Sunday, July 8, 2012

Inflation Is Worldwide

THE EPIDEMIC OF INFLATION IS NOT MERELY AMERIcan but worldwide. And in most countries it is growing more virulent.

The First National City Bank of New York keeps score annually. Its table published in August, 1968, shows the currency depreciation in 45 countries, in 1967 and over the preceding 10 years, as measured by cost-of-living indices.

The table shows that in every one of the 45 countries the purchasing power of the monetary unit declined in the 10-year period 1957-67, and that the rate of decline in the value of money in 1967 exceeded the 10-year average in 27 of those countries. The median rate of depreciation in the 45 countries in 1967 was 3.8 per cent, compared with a median rate of 3.3 per cent a year for the decade as a whole.

The buying power of the United States dollar suffered a rate of shrinkage of 2.7 per cent in 1967, compared with an average rate of 1.7 per cent a year over the past decade. (The dollar’s purchasing power shrank by 4.0 per cent during 1968.)

At the end of 1967 the United States dollar bought only 84 per cent as much as it bought 10 years before. On the same 10-year basis of comparison Canada’s currency bought only 82 per cent as much, Belgium’s 80, West Germany’s 79, Switzerland’s 76, the United Kingdom’s 75, Holland’s 73, Italy’s 71, Sweden’s 69, Japan’s 66, France’s 62, India’s 54, Spain’s 50, Vietnam’s 31, Chile’s 11, Argentina’s 6, and Brazil’s only 2 per cent as much.

The three countries with the worst records were Latin American countries; but so, remarkably, were the three countries with the best records. These were Guatemala, whose currency in 1967 still bought 99 per cent as much as it did 10 years before; El Salvador, whose currency bought 94 per cent as much; and Venezuela, whose currency bought 88 per cent as much.

This contrast shows that the extent of inflation has nothing to do with the wealth or resources of a country. It is certainly not the result of a “scarcity of goods.” It is true that Argentina and Brazil are not outstandingly rich countries, but the nations that suffered from inflation least, Guatemala and El Salvador, are among the poorest in the world.

The truth is that inflation is always the result of governmental policy. It is a consequence of printing too much money.

If the Citibank’s table had compared not only the extent of the fall in buying power of each of the 45 countries’ currencies, but also the respective increases in the amount of money issued by each country, this fact would have been made clear. Digging these comparisons out myself from the monthly publication of the International Monetary Fund, International Monetary Statistics, I find that in Guatemala, for example, the supply of currency was increased from 120 million quetzales in 1957 to 157 million in 1967, a rise of only 31 per cent. In Brazil, by contrast, the supply of money was increased from 291 million new cruzeiros in 1957 to 19,593 million in 1967, a rise of 6,633 per cent. This is sufficient explanation of the fact that the Guatemalan currency lost only 1 per cent of its purchasing power in the 10-year period while the Brazilian currency lost 98 per cent of its former purchasing power. Similar comparisons could be made for the other countries.

The governments that have done most to expand their issuance of money have done so, or have “had” to do so, because they plunged into welfare schemes and socialistic programs that brought on enormous chronic budget deficits.

In their rush to bring perpetual prosperity and to “end poverty” in their own lands they have eroded the value of their own people’s savings and left millions of their most hard-working and thrifty citizens facing the specter of poverty.


Man vs. The Welfare State

Saturday, July 7, 2012

Uruguay: Welfare State Gone Wild



IF THERE WERE A NOBEL PRIZE FOR THE MOST EXtreme or worst example of the welfare state (and if the outright Communist states of Russia and China were made ineligible), which country has done most to earn it?

The decision would be a hard one. Among the outstanding candidates would be Britain, France, Sweden, and India. But the British case, though the most familiar, is certainly not the worst; it is the most discussed and most deplored because of the former eminence of Britain in the world.

The tragedy certainly reaches its greatest dimensions in India, with much of its 500 million population always on the verge of famine, and kept there by an incredible mixture of economic controls, planning, welfarism and socialism, imposed by its central and state governments. We have already discussed a few of India’s sins of commission and omission in Chapter 9. However, India has always been a poverty-stricken country, periodically swept by drought or floods resulting in human misery on a catastrophic scale, and it is often difficult to calculate just how much worse off its governmental policies have made it.

Perhaps the most dramatic example of a country needlessly ruined by “welfare” policies is Uruguay. Here is a country only about a third larger than the state of Wisconsin, with a population of only about 2.8 million. Yet that population is predominantly of European origin, with a literacy rate estimated at 90 per cent. It was once so distinguished for its high living standards and good management that it was frequently referred to as “the Switzerland of Latin America.”

Uruguay adopted an elaborate state pension system as early as 1919. But its major troubles seem to have begun after March, 1952, when the office of president was abolished, and Uruguay was governed by a nine-man national council elected for a four-year term, six members of which belonged to the majority party and three to the leading minority party. All nine were given equal power.
What is so discouraging about the example of Uruguay is not only that its welfare programs persisted, but that they became more extreme in spite of the successive disasters to which they led. The story seems so incredible that instead of telling it in my own words, I prefer to present it as a series of snapshots taken by different first-hand observers at intervals over the years.

The first snapshot I present is one taken by Karel Norsky in the Manchester Guardian Weekly of July 12, 1956:

Uruguay today offers the sad spectacle of a sick Welfare State. It is living in a Korean boomday dream. . . . No politician comes out with the home truth that this country’s wide range of welfare services has to be paid for with funds which have to be earned. Demagogy is used as a sedative. The result is that the foreign payments deficit is increasing, internal debt soaring, wage demands accumulating, prices rising, and the Uruguayan peso rapidly depreciating. Nepotism is rife. Now one in every three citizens in Montevideo, which accounts for a third of the country’s 3 million inhabitants, is a public servant, draws a small salary, is supposed to work half a day in a Government office, and more often than not spends the rest of his time doing at least one other job in a private enterprise. . . . Corruption is by no means absent. . . .

The foreign payments deficit has been running at a monthly rate of about 5 million pesos. The public servants are asking for a substantial increase in salaries. The meat-packing workers are on strike for higher pay and a “guaranteed” amount of a daily ration of four pounds of meat well below market price. . . .

No politician here can hope to get a majority by advocating austerity, harder work, and the sacrifice of even some of the Welfare State features.

I should like to pause here to underline this last paragraph, for it illustrates what is perhaps the most ominous aspect of the welfare state everywhere. This is that once a subsidy, pension, or benefit payment is extended to any group, it is immediately regarded as a “right.” No matter what the crisis facing the budget or the currency, it becomes “politically impossible” to discontinue or reduce it. We will find this repeatedly illustrated in Uruguay.

The next snapshot I present was taken by S. J. Rundt & Associates of New York nearly seven years later, in April, 1963:

In one of his first statements the new President of the National Council admitted that Uruguay is practically bankrupt. . . . He made it pretty clear, however, that the country’s welfare system of long standing will remain more or less unchanged.

The “social laboratory of the Americas,” Uruguay has launched a legislative program which goes much further toward the complete “welfare state” than any similar plan in this hemisphere. . . . The government grants family allowances based on the number of children; employees cannot be dismissed without proper indemnification; both men and women vote at the age of 18. . . .

An elaborate and all-encompassing state pension system was introduced as early as 1919. Financed by payroll deductions of 14 to 17 per cent, which must be matched by employers, a pension is available to any Uruguayan at the age of 55 after 30 years of work, or at 60 after 10 years. At retirement, the worker draws his highest salary, plus what has been deducted for pensions. . . . Employees obtain free medical service and are entitled to 20 days of annual vacation with pay. The government takes care of expectant and nursing mothers.

The overwhelming expenses of a super-welfare state (where nearly one-fifth of the population is dependent on government salaries) and the uncertain income from a predominantly livestock and agricultural economy have left their marks. Today, Uruguay is in severe financial and fiscal stress. . . .
Inflation is rampant. . . . Local production has declined sharply. Unemployment has risen. There are many severe strikes. Income from tourism has fallen off markedly. . . .

So far as exchange controls and import restrictions are concerned, Uruguay has tried them all. . . .
In an effort to prevent another buying spree in 1963, the new Administration decreed an import ban for 90 days on a wide array of goods considered non-essential. . . . All told, the ban applies to about one-third of all Uruguayan importations. . . . The smuggling of goods, mainly from Brazil and Argentina, has become one of the foremost headaches of Montevideo planners. . . .

