as part of circulating capital,47 he used his chief concepts in a far from rigorous manner. One can hardly feel that he was visualizing, even dimly, the prospective yield which induces the acquisition of money assets.48
Wicksell accepted explicitly Aristotle’s contention that money is “sterile.”49 It “does not itself enter into the processes of production,” he said.50 Yet, in discussing the various functions of money (e.g., as resources to meet unforeseen disbursements), he discussed also the factors determining its average period of “rest” or “idleness,” notions which suggest that it must have periods of work or activity. He held that money was held “not to be consumed . . . or to he employed in technical production, but to be exchanged for something else. . . .”51 He did not explain why the fact that money is not consumed, or intended to be exchanged for something else, should prevent it from providing continuous services in production.52 But in criticizing Menger for his false distinction between “money on the wing” and “money in hand,” he wrote, “Some money may often lie untouched for years in the till, though it has not, on that account, ceased to serve as a means of circulation.”53 Here, surely, is an admission that money in the till is providing continuous services, that it is not economically idle, or “resting,” and that its usefulness is not concentrated into the moment at which it is spent.54
Marshall referred to the services (without using this word) rendered by holdings of currency, in making business “easy and smooth,”55 and discussed the balancing of the “advantages” of holding resources in this form with the “disadvantages” of putting more of a person’s resources into a form “in which they yield him no direct income or other benefit.”56 But somehow he did not see that he was comparing one “advantage” with another “advantage,” i.e., one end or means with another end or means. It certainly seems that he also was in some measure misled by the realization that a mere increase in the number of money units (pounds, francs, dollars, etc.) does not, in itself, result in an increase in the flow of monetary services. He said, “currency differs from other things in that an increase in its quantity exerts no direct influence on the amount of services it renders.”57 That view, combined with the influence of the “barren money” tradition, appears to account for his insistence that the holding of resources in the form of currency “locks up in a barren form resources that might yield an income of gratification if invested, say, in extra furniture; or a money income if invested in extra machinery or cattle.”58 This contrast of furniture and money (as opposed to Adam Smith’s identification of furniture with money) curiously failed to suggest to him, or his critics and disciples, that he was making a false distinction. Money assets (held as consumers’ capital goods) render non-pecuniary gratifications just like those rendered by furniture.
How much wiser was Edwin Cannan’s insight, in his Modern Currency: “Our need for currency is analagous to our need for houses,” he said.59 And he was, I feel, ahead of his contemporaries in his recognition, from the beginning, that the demand for money is essentially a demand to hold.60 Nevertheless, the passage quoted seems to be inconsistent with what he wrote elsewhere. Thus, in his Money, he wrote at one point in the traditional way, that “people only want money in order to buy other things with it. . . .”61 In reality, people want money so as to be in a position to acquire other things at the most profitable time, or at the most convenient time. Had it been put this way to him Cannan, like anyone else, would have agreed at once.62 As things are, after having recognized that the services of money are analogous to those of a house, he wrote that holdings of money “are not directly productive.”63 People would not diminish their holdings “without reason,” he continued, “because it would, they believe, be inconvenient to have less in hand.” But cash in hand and at the bank does not differ in this respect from any type of stock in trade. The main difference is that, in the case of money stocks, it is easier to rectify any mistaken judgment which has led to surplus stocks (but less easy to rectify any deficiency).
Wicksteed (agreeing with his interpretation of Aristotle) illustrated what he thought was “the exact nature of a circulating medium” as “something which X, when he has given Y something that Y wants, is willing to receive in exchange though he has no use for it himself, because he knows that he can, in his turn, get something that he does want in exchange for it.”64 No article, he contended, which is accepted as a medium of exchange, occupies “on its own merits . . . such a place on (people’s) relative scale as would justify the exchange.”65 But if we had “no use for” money, would we not always part with it immediately we got it, so that the velocity of circulation would be infinite? The fact that we hold money assets for any period at all indicates that, although we do not want to use these assets in any other way, their services do occupy a place on our scale of preferences, just like the services of all the other capital resources which we refrain from exchanging.66
Cassel recognized that “an object in general demand” which develops “spontaneously into a general medium of exchange . . . naturally acquires a new attraction, in virtue of its new property.”67 But he did not represent this “new attraction,” or the “new property,” as a new and additional use (personal or business); and on the next page he employed the words, “merely to be used later for exchange with another commodity.”68
Robertson (Sir Denis H.), in spite of his highly independent and original approach to the question, has never torn himself away from the tradition which regards “idle money” as unproductive. The following passage from the 1947 edition of his delightful textbook is not one of the “little bits of specially dead wood” which he cut out of the 1928 version.
. . . The value of money is (within limits) a measure of the usefulness of any one unit of money to its possessor, but not to society as a whole: while the value of bread is also a measure (within limits) of the social usefulness of any one loaf of bread. And the reason for this peculiarity about money is the fact that nobody generally speaking wants it except for the sake of the control which it gives over other things.69
Again I ask, then why is the velocity of circulation not infinite?
Pigou, in The Veil of Money, refers to the damage which would be inflicted on us if we lost the services of money. It would be just as if roads and railways were destroyed.70 But he similarly insists that money is “only useful because it exchanges for other things,” and he accepts the tradition that “a larger quantity does not, as with other things, carry more satisfaction on its back than a smaller quantity, but the same satisfaction.” Nevertheless, he differs from previous writers (with the exception of Greidanus and the possible exception of Cannan)71 because he makes it clear that by “quantity of money” he means “the number of units of money embodied” in the “instrument” or “institution” of money. (Pigou’s italics.) The mere fact, however, that a particular economic good is capable of being diluted is no proof that it is not useful or productive. Milk does not cease to be useful because its adulteration does not increase its gross usefulness.72
Pigou has recourse also to a metaphor which previous writers have used, namely, that of comparing money to the oil in a machine. He refers to it as a “lubricant.”73 Now a lubricant is always consumed, whereas money assets are economically durable. If we use this metaphor, then, we must regard money assets as the resources which supply a continuous flow of lubrication. The comparison then succeeds in suggesting the continuous yield which money assets offer. But it may still leave the wrong impression that the services of money consist in “circulation.”74
Keynes adopted the Marshallian view of money being resources, but barren resources (although Marshall seems to have been nearer  than Keynes to a perception of the essential productiveness of money assets). Yet the terminology of The General Theory suggests, in itself, an awareness of the continuous services of money assets; for it appears at first to be conferring a definite name upon the yield which is expected to flow from an investment in such assets, namely, “liquidity.”75 Certainly, liquidity is regarded as (a) something valuable and (b) something continuously received or enjoyed. This is implicit in the contention that we want a “reward” for parting with it for any given length of time, and that we shall be “rewarded” for so doing. “The power of disposal” over money assets, said Keynes, although it offers “a potential convenience or security,” and although people are “ready to pay something” (a “liquidity premium”) for this advantage, brings forth, “so to speak, nothing . . . in the shape of output.”76 But if the capital value of my till is £ 100 and the average amount of cash in the till is also £ 100, may they not be expected to make an equal contribution to my output? However, Keynes contended that the liquidity which is provided continuously by money held, and for which people are prepared to pay a premium, represents a yield of nil. The holders of money are envisaged as refusing to part with this yield of nil unless they are paid the rate of interest.77
Keynes built a heavy structure on this thesis that money assets are absolutely sterile. So much is this so, that Greidanus actually contrasts him with Marshall. Greidanus contends that Keynes’ view—first expressed in his Tract—that money has no utility apart from its exchange value, although supported by quotations from Marshall,78 completely overlooked “the advantages of holding currency” which Marshall stressed.79 “The place Marshall would have assigned to the ‘advantages,’ Keynes in his equation allots to the number of consumption units we wish to buy in a certain period.”80 But the fact that Keynes did not realize that his views about the services of money diverged so fundamentally from those of his great teacher is surely due to Marshall’s own exposition reflecting some conceptual confusion.81
Keynes’ acknowledged followers have, as far as I am aware, failed to examine or test this crucial stone in his foundations. Apart from the false impressions created through his having excluded the acquisition of assets which provide liquidity from the concept of “investment,” there remains this notion that money assets differ from other assets in that they do not multiply. For instance, L. Tarshis, in a 1948 exposition of Keynesianism, contends that, against the advantages of liquidity, “the holder of money must set the disadvantage that it does not multiply, that his wealth held in that form does not grow.”82 Of course, it does multiply in the sense that any agent of production provides valuable services which may be embodied into cumulable resources. The services of consumers’ capital goods (including cash balances) are always consumed; but those of producers’ goods (including cash balances) are incorporated into wanted things with exchange value. That is why they are acquired or retained.
Even Mises, who has so clearly perceived and emphasized the essential homogeneity of the scarcity concept, has not yet rejected the traditional view. Money, he says, is “an economic good,”83 but neither a producer’s nor a consumer’s good.84 It is not acquired by people “for employment in their own production activities,”85 and it is “not a part of capital; it produces no fruit.”86 Although “indispensable in our economic order . . . [money] is not a physical component of the social distributive apparatus in the way that account books, prisons, or fire-arms are.”87 Adam Smith said that money was unproductive because it was like a highway.88 But Mises would insist that a highway is productive. Money, he says a little later, does not derive its value from that of its products, like other products, “for no increase in the welfare of the members of a society can result from the availability of an additional quantity of money.”89 Now it is true (as he puts it in his Human Action) that “the services money renders can be neither improved nor impaired by changing the supply of money,”90 for he is here referring to the number of money units. But it is not true that the aggregate stock of all commodities, securities or tokens which can serve the purposes of a medium of exchange and which are demanded for that purpose, does not contribute to “welfare” in proportion to its value. When society decides to use assets to a greater extent for the monetary services which they can perform, that does result in a preferred use of all scarce resources and an increase in “welfare” in that sense. Money assets held provide valuable services (utilities), and they do derive their value from their power to render these services. The fact that some assets held for medium of exchange purposes may have value because they can be used for other purposes also (e.g., a gold coin) does not affect this truth.
It may be objected that, when the assets held are mere tokens, as with currency notes and demand deposits, their value is derived, not from the value of their services, but (a) from their market convertibility into goods in general or (b) from their contractual or legal convertibility into a monetary metal or other currencies. But in the absence of faith in convertibility in some such sense, the assets would be incapable of rendering a medium of exchange services. They could not constitute money. It remains true, then, that we part with non-money goods and services in order to acquire money because we judge that money can render us services; and we hold so much of it as renders services which we value more highly than those rendered by non-money assets.
Far from denying the productiveness of money assets held, however, Mises constantly stresses their “services.” And in a most lucid passage he describes the nature of their productiveness91 (although without using this word). He insists that “what is called storing money is a way of using wealth.”92 One’s holdings of money do not represent “an unintentional remainder,” he says. Their amount “is determined by deliberate demand.”93 Money is “appraised on its own merits, i.e., the services which each man expects from holding cash.”94 And it does not perform its task by circulating, but by being held. Thus, he says: “Money is an element of change, not because it circulates but because it is kept in cash holdings.”95 Indeed “there is no fraction of time in between in which the money is not a part of an individual’s or a firm’s cash holding, but just in ‘circulation’.”96 And although it is true that people are continuously acquiring money in order continuously to part with it, they accumulate it in the first place “in order to be ready for the moment in which a purchase may be accomplished.”97 For this reason, he denies that there is a difference between money and vendible goods.
I get the impression therefore that, in his Human Action, Mises is on the point of saying that it is merely the pecuniary yield which is missing from the private holding of money assets.
H. S. Ellis, in an early work on German Monetary Theory (1934), also comes remarkably near to stating the correct principle—so near, indeed, that it looks almost as though, having prepared for combat, he is unwilling actually to clash with the great weight of authority against him. He certainly appears to be trying to escape the conclusions of his own analysis. Thus, he recognizes the “flow of utilities” from money holdings and says that this flow “appears to the producer indirectly as a plus in quantity of product ascribable to his possessing a perfectly liquid asset and to the consumer as a plus in satisfactions in the form of convenience. . . .”98 Moreover, he realizes that the circulation of money “terminates the flow of services. . . .”99 On all these points, he is well ahead of most writers. Yet at the same time he wants to “preserve the undeniably separate character of monetary services,”100 partly for reasons which I do not follow, but partly because he feels that money assets as such, although providing services or utilities, cannot be properly regarded as part of the aggregate assets of the community. This is so, he says, because it would be double counting, such as would result if one included mortgages or stocks and shares as well as the assets they represent, as part of society’s aggregate capital.101