Capital flight during 1963 is estimated at between $40 million and $50 million. . . .

The budget deficit in 1961 nearly doubled to 210 million pesos. The situation turned from bad to worse in 1962 when the Treasury recorded the largest deficit in 30 years. . . . Press reports cite a red figure of 807 million pesos. The Treasury is said to owe by now nearly 700 million pesos to the pension funds and roughly a billion pesos to Banco de la República. The salaries of public officials are at least one month behind schedule. . . .

Labor costs in Uruguay, the Western Hemisphere’s foremost welfare state, are high. The many contributions toward various social benefits—retirement, family allotments, sickness, maternity, accident, and unemployment insurance—vary from industry to industry, but the general average for industry as a whole is at least 50 per cent of the payroll. In some sectors, the percentage is much higher. . . .

Social unrest is rising. . . . Widespread and costly strikes have become the order of the day. As a rule, they involve demands for pay hikes, sometimes as high as 50 per cent.

Our third snapshot was taken by Sterling G. Slappey in Nation’s Business magazine four years later, in April, 1967:
Montevideo—Two hundred imported buses are rusting away on an open dock while Uruguayan government bureaucrats bicker with each other over payment of port charges. The buses have not moved in nearly four years.

Scores of men listed under false female names receive regular government handouts through Uruguay’s socialized hospitals. They are listed as “wet nurses.”

At many government offices there are twice as many public servants as there are desks and chairs. The trick is to get to work early so you won’t have to stand during the four to six hour workday that Uruguayan bureaucrats enjoy.

It is rather common for government workers to retire on full pay at 45. It is equally common to collect on one retirement while holding a second job or to hold a job while collecting unemployment compensation. These are a few of the facts of life in Uruguay—a nation gone wild over the welfare state. . . .

Between 40 and 45 per cent of the 2.6 million people in this once affluent land are now dependent on the government for their total income. These include youthful “pensioners” who have no great problem getting themselves fired or declared redundant, thereby qualifying for large retirement benefits. . . .
At any given moment eight to ten strikes are going on, in a nation which until fifteen years ago called itself “the Switzerland of Latin America” because its people were so industrious, busy and neat. Montevideo is now one of the world’s filthiest cities outside the Orient. The people have so little pride left they litter their streets with paper and dump their nastiest garbage on the curb. . . .

Besides controlling meat and wool production and supplying meat to Montevideo, the government also entirely operates:
Fishing; seal catching; alcohol production; life and accident insurance; the PTT—post office, telephone and telegraph; petroleum and kerosene industry; airlines; railroads; tug boats; gambling casinos; lotteries; theaters; most hospitals; television and radio channels; three official banks; the largest transit company. . . .

In 1950 the Uruguayan peso, South America’s most solid coin, was worth 50 cents. During a six-day period last February, the value of the peso slumped from 72 to the $1 to 77.
Cost of living went up 88 per cent in 1965. During 1966 the increase was something like 40 to 50 per cent.

To keep pace the government has increased its spending, ground out more paper money and lavishly passed out huge pay raises—some as high as 60 per cent a year. . . .

One fiscal expert diagnoses Uruguay’s troubles as “English sickness” which, he says, means trying to get as much as possible out of the community while contributing as little as possible towards it.
Until President Gestido took over, Uruguay had been ruled for fifteen years by a nine-member council in a collegiate system of government. It was idealistic, unworkable and rather silly from the start. It quickly fragmented, making the government a coalition of seven different groups. Every year a different member of the council took over as president, or council chief.


The collegiate system was a Tammany Hall patronage-type of group. Instead of each party watching the opposition, all took care of their friends and got their cousins government sinecures.
The western world has rarely seen such patronage, nepotism, favoritism.

The return to a presidential system brought hopes that Uruguay’s extreme welfarism could now be mitigated. But here is our fourth snapshot, taken by C. L. Sulzberger for the New York Times of October 11, 1967:

Montevideo—Contemporary England or Scandinavia might well take a long southwesterly look at Uruguay while murmuring: “There but for the grace of God go I.” For Uruguay is the welfare state gone wild, and this fact, at last acknowledged by the government, brought about today’s political crisis and the declaration of a state of emergency.

This is the only country in the Western Hemisphere where the kind of democratic socialism practiced in Norway, Labor Britain or New Zealand has been attempted. Alas, thanks to warped conceptions and biased application, the entire social and economic structure has been set askew. Here charity begins at home. One out of three adults receives some kind of pension. Forty per cent of the labor force is employed by the state. Political parties compete to expand a ridiculously swollen bureaucracy which only works a thirty-hour week. . . .

The cost of living has multiplied 32 times in the past decade. Gross national production has actually declined 9 per cent and this year will take a nose dive. . . .

Instead of having one President, like the Swiss they elected a committee and, not being Swiss, the Uruguayans saw to it the committee couldn’t run the country. The result was a system of self-paralysis. . . .

Anyone can retire on full salary after thirty years on the job, but with full salary worth one thirty-second of its worth ten years ago, the pension isn’t very helpful. To compound the confusion, trade unions make a habit of striking. Right now the bank employes refuse to handle government checks so neither wage-earners nor pension-receivers get paid. . . .

This was a needless tragedy. Uruguay has proportionately more literacy and more doctors than the United States. It is underpopulated and has a well-developed middle class. . . .

Uruguay should serve as a warning to other welfare states.

Our fifth snapshot was taken by S. J. Rundt & Associates on August 6, 1968:
The mess continues . . . and seems to perpetuate itself. . . . The government is getting tougher and Uruguayans more obstreperous. The powerful and sharply leftist, Communistled 400,000 member CNT (National Workers Convention) is on and off 24-hour work stoppages in protest against the lid clamped on pay boosts by the price, wage and dividend freeze decreed on June 28. . . . The currently severe six-month drought has brought a gloomy brownout, after a 50 per cent reduction in electric power use was decreed. . . . The near-darkness helps sporadic anti-government rioting and terrorist activities. A leading pro-government radio transmitter was destroyed by bombs. . . . Last year there were 500 strikes; the dismal record will surely be broken in 1968. . . .

Of a population of around 2.6 million, the number of gainfully active Uruguayans is at the most 900,000. Pensioners number in excess of 300,000. Months ago the unemployed came to 250,000, or almost 28 per cent of the work force, and the figure must now be higher. . . .

The government closed at least three supermarkets and many stores for having upped prices, as well as such institutions as private hospitals that had violated the wage-price freeze decree. But despite rigid press censorship and Draconian anti-riot and anti-strike ukases, threatening punishment by military tribunals, calm fails to return.

Our sixth and final snapshot of a continuing crisis is from a New York Times dispatch of January 21, 1969:
Striking Government employes rioted in downtown Montevideo today, smashing windows, setting up flaming barricades and sending tourists fleeing in panic. The police reported that one person had been killed and 32 injured.

The demonstrators acted in groups of 30 to 50, racing through a 30-block area, snarling traffic with their barricades, and attacking buses and automobiles. The police fought back with tear gas, high-pressure water hoses and clubs. . . .

The striking civil servants were demanding payment of monthly salary bonuses of $24, which they say is two months overdue.

These six snapshots, taken at different intervals over a period of thirteen years, involve considerable repetition; but the repetition is part of the point. The obvious reforms were never made.

Here are a few salient statistics to show what was happening between the snapshots:
In 1965 consumer prices increased 88 per cent over those in the preceding year. In 1966 they increased 49 per cent over 1965. In 1967 they increased 136 per cent over 1966. By August, 1968, they had increased 61 per cent over 1967.

The average annual commercial rate of interest was 36 per cent in 1965. In 1966, 1967, and August, 1968, it ranged between 32 and 50 per cent.

The volume of money increased from 2,924 million pesos in 1961 to 10,509 in 1965, 13,458 in 1966, 30,163 in 1967, and 40,738 million pesos in August, 1968.

In 1961 there were 11 pesos to the American dollar. In 1965 there were 60; in 1966 there were 70; in early 1967 there were 86; at the end of 1967 there were 200, and in April, 1968, there were 250.

Uruguay’s warning to the United States, and to the world, is that governmental welfarism, with its ever-increasing army of pensioners and other beneficiaries, is fatally easy to launch and fatally easy to extend, but almost impossible to bring to a halt—and quite impossible politically to reverse, no matter how obvious and catastrophic its consequences become. It leads to runaway inflation, to state bankruptcy, to political disorder and disintegration, and finally to repressive dictatorship. Yet no country ever seems to learn from the example of another.







Man vs. The Welfare State

Friday, July 6, 2012

Government As Prosperity-Maker

IN A SPEECH IN DECEMBER, 1967, GILBERT W. Fitzhugh, chairman of the board of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, neatly stuck a pin in the pretensions of “the new breed” of economists.

I shall risk ostracism [he said] by questioning the basic premises of the thesis that government planners can fine-tune the economy to such an extent as to assure steady growth in employment and productivity . . . while at the same time maintaining a sound dollar. These premises seem to be:

1. Economists now have sufficiently accurate information to predict whether the government should be pursuing expansionary or restraining policies;

2. This information is available in time to be of practical use;

3. The fallible human beings who make the decisions for the government based on these data will make the right decision based on economics rather than politics; and

4. That these decisions will be made promptly at the right time.

Does recent history give us confidence that any of these four premises, much less all of them, will be met in this practical world of ours? On the contrary, is there not some reason to feel that government actions in recent years have been more unstabilizing than stabilizing?

Mr. Fitzhugh’s doubts were not only justified, but understated.

One of the premises of the “new economists” is that the government bureaucrats in charge of “keeping the economy on an even keel” are not only capable of forecasting future business conditions (or forecasting what they would be in the absence of timely governmental intervention), but are capable of forecasting them consistently better than private business. In fact, a chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers once informed me that without him the American economy would be “flying blind.”

One of the elementary facts that the would-be economic fine-tuners overlook is that most of the chief statistics on which they rely are not known until a month or two after the conditions they record. Even the latest statistics, in other words, only tell us what past conditions were, not what present conditions are, much less what they will be. And when some major economic event occurs—like the devaluation of the British pound by 14 per cent in November, 1967—our government economists, like the rest of us, don’t know about it until after it happens.

The only way government bureaucrats know of keeping prosperity going is to inflate some more—to increase the deficit or to pump more money into the system.

They proudly claim credit for a good result. But when the inflation begins to get out of hand, when the deficit in the balance of payments mounts, when the integrity of the dollar is threatened, they disclaim all responsibility. They explain that it is politically impossible to cut back government spending and would precipitate a crisis to stop expanding the supply of paper money. The only remedy they suggest is to raise taxes still further to pay for their own past extravagances.

They denounce the banks for raising interest rates. They denounce business for raising prices and for investing abroad. In brief, they denounce private enterprise for the consequences of their own reckless policies and demand still more governmental controls.





Man vs. The Welfare State

Thursday, July 5, 2012

Government Planning vs. Economic Growth




WHEN WE DISCUSS “ECONOMIC PLANNING,” WE MUST be clear concerning what it is we are talking about. The real question being raised is not: plan or no plan? but whose plan?
Each of us, in his private capacity, is constantly planning for the future: what he will do the rest of today, the rest of the week, or on the weekend; what he will do this month or next year. Some of us are planning, though in a more general way, ten or twenty years ahead.

We are making these plans in our capacity both as consumers and as producers. Employees are either planning to stay where they are, or to shift from one job to another, or from one company to another, or from one city to another, or even from one career to another. Entrepreneurs are either planning to stay in one location or to move to another, to expand or contract their operations, to stop making a product for which they think demand is dying and to start making one for which they think demand is going to grow.

Now the people who call themselves Economic Planners either ignore or by implication deny all this. They talk as if the world of private enterprise, the free market, supply, demand, and competition, were a world of chaos and anarchy, in which nobody ever planned ahead, but merely drifted or staggered along. I once engaged in a television debate with an eminent Planner in a high official position who implied that without his forecasts and guidance American business would be “flying blind.” At best, the Planners imply, the world of private enterprise is one in which everybody works or plans at cross-purposes or makes his plans solely in his “private” interest rather than in the “public” interest.
Now the Planner wants to substitute his own plan for the plans of everybody else. At best, he wants the government to lay down a Master Plan to which everybody else’s plan must be subordinated.

Planning Means Compulsion
It is this aspect of Planning to which our attention should be directed: Planning always involves compulsion. This may be disguised in various ways. The government Planners will, of course, try to persuade people that the Master Plan has been drawn up for their own good, and that the only persons who are going to be coerced are those whose plans are “not in the public interest.”

The Planners will say, in the newly fashionable phraseology, that their plans are not “imperative,” but merely “indicative.” They will make a great parade of “democracy,” freedom, cooperation, and noncompulsion by “consulting all groups”—“Labor,” “Industry,” the Government, even “Consumers’ Representatives” — in drawing up the Master Plan and the specific “goals” or “targets.” Of course, if they could really succeed in giving everybody his proportionate weight and voice and freedom of choice, if everybody were allowed to pursue the plan of production or consumption of specific goods and services that he had intended to pursue or would have pursued anyway, then the whole Plan would be useless and pointless, a complete waste of energy and time. The Plan would be meaningful only if it forced the production and consumption of different things or different quantities of things than a free market would have provided. In short, it would be meaningful only insofar as it put compulsion on somebody and forced some change in the pattern of production and consumption.

There are two excuses for this coercion. One is that the free market produces the wrong goods, and that only government Planning and direction can assure the production of the “right” ones. This is the thesis popularized by J. K. Galbraith. The other excuse is that the free market does not produce enough goods, and that only government Planning can speed things up. This is the thesis of the apostles of “economic growth.”

The Galbraith Thesis
Let us take up the “Galbraith” thesis first. I put his name in quotation marks because the thesis long antedates his presentation of it. It is the basis of all the Communist “Five-Year Plans,” which are now aped by a score of socialist nations. While these Plans may consist in setting out some general overall percentage of production increase, their characteristic feature is rather a whole network of specific “targets” for specific industries: there is to be a 25 per cent increase in steel capacity, a 15 per cent increase in cement production, a 12 per cent increase in butter and milk output, and so forth.

There is always a strong bias in these Plans, especially in the Communist countries, in favor of heavy industry, because it gives increased power to make war. In all the Plans, moreover, even in non-Communist countries, there is a strong bias in favor of industrialization, of heavy industry as against agriculture, in the belief that this necessarily increases real income faster and leads to greater national self-sufficiency. It is not an accident that such countries are constantly running into agricultural crises and food famines.

But the Plans also reflect either the implied or explicit moral judgments of the government Planners. The latter seldom plan for an increased production of cigarettes or whiskey or, in fact, of any so-called “luxury” item. The standards are always grim and puritanical. The word “austerity” makes a chronic appearance. Consumers are told that they must“tighten their belts” for a little longer. Sometimes, if the last Plan has not been too unsuccessful, there is a little relaxation: consumers can, perhaps, have a few more motor cars and hospitals and playgrounds. But there is almost never any provision for, say, more golf courses or even bowling alleys. In general, no form of expenditure is approved that cannot be universalized, or at least “majoritized.” And such so-called luxury expenditure is discouraged, even in a so-called “indicative” Plan, by not allowing access by promotors of such projects to bank credit or to the capital markets. At some point government coercion or compulsion comes into play.

This disapproval and coercion may rest on several grounds. Nearly all “austerity” programs stem from the belief, not that the person who wants to make a “luxury” expenditure cannot afford it, but that “the nation” cannot afford it. This involves the assumption that, if I set up a bowling alley or patronize one, I am somehow depriving my fellow citizens of more necessary goods or services. This would be true only on the assumption that the proper thing to do is to tax my so-called surplus income away from me and turn it over to others in the form of money, goods, or services. But if I am allowed to keep my “surplus” income, and am forbidden to spend it on bowling alleys or on imported wine and cheese, I will spend it on something else that is not forbidden. Thus when the British austerity program after World War II prevented an Englishman from consuming imported luxuries, on the ground that “the nation” could not afford the “foreign exchange” or the “unfavorable balance of payments,” officials were shocked to find that the money was being squandered on football pools or dog races. And there is no reason to suppose, in any case, that the “dollar shortage” or the “unfavorable balance of payments” was helped in the least. The austerity program, insofar as it was not enforced by higher income taxes, probably cut down potential exports as much as it did potential imports; and insofar as it was enforced by higher income taxes, it discouraged exports by restricting and discouraging production.