But to obtain the goods which money is said to “represent,” one must exchange money assets for non-money assets, whereas, if a company is liquidated, the shareholders do not exchange assets, i.e., they do not buy the capital resources of the firm: they receive them without any exchange taking place (in practice after the assets are realized for money). Similarly, if a mortgage is foreclosed, there is no exchange of assets. Money assets do not, then, “represent” in the same sense the assets for which they can be exchanged. They are themselves assets which are just as productive (although in a different way) as those for which they are exchanged.102 To appreciate this, one must try for a moment to forget about the number of units into which these assets are divided and to think of their aggregate amount in real terms.
As far as I know, only one economist has come at all close to an actual enunciation of what I regard as the true theory of the yield of money assets, namely, Greidanus, who has significantly described his theory, “the yield theory.”103 But his contributions on this subject appear to have had little influence upon other economists, whilst his treatment has not brought out explicitly what I conceive to be the full basic truth—the fact that money assets are not only subject to the same laws of value as other scarce things, but are equally productive in all intelligible senses.
Surely the reality is that, although money is always held (except perhaps by misers) with a view to its being ultimately passed on to others, the act of passing it on is merely the culmination of a service (technical or speculative) which it has been rendering to the possessor. Indeed, the transfer itself occupies a mere moment whilst the services which flow from the possession of money are continuous over time. The essence of all these services is availability. In the terminology which I suggested in my Theory of Idle Resources,104 money assets are not unemployed or resting when they are in our pockets, or in our tills, or in our banking accounts, but in pseudo-idleness, like a piano when it is not being played, or a fireman or a fire engine when there are no fires. If it could be shown that there exist various forms of wasteful idleness in money which could be classed as withheld capacity, or which correspond, say, to a trader’s redundant stocks (which, through mismanagement, he fails to realize), we could rightly talk of “idle money,” but not otherwise. And the fact that money units may be held speculatively does not mean that they are not being used. Stocks of goods retained because their sale now would, it is anticipated, realize less than their sale later on, including all such goods in warehouses and shops, are normally105 being used, in the course of the production of “time utilities.” The same applies to money units. When speculatively held, they represent money in use.106
Hence money does not do its work by circulating. The common analogies of “the circulation of the blood,” or “the oil of a machine,” are both bad analogies. Because money units are exchange media, they just happen to change ownership more than other types of assets. If we imagine that the work of money is circulation, then we must conclude that money is always idle; for the transfer of money must be regarded as instantaneous!107 It has been suggested that, if people generally were paid quarterly instead of weekly, the demand for money would increase because more money would “be kept idling about at any one time.”108 That is quite the wrong way of putting it. There would be more work for money units to do,109 more monetary services would be required, and more money would therefore be required. Changes in the average interval between purchases (i.e., changes in the velocity of circulation of money units) do not mean changes in the average period of idleness of those units, but changes in their average period of service to each holder, which is a very different thing.
During an inflation there might appear to be an enormous demand for money assets in the sense that people want them for periods of time which they intend to keep as short as possible. In such circumstances, in spite of a multiplication of transactions, and in spite of increased circulation, the amount of work actually needed from money assets falls off. Each money unit becomes less productive because the real yield in convenience etc., is diminished by a real loss. Certainly, people still want money units “for what they will buy,” but they value them less than ever.110
It may be objected that the nature of money is such that it does do all its work in instantaneous skips from buyer to seller, or from debtor to creditor, or from giver to receiver. The objection may be answered by means of a comparison with a climber’s rope. Can it be said that the rope on which the climber is belayed is of service to him only when he actually loses his grip and dangles on it? Obviously not, for without the security it provides, he would almost certainly not have been attempting that particular climb.111
Some may feel that I am stressing a point which is of verbal rather than of substantial importance. But as Greidanus has pointed out, in the minds of the Keynesians, the failure to recognize the real but non-pecuniary yield enjoyed has led to material fallacies. Once the productiveness of money assets is recognized, the notion that the rate of interest is determined by the demand for and supply of money assets, or the demand for and supply of the services of money assets (“liquidity”), ceases to have meaning. And the modifications of that theory, like the various compromise revisions of Keynes’ theory of interest by his disciples, become equally untenable. For if money assets are demanded, like all other assets, up to the point at which their marginal prospective yield has fallen to the rate of interest, it becomes obvious that the demand for and supply of merely one category of capital assets cannot be held to be the determinants of the ratio between the value of the pure services of assets in general and their capital value, which is the best way of conceiving of the rate of interest. If interest is envisaged (as Keynes regarded it) as the “reward” for not hoarding, it has to be accepted equally as the “reward” for not investing in each and every other productive field. Or, more generally, the “reward” for not investing in any productive field (including that of money assets) is the “average” or “general” return which can be expected from all other fields of investment—allowance made for entrepreneurial remuneration.112
It might be argued that there is one respect in which money assets are different, namely, that their real volume or stock is not determined by their being produced and consumed. That is, whereas services may be embodied into non-money assets for replacement or net accumulation purposes, this is impossible with money (although the number of money units could be affected by the production of any commodity into which such units are contractually or legally convertible—e.g., gold, under the gold standard). The truth is, however, that money is in exactly the same position as certain other non-money assets in this respect. Thus, consider the case of land, in the sense of site. With the growth of population and the expansion of the productive purposes to which land can be put, its aggregate value in real terms will increase. Similarly (and ceteris paribus) the real value of money assets will increase to the same extent under such circumstances.113 But the services of money assets are produced and, like all other services, they are either consumed or embodied into products.
In conclusion, I suggest that if we understand that the demand for money assets is a demand for productive resources, we are in a better position to grasp the nature of the difficult problems which arise owing to (a) uncertainties about the future value of the money unit (in practice, uncertainties about what governments or monetary authorities will do) or (b) (less important and rather less difficult) realized changes in the value of the money unit.



On Freedom and Free Enterprise: Essays in Honor of Ludwig von Mises

Thursday, November 8, 2012

Unearned Riches by LEONARD E. READ


ONE of the cornerstones of economic theory is the economic value we attach to commodities and services that possess a relation to our well-being. Economic value is the importance which a good possesses for us because it is useful and scarce.
It is to the everlasting credit and fame of Carl Menger and other scholars of the Austrian School to have found and expounded this elementary knowledge of subjective value. They then proceeded to apply the value analysis in the field of complementary goods, i.e., goods that are required to cooperate in the rendition of use services, and finally in the field of capital goods, which they called “goods of higher order.” The theory of the value of complementary goods then became the key for the solution of one of the most important and difficult problems of economics: the problem of distribution.
The valuations of the consumers in a market economy, in final analysis, determine the way in which the ultimate product is distributed among the cooperating factors of production. How little this elementary knowledge of economic valuation is known can be seen at the widespread acceptance and circulation of wage theories that deny any relation to the valuation process. The American public embraces and most institutions of economic education teach theories of “bargaining-power,” “purchasing-power,” “standard-of-living,” the “subsistence theory,” or even the unadulterated “exploitation theory.” Distribution through the valuation process seems to be known to a few remnants of “reactionary” and “outdated” scholars and writers only. It is to the enduring credit of Ludwig von Mises that he, for several decades, has been the foremost “reactionary” among scholars, a reactionary of reason and economic theory. For this he merits our admiration and gratitude.
Many people sincerely believe that the value of anything is determined by the labor used in producing it; that its price ought to reflect quite objectively the amount of labor put into it. The belief in this labor theory of value, however, is founded in myth, not fact. Day-to-day experiences reveal its error. For a far-fetched example, the same labor could be used to make mud pies as to make mince pies, yet the value in the market place would differ. A service or a product of little value at one time or in one place may be highly valued at another time and place. For instance, an artist may produce hundreds of paintings considered freakish by others and be rewarded with starvation for his labors. But, let his style become the fad, and for less labor than before, he can revel in luxury.
Lost and adrift on a raft for days, a man might offer his fortune in exchange for a hamburger. Yet, the same person, following a lusty meal, might not offer a penny in exchange, though the hamburger had changed not at all.
Individuals have varying value judgments. Value in the market sense, therefore, is a subjective rather than an objective determination. In a way, it is like beauty. What is beauty? It is what you or I or other individuals think is beautiful. It depends on subjective or personal value judgments, judgments characterized by constant variation. Value, as beauty, cannot be objectively determined. That all persons may think of a certain sunset as beautiful, a given monster as hideous, gold as desirable, or mud pies as useless does not alter the fact that these are subjective judgments. Such unanimity merely asserts that some subjective judgments are similar.
It is not at all surprising that many persons in the United States and throughout the world do not subscribe to the subjective nature of value. As far as can be determined, no one understood it well enough to try an explanation until the latter part of the nineteenth century. Prior to that, such a notable as John Stuart Mill and the very best of economists, including Adam Smith and Ricardo, were stymied in their development of economic theory because they accepted the cost-of-production or labor theory of value. They simply could not explain what they otherwise knew to be the great advantages of the free market process of voluntary exchange. They knew full well that both parties must gain when each traded what he wanted less for what he wanted more, yet they could not show that such gain had been “earned,” for they were unable to explain it in terms of labor costs. In short, they were unable to see how the free market price might be competitively or subjectively determined by individuals who had no accurate knowledge of the labor or other costs involved in producing a particular item.
How Adam Smith, holding to this labor theory of value, could have seen the great advantages of trade—the untold blessings of others, or society, to the individual—and could have come out in favor of private enterprise instead of socialism, is a miracle more to be attributed to sound instinct than to economic reasoning.
Marx, as distinguished from Adam Smith, followed the labor theory of value to its logical conclusion: socialism. Marx looked upon all things useful as one great “wages fund” and believed that the entire fund ought to be distributed directly to laborers. To allow any part of this fund as a return on capital would amount to unearned increment and, he argued, would be exploitation. How any advocate of the cost-of-labor theory could believe in anything but socialism is difficult to understand. Smith, Ricardo, Mill, and many others instinctively, not logically, concluded otherwise.
Only if one understands the marginal utility or subjective theory of value based upon the judgments of countless individuals acting freely and voluntarily in the market may he proceed logically to a belief in private ownership and control of property. With this kind of an understanding, he can see why any person may have a perfect right to consume more than he could ever hope to produce by his own labor. He can, it is plain, properly own anything others will freely offer in exchange for what he has to offer them. This means gains for all participants in the exchange process, gains which must always appear to be unearned in terms of labor expended. Nonetheless, it reflects the approval of all who are properly concerned in any transaction. The marginal utility or subjective theory of value needs no other justification. Because it is based on willing exchange, it works without coercing anyone. The labor theory of value—the labor theory of price determination—on the other hand, founded on unwilling exchange, cannot function without coercion.
Now, let us proceed to the person whose father invested $500 in an early auto industry and who now wonders to whom he should give the resulting millions. He is no more the recipient of unearned increment than is the person who today works for a wage in the same company. Both exist on what they themselves do not and could not produce. And if the wage earner were to succeed in cutting off what he might think are the unearned riches of his “lucky” brothers, he would at the same time destroy his own source of livelihood.
Let us contemplate this wage earner. He lives in a house he could not build. Perhaps, given enough materials and tools properly fabricated and the plans some architect has drawn, he could put together something resembling a house. But he wouldn’t know how to make a lowly nail: mine the ore, alloy the metals, construct the furnaces, build the extrusion and other machinery, and so on. Could he make a hammer? A saw? Bring the lumber to its finished state? Even make the string on which his plumb hangs? Grow and gin and spin and comb and weave the cotton from which it is made?
Could he build the machinery that mines the coal he uses to heat his house? He could not make the lamp the miners wear if every ingredient depended solely on his own resources.
What about the automobiles he helps to put together, one of which he owns? Neither he nor any other person on this earth could produce it alone. What about the food he eats? The clothes he wears? The books and magazines he reads? The telephone he uses? The counsel on health that is his? The opportunities that are constantly presented to him? All are done by a vast work and exchange process, millions of individuals with as many varied skills, laboring cooperatively and competitively, a world of complex and flowing energy, the organization of which is more complicated than any one person can understand, let alone control. Others—society past and present—place within his reach goods and services and knowledge in such an array and abundance that he could not himself produce in thousands of years that portion of it which he consumes in a single day. And he obtains all of this in exchange for his own meager efforts.
The astounding thing is that it is possible for him to gain without any change in his efforts, his skills, his knowledge. Let others become more inventive and more productive, and he may receive more in exchange for what he has to offer. Parenthetically, it is also possible for him to lose out entirely, as might happen if he persisted in offering nothing in exchange but buggy whips.