But we come now to the specific Galbraith thesis, growing out of the age-long bureaucratic suspicion of luxury spending, that consumers generally do not know how to spend the income they have earned; that they buy whatever advertisers tell them to buy; that consumers are, in short, boobs and suckers, chronically wasting their money on trivialities, if not on absolute trash. The bulk of consumers also, if left to themselves, show atrocious taste, and crave cerise automobiles with ridiculous tailfins.
The natural conclusion from all this—and Galbraith does not hesitate to draw it—is that consumers ought to be deprived of freedom of choice, and that government bureaucrats, full of wisdom—of course, of a very unconventional wisdom—should make their consumptive choices for them. The consumers should be supplied, not with what they themselves want, but with what bureaucrats of exquisite taste and culture think is good for them. And the way to do this is to tax away from people all the income they have been foolish enough to earn above that required to meet their bare necessities, and turn it over to the bureaucrats to be spent in ways which the latter think would really do people the most good—more and better roads and parks and playgrounds and schools and television programs—all supplied, of course, by government.

“Private” vs. “Public” Sector
And here Galbraith resorts to a neat semantic trick. The goods and services for which people voluntarily spend their own money make up, in his vocabulary, the “private sector” of the economy, while the goods and services supplied to them by the government, out of the income it has seized from them in taxes, make up the “public sector.” Now the adjective “private” carries an aura of the selfish and exclusive, the inward-looking, whereas the adjective “public” carries an aura of the democratic, the shared, the generous, the patriotic, the outward-looking—in brief, the public-spirited. And as the tendency of the expanding welfare state has been, in fact, to take out of private hands and more and more take into its own hands provision of the goods and services that are considered to be most essential and most edifying—roads and water supply, schools and hospitals and scientific research, education, old-age insurance and medical care—the tendency must be increasingly to associate the word “public” with everything that is really necessary and laudable, leaving the “private sector” to be associated merely with the superfluities and capricious wants and vices that are left over after everything that is really important has been taken care of.

If the distinction between the two “sectors” were put in more neutral terms—say, the “private sector” versus the “governmental sector”—the scales would not be so heavily weighted in favor of the latter. In fact, this more neutral vocabulary would raise in the mind of the hearer the question whether certain activities now assumed by the modern welfare state do legitimately or appropriately come within the governmental province. For Galbraith’s use of the word “sector,” “private” or “public,” cleverly carries the implication that the public “sector” is legitimately not only whatever the government has already taken over but a great deal besides. Galbraith’s whole point is that the “public sector” is “starved” in favor of a “private sector” overstuffed with superfluities and trash.

The true distinction, and the appropriate vocabulary, however, would throw an entirely different light on the matter. What Galbraith calls the “private sector” of the economy is, in fact, the voluntary sector; and what he calls the “public sector” is, in fact, the coercive sector. The voluntary sector is made up of the goods and services for which people voluntarily spend the money they have earned. The coercive sector is made up of the goods and services that are provided, regardless of the wishes of the individual, out of the taxes that are seized from him. And as this sector grows at the expense of the voluntary sector, we come to the essence of the welfare state. In this state nobody pays for the education of his own children but everybody pays for the education of everybody else’s children. Nobody pays his own medical bills, but everybody pays everybody else’s medical bills. Nobody helps his elderly parents, but everybody else’s elderly parents. Nobody provides for the contingency of his own unemployment, his own sickness, his own old age, but everybody provides for the unemployment, sickness, or old age of everybody else. The welfare state, as Bastiat put it with uncanny clairvoyance more than a century ago, is the great fiction by which everybody tries to live at the expense of everybody else.


This is not only a fiction; it is bound to be a failure. This is sure to be the outcome whenever effort is separated from reward. When people who earn more than the average have their “surplus,” or the greater part of it, seized from them in taxes, and when people who earn less than the average have the deficiency, or the greater part of it, turned over to them in handouts and doles, the production of all must sharply decline; for the energetic and able lose their incentive to produce more than the average, and the slothful and unskilled lose their incentive to improve their condition.

The Growth Planners
I have spent so much space in analyzing the fallacies of the Galbraithian school of Economic Planners that I have left myself little in which to analyze the fallacies of the Growth Planners. Many of their fallacies are the same; but there are some important differences.

The chief difference is that the Galbraithians believe that a free market economy produces too much (though, of course, they are the “wrong” goods), whereas the Growthmen believe that a free market economy does not produce nearly enough. I will postpone for the moment discussion of some of the statistical errors, gaps, and fallacies in their arguments. Here I want to concentrate on their idea that some form of government direction or coercion can by some strange magic increase production above the level that can be achieved when everybody enjoys economic freedom.

It seems to me self-evident that when people are free, production tends to be, if not maximized, at least optimized. This is because, in a system of free markets and private property, everybody’s reward tends to equal the value of his production. What he gets for his production (and is allowed to keep) is in fact what it is worth in the market. If he wants to double his income in a single year, he is free to try—and may succeed if he is able to double his contribution to production in a single year. If he is content with the income he has—if he feels that he can only get more by excessive effort or risk—he is under no pressure to increase his output. In a free market everyone is free to maximize his satisfactions, whether these consist in more leisure or in more goods.

But along comes the Growth Planner. He finds by statistics (whose trustworthiness and accuracy he never doubts) that the economy has been growing, say, only 2.8 per cent a year. He concludes, in a flash of genius, that a growth rate of 5 per cent a year would be faster. How does he propose to achieve this?

There is among the Growth Planners a profound mystical belief in the power of words. They declare that they “are not satisfied” with a growth rate of a mere 2.8 per cent a year. And once having spoken, they act as if half the job had already been done. If they did not assume this, it would be impossible to explain the deep earnestness with which they argue among themselves whether the growth rate “ought” to be 4 or 5 or 6 per cent. (The only thing they always agree on is that it ought to be greater than whatever it actually is.) Having decided on this magic overall figure, they then proceed either to set specific targets for specific goods (and here they are at one with the Russian Five-Year Planners) or to announce some general recipe for reaching the overall rate.

But why do they assume that setting their magic target rate will increase the rate of production over the existing one? And how is their growth rate supposed to apply as far as the individual is concerned? Is the man who is already making $50,000 a year to be coerced into working for an income of $52,500 next year? Is the man who is making only $5,000 a year to be forbidden to make more than $5,250 next year? If not, what is gained by making a specific “annual growth rate” a governmental “target”? Why not just permit or encourage everybody to do his best, or make his own decision, and let the average “growth” be whatever it turns out to be?

Statistical Fallacies
Now let us get back to some of the statistical errors and fallacies that I mentioned a little while back.
One of them will be plain from what we have just been discussing. This is the fallacy of speaking of a “national” rate of growth. The ambiguity of this should be evident. A gross rate of growth of national income may appear in the official statistics accompanied by an increase in the population of the country. One can have a growth in gross national product (GNP) accompanied by a fall in per capita incomes. Even aside from this, it should be obvious that an average increase in per capita incomes in a country does not necessarily tell us much regarding the fate of individuals. An average increase in per capita incomes may mask a fall in the incomes of some groups if this is more than offset by a rise in the incomes of others. For example, if the rich got richer and the poor got poorer, the average per capita figures might still conceivably show a rise.

Again, there are several pitfalls in dealing with percentage figures. The smaller the base from which we start, the less the absolute increase in the production of anything has to be in order to show a very large percentage increase. To begin with an extreme example, if only one family in a country has a bathtub, and the next year fifty families get one, the rate of growth is 5,000 per cent. But once everybody in that country has a bathtub, net growth may stop. This principle applies to houses, automobiles, radios, television sets, and everything else. From the day of his birth, a boy baby grows in weight an average of 195 per cent in his first year. He never even approaches this record thereafter.

It should not be surprising that there has been found to be a long-run tendency for industrial growth rates to slow down as the level of production in any country gets higher. This results partly from the enlargement of the base, and partly from a physical satiation point in human needs.

Let us take the history of a specific economic product—television. Output of television sets in the United States in 1946 was 7,000. In 1947 this output had risen to 200,000, making a growth rate of 2,757 per cent. In 1948 the United States produced 975,000 sets—making a growth rate of only 387 per cent. In 1949 output rose to 3,029,000 sets—but the growth rate was only 211 per cent. In 1950 production jumped to 7,464,000 sets; but the growth rate now was only 146 per cent. Though output was accelerating enormously in absolute amounts, percentage rates of growth were constantly falling. And after 1950 the rate of growth of annual output for a time stopped entirely. Yet the United States continued to turn out between 6 million and 11 million sets a year—and, of course, now has the highest total number of sets working, old and new, in its history. As of 1967, these were estimated to total 94.2 million. Yet many other countries in the world must now be surpassing the United States’ rate of growth in this particular product. The more backward the country, probably the higher the present growth rate in production or purchase of television sets.