There is a fact still more astounding. Our wage earner may think of his plight as hapless when compared to the one who inherited his millions. True, the millionaire has gained much from the doings of others. But the wage earner himself owes his life to the doings of others. It is not that possessing millions and having life are alternative propositions. That is not the point. The point is that both flow from the same exchange process and that whatever each has—be it autos, houses, food, clothing, heat, millions, knowledge, or life itself—comes to him unearned in the sense that he alone did not produce all of it. We trade because we can all get more satisfaction from our labor by that means. Vast stores are available to those who have anything to trade that others value. In the free market, each earns all that he receives in willing exchange. This is fantastically more than one could produce by himself.
In order fully to grasp the process by which one can consume in a day that which he could not produce in thousands of years—the process by which he can earn in a day that which he could not earn by himself in thousands of years—it is only necessary for one to see that one’s earning power is capable of unlimited expansion by the productivity and exchange and value judgments of others. This world of creative energy, this productivity exterior to self, then, becomes of singular importance to each one of us. Not only does our prosperity—material, intellectual, and spiritual—depend upon it, but life itself comes under its government. In short, each of us is the beneficiary of this productivity through division of labor and capital accumulation and investments by others.
Let us sample this world of productivity through division of labor from the standpoint of oneself as a potential beneficiary of its largess. The mathematics of nuclear fission is known to some scholars. I, however, do not know that much mathematics. Such knowledge conceivably can be mine. But I can possess it only by increasing my own perceptive powers. It may very well be that the required increase in perception is beyond my competency or that I may choose to increase my perception along other lines to the exclusion of perceptive powers along this line. But, assuming that I do gain this knowledge, do I earn it? Yes, as much as though I gained the knowledge by direct revelation. Direct, or indirect through study of the knowledge of others, does not alter the matter.
The same principle applies to a product as to an item of knowledge. Luxurious yachts are available. Their making is as foreign and as unrelated to me as presently is the mathematics of nuclear fission. I do not have one. Such a possession conceivably could be mine. I could become the beneficiary of its existence by increasing my own exchange powers or, should all others become sufficiently productive, I could have one in exchange for efforts no greater than I now exercise. But assume that I do obtain one in exchange for my present meager efforts, do I earn it? Yes, even though it is in the sense I earn a deer by choosing the path I will walk and by pulling the trigger on a gun. All else is supplied. The deer, a miracle about which man had nothing to do, crossed my path. The gun, the powder, the shot represented creative ingenuity flowing through space and time about which I have but the dimmest of notions. As with the deer, so with the yacht. I earn it as though I had done it all myself. Others in their productivity, knowledge, skills willingly exchanged what I offered them.
Someone may argue that I could have exchange power to obtain a yacht had I been born the son of a father who “hit it lucky.” By the same token, I might have the perceptive powers to understand the mathematics of nuclear fission had my parentage been different.
Seeing oneself in true perspective as related to all others is utterly impossible. We but dimly comprehend ourselves; the comprehension of others is much dimmer. However, it is not necessary that this perspective be perfect. It is only necessary that we grasp the idea of being a beneficiary of this benefactor, this division of labor, and that we understand and appreciate our dependence on and our relationship to it.
No better example of the beneficent effects of the division of labor together with capital accumulation is to be found than in the area of our own 48 states. Here, less than 400 years ago, there were perhaps 200,000 Indians. Why was the population limited to this number? Certainly it was not for any lack of natural resources, friendly climates, or fertile soils. Nor was it because of the Indians’ inability to breed. The population was limited and the standard of life was relatively impoverished because of a low form of cooperant society. They lived in a foraging economy, all of them in a near sameness. There was little in the way of division of labor, of variable skills, knowledge. Society was indeed so uncooperative that as a result only 200,000 could live in it, and they not very well.
Today, in this same area, 160,000,000 persons, 800 times as many, live in relative luxury, be luxury measured in terms of goods and services, leisure, opportunities, knowledge, or insights into the nature of things. It is fair to say that 159,800,000 of us have life, and a rather full one at that, due to a higher form of cooperant society, to the freeing of creative energy, to large capital investments per head of population, to an advanced state of division of labor. It is fair to say that nearly all of us exist and have the possessions we enjoy because of a greater division of labor in a market economy. These millions of people with their varied skills and specializations, taken together, constitute a benefactor without which most of us could have no life at all. Each one of us is a beneficiary of this phenomenon.
Looked at in this light—oneself as a beneficiary and division of labor as a benefactor—it becomes pertinent to re-examine one’s own behaviors, attitudes, actions. If we would best serve our individual self-interest, we would do well to live in harmony with the facts of life, not in disharmony with them.
Looked at in this light, one should do everything possible to increase his own perceptive and exchange powers. It is only by self-improvement that one can best serve self. And, clearly, it is only by self-improvement that one can better serve others—that is, add to someone else’s well-being.
Who composes this benefactor of ours, this storehouse of energy? It is composed of individuals who, like ourselves, are different from all others and who, like ourselves, depend on others. And what ought to be our attitude toward these millions of others if looked at from the standpoint of self-interest?
1.   Self-reliance, a great virtue, should be emphasized. The way to be self-reliant is to keep off the backs of others and to engage in willing—never unwilling—exchange. This is the free market.
2.   It is a primary fact of observation that these others, like one-self, will work at their best if permitted the ownership and control of the fruits of their own labor—and of their own participation in the exchange process. It is in one’s interest to preserve his incentive. This is the institution of private property.
3.   As with oneself, these others will act at their best creatively if left free to do so. One should, therefore, look with great disfavor on any interference with creative activity and on any inhibitions to free exchange and communication of creative action. One’s own interest is impaired if there are marauders or robbers or authoritarians among these others; if there are men among them practicing violence, fraud, misrepresentation, or predation. One’s own interest suffers if voters use the political apparatus to gain their own ends at the expense of the vast majority of the public. The form of government that protects the smooth operation of the free market economy and its voluntary division of labor is limited government.
For each individual to save his own skin and soul he must give at least as much concern to the rights of others as he does to his own. He would be as eager to protect the creative energies and the free exchange and communication of others as his own. For each of us can truly say, “I am the beneficiary of their existence.”
If we as individuals would save our own skins and our own souls, we would use all the moral suasion at our command to see that all men are free:
... to pursue their ambition to the full extent of their abilities;
... to associate with whom they please for any reason they please;
... to worship God in their own way;
... to choose their own trade;
... to go into business for themselves, be their own bosses, and set their own hours of work;
... to use their honestly acquired property or savings in their own way;
... to offer their services or products for sale on their own terms;
... to buy or not to buy any service or product offered for sale;
... to agree or to disagree with any other person;
... to study and learn whatever strikes their fancy;
... to do as they please in general, as long as they do not infringe the equal right and opportunity of every other person to do as he pleases.
According to these observations, here is a way of life harmonious with the interests of others. The envy of others for accomplishments or rewards can be made naturally and easily to give way to appreciation and pleasure. Inequality, being but the team-mate of variation without which survival is impossible, would, therefore, be favored rather than disparaged.
Are the riches received in a free society unearned? Only in the sense that all producers reap fantastically more than they could earn in isolation. The benefits flowing from our division of labor are available to all of us in willing exchange if freedom prevails. Such are the thoughts of one who believes himself a beneficiary and who believes that all others who act creatively are his benefactors. I owe my life to them; hence if I would live and prosper, I shall work as diligently for their freedom as for my own.