Not Volume but Value
Suppose we turn now to some of the more basic general problems raised in the compilation of total gross national output figures. The first thing we have to remember is that these are not and cannot be purely objective figures. What we are measuring is not physical volume or weight, but value. The statistician is forced to resort to his own arbitrary values. Shall he include, for example, in the national income figures the compensation of burglars, blackmailers, and drug peddlers? How is he to draw the line between what are usually called economic goods and such activities as washing, shaving, and playing for amusement on the piano? Yet such activities do not differ from the same activities carried on for money as services to other people—such as nursing, barbering, and giving concerts. The statistician is forced to include only items that are dealt in on the market.* But this excludes all do-it-yourself activities, which in total are probably enormous, and it excludes all the products of the family economy, including all the activities of housewives. So we get the paradox, for example, that when a man marries his cook, the value of her work disappears from the national income accounts.

But there are further problems. How is the statistician to treat government activities? Official figures practically always do include these in making up the national income accounts. But there is no market test or gauge of their value. Most people would admit that policemen, firemen, and judges make a contribution to the national income equivalent to the cost of their services. But how about a host of bureaucrats whose activities might merely redistribute income, or might actually restrain and disrupt production through imposition or enforcement of unwise regulations?

Again, how do we count government redistribution of income through subsidized housing, farm price supports, Social Security pensions, doles to the unemployed, subsidized medicine, etc.? Most government statisticians count the income that is handed out to the recipients without deducting from the gross national product figures the income that is taxed away from those who are forced to contribute.

To illustrate, let us take an elementary example. Suppose, in a community of three persons, that two persons have an annual income of $3,000 each and the third has no income at all. The community income is $6,000. Now suppose the government levies a tax of a third, or 33 1/3 per cent, on the two persons who have the $3,000 income, and gives the $1,000 that it takes from each of them to the third person. Then these two people have left only an income of $2,000 to match the income of $2,000 given, say, to the unemployed person. The amount of total income in that community is the same as it was before. The disposable income of each person is $2,000; and their total income is $6,000. But many government statisticians would still credit the first two persons with their original earned income of $3,000 each. So that with their earnings of $6,000, plus the $2,000 given to the unemployed person, the three of them would now be credited with a total income of $8,000—an increase of 33 1/3 per cent. Thus redistribution of wealth and social welfare plans almost invariably increase the gross national product estimate.

Measuring Leisure and Liberty
But now we come to still another problem in the statistical measurement and comparison of national income or gross national product figures. All these figures measure national output multiplied by the monetary value of that output. But they do not measure leisure or the satisfactions of leisure. Yet these are primary concerns in individual welfare. In the United States there is, on the average, a forty-hour working week. A couple of generations ago, there was a sixty- or seventy-hour typical working week. Now a community that can turn out its national product in an average week of forty hours is obviously immensely better off in economic satisfactions than another community of equal numbers that turns out the same physical product but requires a seventy-hour average working week to do it. I will not elaborate upon this, but simply point out that it is only one of the considerations that make any precise comparison of national incomes of different countries invalid.

Of course all economic planning, as we have already seen, must necessarily involve compulsion and coercion—in other words, a loss of liberty on the part of the citizens. This loss of liberty is a substantial cost, which some of us would rank very high; but it is never counted by the economic planners. Again, like the loss of leisure, the loss of liberty is another factor that makes statistical comparisons between, say, the GNP of the United States and Soviet Russia misleading and invalid.

All economic planning by a government involves problems of arbitrary allocation, arbitrary quotas for thousands of commodities and services, allocations of work, and allocations of income and consumption. And among the most serious of these, though the Growth Planners almost never mention it, are what we may call intertemporal problems and allocations.* When the Growth Planners decide that we must grow economically 5 or 6 per cent a year, or whatever rate, they are arbitrarily deciding that we are entitled to consume only a certain percentage of our income in any year, and must save and invest the rest in order to have greater production in the future. But is it always and under all conditions desirable to sacrifice the present to the future? Is it always desirable for the present generation to consume less so that people still unborn (whom we do not even know) should consume more? I shall not try to answer this question. I wish merely to point out here that economic growth has a cost—that the higher we wish to make this rate of economic growth, the more we must restrain and constrict consumption in the present to make it possible. This cost is entirely ignored by most of the Growth Planners.


Finally, we have to ask, what is it that is measured by the gross national product figures? What is being measured is the marginal market value of thousands of goods and services, in terms of money, multiplied by the total quantities of such goods and services. (Of course any inflation of the currency will multiply this figure correspondingly without adding an iota to the economic satisfaction that anybody gets. I will come back to this in a moment.) What I wish to point out here is that if we increase the supply of anything (with the money supply remaining constant), the marginal value of that commodity, and hence its price, falls. So if there is no inflation of the currency, an increase in production leads to a fall in prices. And this fall in prices is likely to be much greater proportionately than the increase in production. It has been recognized for many years, for example, that a larger wheat crop will ordinarily have a smaller total dollar market value than a smaller crop. This, in fact, is a basis of all crop restriction schemes. But this merely illustrates a wider principle. It is not “value-in-use,” but scarcity, that determines “value-in-exchange,” or money price. Water is an indispensable commodity that ordinarily commands no price at all. If more and more things became plentiful (except dollars), the national income, as measured in dollars, might begin to fall. And if we could imagine a situation in which everything we could wish for were in as adequate supply as air and water, we might have no (monetary) national income at all!

Inflation vs. Growth
Most of the advocates of economic growth through government action in fact put their major faith in one overall policy—inflation.

This policy, however, is almost never recommended under that name. The Growth Planners simply argue (along Keynesian lines) that growth has been slow or business stagnant because of an “insufficiency of aggregate demand”; and they think this can be rectified by more government spending. Some of these Planners are candid enough openly to advocate government deficits. For they recognize that if the increased government spending is paid for out of increased taxation, then the taxpayers lose exactly as much “purchasing power” as the government gains. They also recognize that if the increased government spending is financed by a bond issue bought by individuals out of real savings, the bondbuyers lose as much purchasing power for other things as the government gains.
They recognize, finally, that if the government raises, say, $10 billion in the investment market, this either leaves just that much less funds available for investment in private industry or pushes up interest rates. And high interest rates, other things being equal, discourage business expansion and investment.
So the only way to get the “increased purchasing power” is to increase the money supply. If a country is already frankly on a paper-money basis, it merely runs the printing presses a little faster. If, like the United States, it is on the semblance of a gold standard, it does this through the central bank. The usual process is for the bank to buy government securities in the open market and “monetize” them.
But does the increase in money supply necessarily promote economic growth? If there is already full employment and no substantial idle capacity, the new money will simply lead to an increase in wages and prices. If there is less than full employment, the new money can, it is true, at least temporarily increase employment if it leads to an increased demand for products or to higher prices for products without also leading to correspondingly increased wage rates.

Those who propose the inflationary solution for unemployment always forget to ask themselves what has caused the unemployment. The long-run cause will always be found to be some discoordination of prices and wages. This can take many forms. Commonly wage rates in some lines will be too high in relation to prices or to the demand for particular products. But wage-price coordination, in such cases, can be restored and maintained if there are free-market wages and free-market prices flexible in both directions. Inflation is not necessary to restore such coordination. Moreover, any price-wage adjustment brought about by inflation is likely to be only temporary. For labor unions, finding more demand for their services, or trying to “catch up” with rising living costs, demand still higher wages, with the result that the discoordination of wages and prices may be brought about all over again, and the situation can be cured once more only by a still further dose of inflation.

As long as the government authorities encourage or tolerate a system that makes it possible for unions constantly to demand and secure uneconomic wage rates, to which prices can be adjusted only by successive doses of inflation, the authorities must encourage the continuance and perpetuation of such discoordination. This must retard economic growth.

Inflation Falsifies Calculation
Inflation is not only unnecessary for economic growth. As long as it exists it is the enemy of economic growth. It distorts and falsifies economic calculation. An economy grows and functions at its maximum rate when the relationship of prices and wages and profits, and the whole balance of production among thousands of different commodities and services are such as to lead toward an equalization of profit margins because of correct anticipations of the relationship of supply and demand, of prices, production and costs.