On Freedom and Free Enterprise: Essays in Honor of Ludwig von Mises

Wednesday, November 7, 2012

The Market Economy and the Distribution of Wealth by L. M. LACHMANN


EVERYWHERE today in the free world we find the opponents of the market economy at a loss for plausible arguments. Of late the “case for central planning” has shed much of its erstwhile luster. We have had too much experience of it. The facts of the last forty years are too eloquent.
Who can now doubt that, as Professor Mises pointed out thirty years ago, every intervention by a political authority entails a further intervention to prevent the inevitable economic repercussions of the first step from taking place? Who will deny that a command economy requires an atmosphere of inflation to operate at all, and who today does not know the baneful effects of “controlled inflation?” Even though some economists have now invented the eulogistic term “secular inflation” in order to describe the permanent inflation we all know so well, it is unlikely that anyone is deceived. It did not really require the recent German example to demonstrate to us that a market economy will create order out of “administratively controlled” chaos even in the most unfavorable circumstances. A form of economic organization based on voluntary cooperation and the universal exchange of knowledge is necessarily superior to any hierarchical structure, even if in the latter a rational test for the qualifications of those who give the word of command could exist. Those who are able to learn from reason and experience knew it before, and those who are not are unlikely to learn it even now.
Confronted with this situation the opponents of the market economy have shifted their ground; they now oppose it on “social” rather than economic grounds. They accuse it of being unjust rather than inefficient. They now dwell on the “distorting effects” of the ownership of wealth and contend that “the plebiscite of the market is swayed by plural voting.” They show that the distribution of wealth affects production and income distribution since the owners of wealth not merely receive an “unfair share” of the social income, but will also influence the composition of the social product: Luxuries are too many and necessities too few. Moreover, since these owners do most of the saving they also determine the rate of capital accumulation and thus of economic progress.
Some of these opponents would not altogether deny that there is a sense in which the distribution of wealth is the cumulative result of the play of economic forces, but would hold that this cumulation operates in such a fashion as to make the present a slave of the past, a bygone an arbitrary factor in the present. Today’s income distribution is shaped by today’s distribution of wealth, and even though today’s wealth was partly accumulated yesterday, it was accumulated by processes reflecting the influence of the distribution of wealth on the day before yesterday. In the main this argument of the opponents of the market economy is based on the institution of Inheritance to which, even in a progressive society, we are told, a majority of the owners owe their wealth.
This argument appears to be widely accepted today, even by many who are genuinely in favor of economic freedom. Such people have come to believe that a “redistribution of wealth,” for instance through death duties, would have socially desirable, but no unfavorable economic results. On the contrary, since such measures would help to free the present from the “dead hand” of the past they would also help to adjust present incomes to present needs. The distribution of wealth is a datum of the market, and by changing data we can change results without interfering with the market mechanism! It follows that only when accompanied by a policy designed continually to redistribute existing wealth, would the market process have “socially tolerable” results.
This view, as we said, is today held by many, even by some economists who understand the superiority of the market economy over the command economy and the frustrations of interventionism, but dislike what they regard as the social consequences of the market economy. They are prepared to accept the market economy only where its operation is accompanied by such a policy of redistribution.
The present paper is devoted to a criticism of the basis of this view.
In the first place, the whole argument rests logically on verbal confusion arising from the ambiguous meaning of the term “datum.” In common usage as well as in most sciences, for instance in statistics, the word “datum” means something that is, at a moment of time, “given” to us as observers of the scene. In this sense it is, of course, a truism that the mode of the distribution of wealth is a datum at any given moment of time, simply in the trivial sense that it happens to exist and no other mode does. But in the equilibrium theories which, for better or worse, have come to mean so much for present-day economic thought and have so largely shaped its content, the word “datum” has acquired a second and very different meaning: Here a datum means a necessary condition of equilibrium, an independent variable, and “the data” collectively mean the total sum of necessary and sufficient conditions from which, once we know them all, we without further ado can deduce equilibrium price and quantity. In this second sense the distribution of wealth would thus, together with the other data, be a DETERMINANT, though not the only determinant, of the prices and quantities of the various services and products bought and sold.
It will, however, be our main task in the paper to show that the distribution of wealth is not a “datum” in this second sense. Far from being an “independent variable” of the market process, it is, on the contrary, continuously subject to modification by the market forces. Needless to say, this is not to deny that at any moment it is among the forces which shape the path of the market process in the immediate future, but it is to deny that the mode of distribution as such can have any permanent influence. Though wealth is always distributed in some definite way, the mode of this distribution is ever-changing.
Only if the mode of distribution remained the same in period after period, while individual pieces of wealth were being transferred by inheritance, could such a constant mode be said to be a permanent economic force. In reality this is not so. The distribution of wealth is being shaped by the forces of the market as an object, not an agent, and whatever its mode may be today will soon have become an irrelevant bygone.
The distribution of wealth, therefore, has no place among the data of equilibrium. What is, however, of great economic and social interest is not the mode of distribution of wealth at a moment of time, but its mode of change over time. Such change, we shall see, finds its true place among the events that happen on that problematical “path” which may, but rarely in reality does, lead to equilibrium. It is a typically “dynamic” phenomenon. It is a curious fact that at a time when so much is heard of the need for the pursuit and promotion of dynamic studies it should arouse so little interest.
Ownership is a legal concept which refers to concrete material objects. Wealth is an economic concept which refers to scarce resources. All valuable resources are, or reflect, or embody, material objects, but not all material objects are resources: Derelict houses and heaps of scrap are obvious examples, as are any objects which their owners would gladly give away if they could find somebody willing to remove them. Moreover, what is a resource today may cease to be one tomorrow, while what is a valueless object today may become valuable tomorrow. The resource status of material objects is therefore always problematical and depends to some extent on foresight. An object constitutes wealth only if it is a source of an income stream. The value of the object to the owner, actual or potential, reflects at any moment its expected income-yielding capacity. This, in its turn, will depend on the uses to which the object can be turned. The mere ownership of objects, therefore, does not necessarily confer wealth; it is their successful use which confers it. Not ownership but use of resources is the source of income and wealth. An ice-cream factory in New York may mean wealth to its owner; the same ice-cream factory in Greenland would scarcely be a resource.
In a world of unexpected change the maintenance of wealth is always problematical; and in the long run it may be said to be impossible. In order to be able to maintain a given amount of wealth which could be transferred by inheritance from one generation to the next, a family would have to own such resources as will yield a permanent net income stream, i.e., a stream of surplus of output value over the cost of factor services complementary to the resources owned. It seems that this would be possible only either in a stationary world, a world in which today is as yesterday and tomorrow like today, and in which thus, day after day, and year after year, the same income will accrue to the same owners or their heirs; or if all resource owners had perfect foresight. Since both cases are remote from reality we can safely ignore them. What, then, in reality happens to wealth in a world of unexpected change?
All wealth consists of capital assets which, in one way or another, embody or at least ultimately reflect the material resources of production, the sources of valuable output. All output is produced by human labor with the help of combinations of such resources. For this purpose resources have to be used in certain combinations; complementarity is of the essence of resource use. The modes of this complementarity are in no way “given” to the entrepreneurs who make, initiate, and carry out production plans. There is in reality no such thing as A production function. On the contrary, the task of the entrepreneur consists precisely in finding, in a world of perpetual change, which combination of resources will yield, in the conditions of today, a maximum surplus of output over input value, and in guessing which will do so in the probable conditions of tomorrow, when output values, cost of complementary input, and technology all will have changed.
If all capital resources were infinitely versatile the entrepreneurial problem would consist in no more than following the changes of external conditions by turning combinations of resources to a succession of uses made profitable by these changes. As it is, resources have, as a rule, a limited range of versatility, each is specific to a number of uses.1 Hence, the need for adjustment to change will often entail the need for a change in the composition of the resource group, for “capital regrouping.” But each change in the mode of complementarity will affect the value of the component resources by giving rise to capital gains and losses. Entrepreneurs will make higher bids for the services of those resources for which they have found more profitable uses, and lower bids for those which have to be turned to less profitable uses. In the limiting case where no (present or potential future) use can be found for a resource which has so far formed part of a profitable combination, this resource will lose its resource character altogether. But even in less drastic cases capital gains and losses made on durable assets are an inevitable concomitant of a world of unexpected change.
The market process is thus seen to be a leveling process. In a market economy a process of redistribution of wealth is taking place all the time before which those outwardly similar processes which modern politicians are in the habit of instituting, pale into comparative insignificance, if for no other reason than that the market gives wealth to those who can hold it, while politicians give it to their constituents who, as a rule, cannot.
This process of redistribution of wealth is not prompted by a concatenation of hazards. Those who participate in it are not playing a game of chance, but a game of skill. This process, like all real dynamic processes, reflects the transmission of knowledge from mind to mind. It is possible only because some people have knowledge that others have not yet acquired, because knowledge of change and its implications spread gradually and unevenly throughout society.
In this process he is successful who understands earlier than any-one else that a certain resource which today can be produced, when it is new, or bought, when it is an existing resource, at a certain price A, will tomorrow form part of a productive combination as a result of which it will be worth A’. Such capital gains or losses, prompted by the chance of, or need for, turning resources from one use to another, superior or inferior to the first, form the economic substance of what wealth means in a changing world, and are the chief vehicle of the process of redistribution.
In this process it is most unlikely that the same man will continue to be right in his guesses about possible new uses for existing or potential resources time after time, unless he is really superior. And in the latter case his heirs are unlikely to show similar success—unless they are superior, too. In a world of unexpected change capital losses are ultimately as inevitable as are capital gains. Competition between capital owners and the specific nature of durable resources, even though it be “multiple specificity,” entail that gains are followed by losses as losses are followed by gains.
These economic facts have certain social consequences. As the critics of the market economy nowadays prefer to take their stand on “social” grounds, it may be not inappropriate here to elucidate the true social results of the market process. We have already spoken of it as a leveling process. More aptly, we may now describe these results as an instance of what Pareto called “the circulation of elites.” Wealth is unlikely to stay for long in the same hands. It passes from hand to hand as unforeseen change confers value now on this, now on that specific resource, engendering capital gains and losses. The owners of wealth, we might say with Schumpeter, are like the guests at a hotel or the passengers in a train: They are always there but are never for long the same people.
It may be objected that our argument applies in any case only to a small segment of society and that the circulation of elites does not eliminate social injustice. There may be such circulation among wealth owners, but what about the rest of society? What chance  have those without wealth of even participating, let alone winning, in the game? This objection, however, would ignore the part played by managers and entrepreneurs in the market process, a part to which we shall soon have to return.
In a market economy, we have seen, all wealth is of a problematical nature. The more durable assets are and the more specific, the more restricted the range of uses to which they may be turned, the more clearly the problem becomes visible. But in a society with little fixed capital in which most accumulated wealth took the form of stocks of commodities, mainly agricultural and perishable, carried for periods of various lengths, a society in which durable consumer goods, except perhaps for houses and furniture, hardly existed, the problem was not so clearly visible. Such was, by and large, the society in which the classical economists were living and from which they naturally borrowed many traits. In the conditions of their time, therefore, the classical economists were justified, up to a point, in regarding all capital as virtually homogeneous and perfectly versatile, contrasting it with land, the only specific and irreproducible resource. But in our time there is little or no justification for such dichotomy. The more fixed capital there is, and the more durable it is, the greater the probability that such capital resources will, before they wear out, have to be used for purposes other than those for which they were originally designed. This means practically that in a modern market economy there can be no such thing as a source of permanent income. Durability and limited versatility make it impossible.
It may be asked whether in presenting our argument we have not confused the capital owner with the entrepreneur, ascribing to the former functions which properly belong to the latter. Is not the decision about the use of existing resources as well as the decision which specifies the concrete form of new capital resources, viz. the investment decision, a typical entrepreneurial task? Is it not for the entrepreneur to regroup and redeploy combinations of capital goods? Are we not claiming for capital owners the economic functions of the entrepreneur?
We are not primarily concerned with claiming functions for anybody. We are concerned with the effects of unexpected change on asset values and on the distribution of wealth. The effects of such change will fall upon the owners of wealth irrespective of where the change originates. If the distinction between capitalist and entrepreneur could always easily be made, it might be claimed that the continuous redistribution of wealth is the result of entrepreneurial action, a process in which capital owners play a merely passive part. But that the process really occurs, that wealth is being redistributed by the market, cannot be doubted, nor that the process is prompted by the transmission of knowledge from one center of entrepreneurial action to another. Where capital owners and entrepreneurs can be clearly distinguished, it is true that the owners of wealth take no active part in the process themselves, but passively have to accept its results.
Yet there are many cases in which such a clear-cut distinction cannot be made. In the modern world wealth typically takes the form of securities. The owner of wealth is typically a shareholder. Is the shareholder an entrepreneur? Professor Knight asserts that he is, but a succession of authors from Walter Rathenau2 to Mr. Burnham have denied him that status. The answer depends, of course, on our definition of the entrepreneur. If we define him as an uncertainty-bearer, it is clear that the shareholder is an entrepreneur. But in recent years there seems to be a growing tendency to define the entrepreneur as the planner and decision-maker. If so, directors and managers are entrepreneurs, but shareholders, it seems, are not.
Yet we have to be careful in drawing our conclusions. One of the most important tasks of the entrepreneur is to specify the concrete form of capital resources, to say what buildings are to be erected, what stocks to be kept, etc. If we are clearly to distinguish between capitalist and entrepreneur we must assume that a “pure” entrepreneur, with no wealth of his own, borrows capital in money form, i.e., in a non-specific form, from “pure” capital owners.3
But do the directors and managers at the top of the organizational ladder really make all the specifying decisions? Are not many such decisions made “lower down” by works managers, supervisors, etc.? Is it really at all possible to indicate “the entrepreneur” in a world in which managerial functions are so widely spread?
On the other hand, the decision of a capital owner to buy new shares in company A rather than in company B is also a specifying decision. In fact this is the primary decision on which all the managerial decisions within the firm ultimately depend, since without capital there would be nothing for them to specify. We have to realize, it seems, that the specifying decisions of shareholders, directors, managers, etc., are in the end all mutually dependent upon each other, are but links in a chain. All are specifying decisions distinguished only by the degree of concreteness which increases as we are moving down the organizational ladder. Buying shares in company A is a decision which gives capital a form less concrete than does the decision of the workshop manager as to which tools are to be made, but it is a specifying decision all the same, and one which provides the material basis for the workshop manager’s action. In this sense we may say that the capital owner makes the “highest” specifying decision.
The distinction between capital owner and entrepreneur is thus not always easily made. To this extent, then, the contrast between the active entrepreneurs, forming and redeploying combinations of capital resources, and the passive asset owners, who have to accept the verdict of the market forces on the success of “their” entrepreneurs, is much overdrawn. Shareholders, after all, are not quite defenseless in these matters. If they cannot persuade their directors to refrain from a certain step, there is one thing they can do: They can sell!
But what about bondholders? Shareholders may make capital gains and losses; their wealth is visibly affected by market forces. But bondholders seem to be in an altogether different position. Are they not owners of wealth who can claim immunity from the market forces we have described, and thus from the process of redistribution?