But when inflation forces up prices, prices do not all rise in the same proportion and at the same rate. It becomes very difficult for business men to distinguish between what is lasting and what is merely temporary, or to know what the real demands of the consumers will be or what the real costs of their own operations are. Orthodox accounting practices will give misleading results. Depreciation and replacement allowances will be inadequate. Profits will be overestimated and overstated. Businessmen everywhere will be deceived. They will be using up their real capital when they think they are increasing it. They will think they have profits or capital gains when they really have losses.
A vital function of the free market is to penalize inefficiency and misjudgment and to reward efficiency and good judgment. By distorting economic calculations and creating illusory profits, inflation will destroy this function. Because nearly everybody will seem to prosper, there will be all sorts of maladjustments and investments in the wrong lines. Honest work and sound production will tend to give way to speculation and gambling. There will be a deterioration in the quality of goods and services and in the real standard of living.

The price and wage rises brought about by inflation will lead to public demands for price and wage controls. The government will be only too receptive to such demands because price and wage controls tacitly put the blame for the inflation on those who are getting the prices and wages rather than on the government’s policies. But these price and wage controls will reduce, distort, and disrupt production, and do far more harm than even the inflation itself.

What is likely even before price control is the institution of some sort of exchange control, to prevent the quotation of the home currency from falling in terms of other currencies. But the effect of such an exchange control, overvaluing the domestic currency, will be to bring about a deficit in the balance of payments. It will discourage exports, because they will be overpriced compared with foreign goods. It will encourage imports. The exchange authorities, to prevent this, will institute a quota and licensing system. But this will disrupt foreign trade.

I have yet to mention what many will consider the most important reason of all why inflation must in the long run retard rather than accelerate economic growth. Its effect must be to discourage monetary savings, and to encourage personal spending on immediate consumption. To this extent it must discourage and reduce capital formation, the principal cause of economic growth.

Of course inflation does temporarily stimulate investment in certain directions. When it is going on it makes nearly every venture look profitable in monetary terms. It therefore provides a strong incitement to reinvestment of profits and to the purchase of equity shares (though not of mortgages and bonds). But, as we have already seen, inflation falsifies all the signals and confuses and distorts economic calculation. What it tends to stimulate is malinvestment. By directing investment into the wrong channels it leads to great waste and must retard properly balanced growth over the long run.
The long-run effect of inflation, in sum, can only be to reduce and distort production and to retard economic growth. Of course this effect can be concealed from many people, perhaps a majority, for a long time. For prices, wages, and incomes will all be constantly going higher in monetary terms. The official gross national product figures will be constantly soaring. The euphoria can temporarily lull all misgivings. But eventually the bitter moment of truth must arrive.

Summary
The way to get a maximum rate of “economic growth”—assuming this to be our aim—is to give maximum encouragement to production, employment, saving, and investment. And the way to do this is to maintain a free market and a sound currency. It is to encourage profits, which must in turn encourage both investment and employment. It is to refrain from oppressive taxation that siphons away the funds that would otherwise be available for investment. It is to allow free wage rates that permit and encourage full employment. It is to allow free interest rates, which would tend to maximize saving and investment.

The way to slow down the rate of economic growth is, of course, precisely the opposite of this. It is to discourage production, employment, saving and investment by incessant interventions, controls, threats, and harassment. It is to frown upon profits, to declare that they are excessive, to file constant antitrust suits, to control prices by law or by threats, to levy confiscatory taxes that discourage new investment and siphon off the funds that make investment possible, to hold down interest rates artificially to the point where real saving is discouraged and malinvestment encouraged, to deprive employers of genuine freedom of bargaining, to grant excessive immunities and privileges to labor unions so that their demands are chronically excessive and chronically threaten unemployment—and then to try to offset all these policies by government spending, deficits, and monetary inflation. But I have just described precisely the policies that most of the fanatical Growthmen advocate.

Their recipe for inducing growth always turns out to be—inflation. This does lead to the illusion of growth, which is measured in their statistics in monetary terms. What the Growthmen do not realize is that the magic of inflation is always a short-run magic, and quickly played out. It can work temporarily and under special conditions—when it causes prices to rise faster than wages and so restores or expands profit margins. But this can happen only in the early stages of an inflation that is not expected to continue. And it can happen even then only because of the temporary acquiescence or passivity of the labor union leaders. The consequences of this short-lived paradise are malinvestment, waste, a wanton redistribution of wealth and income, the growth of speculation and gambling, immorality and corruption, disillusionment, social resentment, discontent, upheaval and riots, bankruptcy, increased governmental controls, and eventual collapse. This year’s euphoria becomes next year’s hangover. Sound long-run growth is always retarded.


Ultimately we must fall back upon an a priori conclusion, yet a conclusion that is confirmed by the whole range of human experience: that when each of us is free to work out his own economic destiny, within the framework of the market economy, the institution of private property, and the general rule of law, we will all improve our economic condition much faster than when we are ordered around by bureaucrats.




Man vs. The Welfare State

Wednesday, July 4, 2012

Soaking the Corporations



PERSONAL INCOME TAX RATES THAT RISE TO THE level of 77 per cent obviously discourage incentives, investment, and production. But no politician raises the point for fear that he will be accused of defending the rich. What is probably an even greater discouragement to new investment and increased production is the present marginal corporation income tax of 52.8 per cent. Yet this gets even less criticism than high personal income taxes. Nobody wants to defend the corporations. They are everybody’s whipping boy. And yet they are the key productive element on which the nation’s income, wealth and economic growth depend.

There was at least some awareness of this until recent years. When the tax on corporation income was first imposed, in 1913, it was at the very cautious rate of 1 per cent. This was also raised very cautiously. Even in World War I the rate was lifted only to 12 per cent. It never got above 15 per cent until 1937. In the midst of World War II it was still only 40 per cent. It did not get to 52 per cent until 1952.

Today such a rate is taken for granted. Yet the people who approve of it, and who suggest maybe it could be a little higher, are the very people who have been complaining most loudly in recent years about the country’s disappointing rate of economic growth.

The steep rate of tax on corporate income gets so little criticism because there is confusion of thought concerning whom it falls on and what are its economic effects. Is the whole tax “absorbed” by the corporation, for instance, or is part or all of it “shifted”?

What happens is somewhat complicated. A corporation is a legal fiction. From an investment standpoint, it consists of its present stockholders. When the tax on corporations is raised above its preceding level, most of the loss falls on existing stockholders in the form of a capital loss—and later of an income loss. If, to simplify, we can imagine a situation in which a corporation were wholly free from taxation, and then suddenly a 50 per cent income tax (assumed to be permanent) were imposed on its future earnings, the price of its shares would tend to fall in the stock market by 50 per cent. The old shareholders would be forced to absorb the loss in capital value and in future income. The new buyers, however, able to buy the stock for half of its former market price, would stand to get the prevailing “normal” return on their capital investment.

Even for the new buyers, however, this would apply only to their original investment. When the corporation management considered any new investment, any corporate expansion, any addition to plant or equipment, it would have to consider the tax. And this would apply, of course, to anybody who thought of launching an entirely new corporation.

The present average tax on all corporations is about 45 per cent. On successful corporations of any size, however, the average rate is close to 52 per cent. Broadly speaking, therefore, when anybody contemplates a new corporate investment, he will not make it unless the investment promises to yield before taxes at least twice as much as the net return he would consider worthwhile. If, for example, he would not consider a new investment worthwhile unless it promised a 10 per cent average annual return on his capital outlay, then it would have to promise a return of 20 per cent on that outlay before taxes.
It is obvious that a corporation income tax in the neighborhood of 50 per cent must drastically reduce the incentive to new investment, and therefore to the consequent increase in jobs, real wages, and economic growth that the politicians are always calling for.

But what is at least as important as reducing the incentive to investment, the present corporate tax reduces the funds available for investment. In 1968, according to estimates of the Department of Commerce, United States corporations earned total profits before taxes of $91.1 billion. Out of this their corporate tax liability was $41.3 billion. This reduced their profits after taxes to $49.8 billion. Out of this sum, in turn, $23.1 billion was paid out in dividends while $26.7 billion was retained in undistributed profits.

This last figure represents the corporations’ own reinvestment of their earnings in working capital, inventories, improvements, new plants and equipment. If there had been no corporate tax, and there had been the same proportionate distribution of profits between dividends and reinvestment, the amount of money reinvested would have been $50.5 billion instead of $26.7 billion—89 per cent, or $23.8 billion, greater. A proportional increase in dividends would have given stockholders about $20 billion more than they actually received. If they reinvest only a fifth of what they receive in dividends, this would make an annual increase in corporate investment in the neighborhood of $25 billion.

Of course certain deductions would have to be made from this figure if we tried to calculate what would be lost from investment by alternate taxes imposed to raise the same revenue. But broadly speaking, the overwhelming bulk of annual government expenditure goes into current consumption rather than in building up the capital formation, the economic strength and wealth-and-income-producing capacity of the country.

A great deal of the complacency about our drastic corporation tax stems from the idea that the tax is somehow “shifted” to others. One common facile assumption is that the corporations just pass the tax along by raising their prices. How they can do this so easily is never explained.
Nor is it prima facie plausible. Every television manufacturer, for instance, must keep his prices competitive with other television manufacturers. Granted, they all pay about the same percentage tax on their net profits. Yet all of them must also keep their prices competitive with those of foreign manufacturers. The same is true of automobile companies and, in fact, of all American companies that either have an export market or must meet competition from imports.

A uniform sales or excise tax (if also imposed on imports) can be passed along uniformly, but not a percentage tax on profits after expenses, because this necessarily means a different tax rate per unit of output on every producer. Its general tendency is to penalize the low-cost efficient producer much more than the high-cost inefficient producer.

There is one reason, however, why over a long period a higher corporate income tax can be passed along in a price rise. This is because the tax may eventually put some manufacturers out of business, prevent others from expanding, and certainly retard the expansion of the rest. It will force those who stay in business to keep decrepit and obsolete machinery much longer than otherwise. It will retard or prevent reduction in costs. It will reduce supply, raise production costs, and make quality and variety poorer than they otherwise would be. The consumers of the country will be more poorly served.
The end result in this case, however, is not so much that the corporate income tax is “shifted” as that an additional burden is placed on the whole country. By discouraging and retarding investment in new machinery and plants, either by existing corporations or by the formation of new corporations, the 52.8 per cent corporation income tax shields existing obsolescent capacity from the competition of the new, more modern and efficient plant and equipment that would otherwise come into existence, or that would come into existence much sooner.

By striking directly at new investment, the present corporate income tax slows down economic growth more directly and surely than does any other tax.

The only study I can at present think of that has adequately explained the devastating effect of the high corporate income tax on investment appeared in a pamphlet by Dr. George Terborgh for the Machinery and Allied Products Institute of Washington in 1959. It left no traceable influence on Congress or the Treasury.

The tax, by hurting business and investment, hurts employment and slows down the increase in productivity and in real wages. In brief, in the long run it hurts most of all the mass of the country’s workers.



Man vs. The Welfare State

Tuesday, July 3, 2012

Soaking the Rich


EVERYWHERE WE TURN TODAY WE FIND THE WELfare state—the state that promises guaranteed jobs, guaranteed incomes, the guaranteed life, security from cradle to grave, the quick if not overnight elimination of poverty. And the principal way in which it undertakes to achieve these goals is to seize from those who have and give to those who have not.
The main instrument it uses for this purpose is the graduated income tax. In the United States this tax has been imposed since 1913. In the beginning it seemed innocent enough. The top rate was only 7 per cent. But in 1925 the top rate had gone to 25 per cent; in 1935 to 63 per cent; in 1940 to 81 per cent; in 1945 to 94 per cent. In the tax cut of 1964 the top rate was reduced to 70 per cent. With the 1968 surcharge it went up again to 77 per cent.
In today’s world these confiscatory rates are not exceptional. The First National City Bank of New York recently compiled a table comparing the highest marginal income tax rates in fifteen countries. The rates (after rounding out fractions) are: Italy 95 per cent, United Kingdom 91, Canada 82, United States 77, France 76, Japan 75, Netherlands 71, Austria 69, Australia 68, Belgium 66, Sweden 65, West Germany 55, Denmark 53, Norway 50, and Switzerland 8.
It would be misleading to assume that these top-rate figures necessarily reflect the overall comparative tax levels in these countries. Italy’s 95 per cent rate applies only to incomes above $800,000, whereas Norway’s 50 per cent rate applies to all incomes above $13,000. Though Sweden’s top income tax rate is in the lower half of the list, Sweden imposes the heaviest comparative tax load in the world.
What the comparisons do show graphically is how almost universal the soak-the-rich tax philosophy has now become. An elaborate rationalization, on grounds of “social justice” and “ability to pay,” has been built up for progressive tax rates since the beginning of this century; but economists are at last beginning to recognize that all arguments in support of progression can be used to justify any degree of progression.
Certainly there is no evidence that the steeply progressive rates have helped the poor. On the contrary, these confiscatory rates clearly undermine incentives, reduce production and capital accumulation, and leave less to be shared by everybody.
The earliest sponsors of the progressive income tax recognized this, but they had other aims in mind. In the Communist Manifesto of 1848, Marx and Engels frankly proposed “a heavy progressive or graduated income tax” as an instrument by which “the proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeois, to centralize all instruments of production in the hands of the State,” and to make “despotic inroads on the right of property, and on the conditions of bourgeois production.”
Progressive rates of income taxation are not necessary to raise great revenues. A simple calculation, based on the Treasury’s own figures for 1966, shows that, with the same existing exemptions and deductions, a flat rate of 19.6 per cent would have raised all the revenue raised from the scale of rates ranging from 14 to 70 per cent.
On a similar calculation, if all the rates now above 50 per cent were reduced to that level, then (on the basis of 1965 income tax returns) a maximum of $373 million would be lost. This is not enough to run the government, at present spending rates, for a single day. If all incomes over $100,000 were taxed at a rate of 100 per cent, the maximum revenue gain would be $200 million.
For 1965, 70 per cent of the total income tax was paid by people with adjusted gross incomes under $20,000, for the simple reason that these people constituted 97.5 per cent of all income tax payers, and that they collectively reported more than 80 per cent of the country’s taxable income.
It is not only in the United States that the actual revenue yield from the higher income tax rates is negligible. In Great Britain, in the fiscal year 1964-65, total government revenues were£8,157 million, the revenue from the personal income tax£3,088 million, and the revenue from the surtax£184 million. In other words, the revenue from all the surtax rates (ranging above the standard rate of 41¼ per cent up to 96¼ per cent) yielded less than 6 per cent of all revenue from the income tax, and barely more than 2 per cent of Britain’s total revenues.
In Sweden, in 1963, individuals paid first a local proportional income tax averaging about 15 per cent; then on the rest of their income, they paid progressive national taxes ranging from 10 to 65 per cent. A study published by the Swedish Taxpayers’ Association found that the basic national income tax rate of 10 per cent brought in about 70 per cent of the total national income tax revenue; that if the maximum national rate had stopped at 25 per cent, the tax would have brought in 90 per cent of its then revenue; and that if the maximum rate had stopped at 45 per cent, the government would have received 99 per cent of its actual revenue. In short, the study found that the rates between 45 and 65 per cent brought in only 1 per cent of the total national income tax revenue.
The unavoidable conclusion is that the progressive rates of income tax everywhere, and especially those above 50 per cent, are imposed not to raise revenue, but merely to satisfy vindictiveness and envy.
Yet perhaps the most serious evil of the progressive income tax is that it produces the illusion in the overwhelming majority of taxpayers that the “rich”—meaning the people in the brackets above them—are really paying for most of the benefits that the majority gets from the government. This illusion is probably shared in the United States even by single taxpayers with taxable income just above $7,000, who are in fact paying more than the 21 per cent average rate that yielded the fiscal 1969 revenue. This illusion leads them to accept complacently a burden of government expenditure and taxation that they would not otherwise tolerate.
Though this aspect of progressive income taxation receives practically no attention today, its menace was recognized as early as 1899 by W. E. H. Lecky:
Highly graduated taxation realizes most completely the supreme danger of democracy, creating a state of things in which one class imposes on another burdens which it is not asked to share, and impels the State into vast schemes of extravagance, under the belief that the whole costs will be thrown upon others.


Man vs. The Welfare State

Monday, July 2, 2012

Can We Guarantee Jobs?



WHEN A GALLUP POLL IN JUNE, 1968, ASKED PEOPLE whether they favored a guaranteed income for everybody, whether they were willing to work or not, only 36 per cent said yes and 58 per cent were opposed. When the pollsters asked the same people whether the government ought to “guarantee enough work so that each family that has an employable wage earner would be guaranteed enough work each week to give him a wage of about $60 a week or $3,200 a year,” 78 per cent answered yes. Only 18 per cent were opposed.