In the first place, of course, the difference is merely a matter of degree. Cases are not unknown in which, owing to failure of plans, inefficiency of management, or to external circumstances which had not been foreseen, bondholders had to take over an enterprise and thus became involuntary shareholders. It is true, however, that most bondholders are wealth owners who stand, as it were, at one remove from the scene we have endeavored to describe, from the source of changes which are bound to affect most asset values, though it is not true of all of them. Most of the repercussions radiating from this source will have been, as it were, intercepted by others before they reach the bondholders. The higher the “gear” of a company’s capital, the thinner the protective layer of the equity, the more repercussions will reach the bondholders, and the more strongly they will be affected. It is thus quite wrong to cite the case of the bondholder in order to show that there are wealth owners exempt from the operation of the market forces we have  described. Wealth owners as a class can never be so exempt, though some may be relatively more affected than others.
Furthermore, there are two cases of economic forces engendering capital gains and losses from which, in the nature of these cases, the bondholder cannot protect himself, however thick the protective armor of the equity may happen to be: the rate of interest and inflation. A rise in long-term rates of interest will depress bond values where equity holders may still hope to recoup themselves by higher profits, while a fall will have the opposite effect. Inflation transfers wealth from creditors to debtors, whereas deflation has the opposite effect. In both cases we have, of course, instances of that redistribution of wealth with which we have become acquainted. We may say that with a constant long-term rate of interest and with no change in the value of money, the susceptibility of bondholders’ wealth to unexpected change will depend on their relative position as against equity holders, their “economic distance” from the center of disturbances; while interest changes and changes in the value of money will modify that relative position.
The holders of government bonds, of course, are exempt from many of the repercussions of unexpected change, but by no means from all of them. To be sure, they do not need the protective armor of the equity to shield them against the market forces which modify prices and costs. But interest changes and inflation are as much of a threat to them as to other bondholders. In the world of permanent inflation in which we are now living, to regard wealth in the form of government securities as not liable to erosion by the forces of change would be ludicrous. But in any case the existence of a government debt is not a result of the operation of market forces. It is the result of the operation of politicians eager to save their constituents from the task of having to pay taxes they would otherwise have had to pay.
The main fact we have stressed in this paper, the redistribution of wealth caused by the forces of the market in a world of unexpected change, is a fact of common observation. Why, then, is it constantly being ignored? We could understand why the politicians choose to ignore it: After all, the large majority of their constituents are unlikely to be directly affected by it, and, as is amply shown in the case of inflation, would scarcely be able to understand it if they were. But why should economists choose to ignore it? That the mode of the distribution of wealth is a result of the operation of economic forces is the kind of proposition which, one would think, appeal to them. Why, then, do so many economists continue to  regard the distribution of wealth as a “datum” in the second sense mentioned above? We submit that the reason has to be sought in an excessive preoccupation with equilibrium problems.
We saw before that the successive modes of the distribution of wealth belong to the world of disequilibrium. Capital gains and losses arise in the main because durable resources have to be used in ways for which they were not planned, and because some men understand better and earlier than other men what the changing needs and resources of a world in motion imply. Equilibrium means consistency of plans, but the redistribution of wealth by the market is typically a result of inconsistent action. To those trained to think in equilibrium terms it is perhaps only natural that such processes as we have described should appear to be not quite “respectable.” For them the “real” economic forces are those which tend to establish and maintain equilibrium. Forces only operating in disequilibrium are thus regarded as not really very interesting and are therefore all too often ignored. There may be two reasons for such neglect. No doubt a belief that a tendency towards equilibrium does exist in reality and that, in any conceivable situation, the forces tending towards equilibrium will always be stronger than the forces of resistance, plays a part in it.
But an equally strong reason, we may suspect, is the inability of economists preoccupied with equilibria to cope at all with the forces of disequilibrium. All theory has to make use of coherent models. If one has only one such model at one’s disposal a good many phenomena that do not seem to fit into one’s scheme are likely to remain unaccounted for. The neglect of the process of redistribution is thus not merely of far-reaching practical importance in political economy since it prevents us from understanding certain features of the world in which we are living. It is also of crucial methodological significance to the central area of economic thought.
We are not saying, of course, that the modern economist, so learned in the grammar of equilibrium, so ignorant of the facts of the market, is unable or unready to cope with economic change; that would be absurd. We are saying that he is well-equipped only to deal with types of change that happen to conform to a fairly rigid pattern. In most of the literature currently in fashion change is conceived as a transition from one equilibrium to another, i.e., in terms of comparative statics. There are even some economists who, having thoroughly misunderstood Cassel’s idea of a “uniformly progressive economy,” cannot conceive of economic progress in any other way!4 Such smooth transition from one equilibrium (long-run or short-run) to another virtually bars not only discussion of the process in which we are interested here, but of all true economic processes. For such smooth transition will only take place where the new equilibrium position is already generally known and anticipated before it is reached. Where this is not so, a process of trial and error (Walras’ “tâtonnements”) will start which in the end may or may not lead to a new equilibrium position. But even where it does, the new equilibrium finally reached will not be that which would have been reached immediately had everybody anticipated it at the beginning, since it will be the cumulative result of the events which took place on the “path” leading to it. Among these events changes in the distribution of wealth occupy a prominent place.
Professor Lindahl5 has recently shown to what extent Keynes’ analytical model is vitiated by his apparent determination to squeeze a variety of economic forces into the Procrustean bed of short-period equilibrium analysis. Keynes, while he wished to describe the modus operandi of a number of dynamic forces, cast his model in the mold of a system of simultaneous equations, though the various forces studied by him clearly belonged to periods of different length. The lesson to be learned here is that once we allow ourselves to ignore fundamental facts about the market, such as differential knowledge, some people understanding the meaning of an event before others, and in general, the temporal pattern of events, we shall be tempted to express “immediate” effects in short-period equilibrium terms. And all too soon we shall also allow ourselves to forget that what is of real economic interest are not the equilibria, even if they exist, which is in any case doubtful, but what happens between them. “An auxiliary makeshift employed by the logical economists as a limiting notion”6 can produce rather disastrous results when it is misemployed.
The preoccupation with equilibrium ultimately stems from a confusion between subject and object, between the mind of the observer and the minds of the actors observed. There can, of course, be no systematic science without a coherent frame of reference, but we can hardly expect to find such coherence as our frame of reference requires ready-made for us in the situations we observe. It is, on the contrary, our task to produce it by analytical effort. There are, in the social sciences, many situations which are interesting to us precisely because the human actions in them are inconsistent with each other, and in which coherence, if at all, is ultimately produced by the interplay of mind on mind. The present paper is devoted to the study of one such situation. We have endeavored to show that a social phenomenon of some importance can be understood if presented in terms of a process reflecting the interplay of mind on mind, but not otherwise. The model-builders, econometric and otherwise, naturally have to avoid such themes.
It is very much to be hoped that economists in the future will show themselves less inclined than they have been in the past to look for ready-made, but spurious, coherence, and that they will take a greater interest in the variety of ways in which the human mind in action produces coherence out of an initially incoherent situation.
On Freedom and Free Enterprise: Essays in Honor of Ludwig von Mises

Tuesday, November 6, 2012

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Gold and Silver (via http://www.economicnoise.com)

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Confidence is A Con Man’s First Name And Government’s Last Scam (via http://www.economicnoise.com)

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The Deflation-Inflation Alternate Routes to Depression (via http://www.economicnoise.com)

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The End Is Near (via http://www.economicnoise.com)

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Rooster Economics (via http://www.economicnoise.com)

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