Yet the plausible notion that the government should become the “employer of last resort” would prove as unsound in practice as the guaranteed income without any work attached.

The politicians in power could certainly not afford to be accused of offering even harder jobs or worse conditions than the poorest private employers. Therefore they would have to supply easier jobs and much better conditions, and would probably attract many workers out of existing private marginal jobs into the government-made jobs. For most of those whom the plan would affect, the government would in fact become the employer of first resort.

There is already a demand for workers for the jobs that need to be done, and for which employers are willing and able to pay the legal minimum wage. The government would therefore either have to invent jobs that do not need to be done, or at least are not worth having done at the minimum wage.

The invented jobs, moreover, would have to be where the jobless were. The government could not announce that there were plenty of guaranteed jobs in the forests of Alaska for the slum dwellers of New York City—unless it also provided guaranteed transportation for the workers, their families and their furniture, and guaranteed their housing, supermarkets, schools and other living conditions.
Under such a program it is obvious that most of the made work would be pointless and useless, and most of the made jobs needless and phony.

That is not the end. Suppose the workers with guaranteed jobs were incapable of learning to perform them, or created far more spoilage than useable production? Suppose they habitually showed up an hour or two late, or took three hours for lunch, or came in only to collect their pay, or ignored all instructions, or were unruly, or committed acts of sabotage and vandalism, or kicked the boss downstairs? Their jobs would be guaranteed, wouldn’t they?

Anyone who thinks I am imagining problems need merely read the details of the riot of 1,500 youngsters outside New York’s City Hall on July 10, 1968. They were protesting cutbacks in the city’s projected summer job program. I quote the account in the New York Times:
Some of the youngsters (most of them teen-agers from the city’s white, Negro and Puerto Rican poverty areas) smashed six automobiles parked outside City Hall, hurled rocks, bottles and broken glass at the police and looted frankfurter wagons and newsstands in the area. At the height of the disturbance, bands of youngsters fanned out from City Hall Park, smashed several windows in the nearby Woolworth Building and knocked down and robbed a 50-year-old woman.

These tactics were rewarded handsomely. The very next day Mayor John Lindsay announced that the city would appropriate $5 million for more summer jobs. Before that he had repeatedly asserted that no city money was available for such jobs.

All this doesn’t mean that the problem of providing more real jobs for the unskilled and for teen-agers is insoluble. As some eminent economists have already pointed out, the most important step would be to repeal the existing Federal minimum wage law.



Man vs. The Welfare State


Sunday, July 1, 2012

“We Owe It To Ourselves”


AT THE OUTBREAK OF WORLD WAR I, THE NATIONAL debt amounted to only $1.2 billion. At the end of 1919 it had swelled because of that war to $25.5 billion. But there was a national sense of responsibility about it. Prudent policies were followed. Successive Republican administrations reduced it at a rate of nearly $1 billion a year, so that at the end of 1930 it was down to $16.2 billion.
But then, well before we got into World War II, welfare spending started to soar. There was no effort to balance the budget; the cult of deficits prevailed. At the end of fiscal year 1941, five months before Pearl Harbor, the public debt was at the then record level of $55.5 billion. We ended the war with a public debt of $260 billion, but this time there was no important reduction, except almost by accident in 1948 and 1951. Chronic deficits have now brought it up to $363 billion.
It is amusing to recall the rationalizations that accompanied each succeeding deficit. At first each presidential message would solemnly estimate a surplus for the next fiscal year, which always turned out to be a deficit before the year was over. Next, the budget was always to be balanced sometime in the next couple of years—but, of course, not now.
Then a new doctrine began to be put forward. It set up a straw-man: the conservative who allegedly insisted that the budget must be balanced every year, come hell or high water. Ah no, this new doctrine replied; the budget need be balanced only over a period. But the high priests of the new doctrine never got around to specifying just how long the period should be, or just when it would be safe to begin to show a surplus again. They showed no ardor for sticking to the arithmetic even of their own proposals. If, as in the eight years 1961 through 1968, there was an uninterrupted average administrative deficit of $8 billion a year, shouldn’t there be an average surplus of $8 billion a year for the next eight years?
The argument for a budget balanced “over a period” has, in fact, been quietly dropped. In its place is the argument that the budget should never be balanced when there is less than full employment, or even when there threatens to be less than full employment. And this again has become in fact an argument for a perpetual deficit. For though President Johnson’s economic advisers called for and got a tax increase (but never called for a spending cut), no one dreamed of suggesting a surplus, or even a balanced budget. In presenting his budget for the fiscal year 1968, for example, President Johnson planned a deficit of $4.3 billion in the cash budget and of $8.1 billion in the orthodox administrative budget. (The actual administrative deficit turned out to be $25.4 billion.) “To seek a lower deficit or a surplus” for 1968, he warned, “would be unwarranted and self-defeating” because it would “depress economic activity.”
The implication of this whole philosophy is that it is dangerous even to balance the budget, and that so far from trying to pay off or even reduce the national debt, we should permit a perpetual increase.
Let us look at what this has already meant for annual interest payments alone. They have doubled in the last ten years—from $8.3 billion in 1960 to $16 billion in 1970. Thus interest payments alone are every year greater than the entire amount it took to run the government in 1941, and more than five times as much as was required to run the government in 1929.
In 1932 Candidate Franklin Roosevelt was alarmed because the national debt had increased by $3 billion in the preceding two years. But for a generation the size and growth of the national debt have been lightly dismissed with the argument that “we owe it to ourselves.” This was presented in the Nineteen Thirties as a brilliant discovery of the “new” economics; but the argument is so old that it was familiar to the great British philosopher David Hume, who answered it in a brilliant essay in 1740: “The practice of contracting debt will almost infallibly be abused in every government . . . We have indeed been told that the public is no weaker upon account of its debts, since they are mostly due among ourselves.” But Hume then went on to point out that the creditors who received the interest on the debt were by no means the same people as the taxpayers who had to pay it, and that practically no one paid and received exactly the same amount. The tax burden fell mainly upon the active workers and producers, and hampered production. “If all our present taxes be mortgaged,” he asked, “must we not invent new ones? And may not this matter be carried to a length that is ruinous and destructive?”
“I must confess,” he also wrote in the course of his essay, “that there is a strange supineness, from long custom, creeped into all ranks of men, with regard to public debts,” so that hardly anyone dared to hope that substantial progress would ever be made in paying them off. We find plenty of evidence of this complacency today. Academic economists even vie with each other in trying to prove that the situation is after all very good.
A favorite argument of the last few years is that “the nation is growing faster than its debt.” This is “proved” statistically. In the table below, for example, I merely bring up to mid-1969 some comparisons presented (in billions of dollars) by one academician in 1964:


                                                                                           1945                                             1969


National debt                                                                     $260                                           $359


Gross National Product                                                     $212                                            $925


Debt as burden on GNP                                                  123%                                             39%


So we might advance triumphantly to the conclusion that the national debt, when viewed as a burden on a year’s production, has been cut by two-thirds since 1945!
The conclusion would be technically correct, but complacency would be unjustified. The reason the national debt is less of a burden is that, through inflation, the purchasing power of the dollar has been steadily reduced. It has been reduced 65 per cent since 1933 and more than 50 per cent since 1945. Let us state this another way. By failing to balance its budget, by borrowing, by monetizing the debt, by printing more dollars, by steadily diluting the dollar’s purchasing power, the government has in effect repudiated 65 cents of every dollar it borrowed in 1933 and 50 cents of every dollar it borrowed in 1945.
To put it bluntly, the government’s creditors have been swindled.
Adam Smith, writing in 1776, was perfectly familiar with this method of disguised repudiation. “When national debts have once been accumulated to a certain degree,” he wrote, “there is scarce, I believe, a single instance of their having been fairly and completely paid.” But governments usually covered “the disgrace of a real bankruptcy” by the “juggling trick” of “a pretended payment” in depreciated money.
So the relationship that seems to give some present-day writers so much satisfaction—that the national debt, in dollar terms, has been falling in relation to the gross national product in dollar terms—is simply the outcome of the steady depreciation of the dollar. The more inflation we have, and the more the purchasing power of the dollar is depreciated, the more the national debt will “fall” in relation to the GNP, because the GNP, measured in soaring prices, will rise in relation to the dollar debt.
Do we have any serious intention of ever paying off our national debt in dollars of at least present purchasing power? If so, isn’t it about time we begin to balance the budget and make an honest start?





Man vs. The Welfare State