Hans-Hermann Hoppe
The last four chapters have provided systematic reasons and empirical evidence for the thesis that socialism as a social system that is not thoroughly based on the “natural theory of property” (the first-use-first-own rule) which characterizes capitalism must necessarily be, and in fact is, an inferior system with respect to the production of wealth and the average standard of living. This may satisfy the person who believes that economic wealth and living standards are the most important criteria in judging a society—and there can be no doubt that for many, one’s standard of living is a matter of utmost importance—and because of this it is certainly necessary to keep all of the above economic reasoning in mind. Yet there are people who do not attach much importance to economic wealth and who rank other values even higher—happily, one might say, for socialism, because it can thus quietly forget its original claim of being able to bring more prosperity to mankind, and instead resort to the altogether different but even more inspiring claim that whereas socialism might not be the key to prosperity, it would mean justice, fairness, and morality (all terms used synonymously here). And it can argue that a tradeoff between efficiency and justice, an exchange of “less wealth” for “more justice” is justified, since justice and fairness, are fundamentally more valuable than economic wealth.
This claim will be examined in some detail in this chapter. In so doing, two separate but related claims will be analyzed: (1) the claim made in particular by socialists of the Marxist and the social-democratic camp, and to a lesser degree also by the conservatives, that a principled case in favor of socialism can be made because of the moral value of its principles and, mutatis mutandis, that capitalism cannot be defended morally; and (2) the claim of empiricist socialism that normative statements (“should” or “ought” statements)—since they neither solely relate to facts, nor simply state a verbal definition, and thus are neither empirical nor analytical statements—are not really statements at all, at least not statements that one could call “cognitive” in the widest of all senses, but rather mere “verbal expressions” used to express or arouse feelings (such as ‘Wow” or “grrrrr”).112
The second, empiricist or, as its position applied to the field of morals is called, “emotivist” claim will be dealt with first, as in a way it is more far-reaching.113 The emotivist position is derived by accepting the central empiricist-positivist claim that the dichotomous distinction between empirical and analytical statements is of an all-inclusive nature; that is, that any statement whatsoever must be empirical or analytical and never can be both. This position, it will be seen, turns out to be self-defeating on closer inspection, just as empiricism in general turned out to be self-defeating.114 If emotivism is a valid position, then its basic proposition regarding normative statements must itself be analytical or empirical, or else it must be an expression of emotions. If it is taken to be analytical, then it is mere verbal quibble, saying nothing about anything real, but rather only defining one sound by another, and emotivism would thus be a void doctrine. If, instead, it is empirical, then the doctrine would not carry any weight, as its central proposition could well be wrong. In any case, right or wrong, it would only be a proposition stating a historical fact, i.e., how certain expressions have been used in the past, which in itself would not provide any reason whatsoever why this would have to be the case in the future, too, and hence why one should or rather should not look for normative statements that are more than expressions of emotions in that they are meant to be justifiable. And the emotivist doctrine would also lose all its weight if it adopted the third alternative and declared its central tenet itself a “wow” statement, too. For if this were the case, then it would not contain any reason why one should relate to and interpret certain statements in certain ways, and so if one’s own instincts or feelings did not happen to coincide with somebody else’s “wowing,” there would be nothing that could stop one from following one’s own feelings instead. Just as a normative statement would be no more than the barking of a dog, so the emotivist position then is no more than a barking comment on barking.
On the other hand, if the central statement of empiricism-emotivism, i.e., that normative statements have no cognitive meaning but are simply expressions of feelings, is itself regarded as a meaningful statement communicating that one should conceive of all statements that are not analytical or empirical as mere expressive symbols, then the emotivist position becomes outrightly contradictory. This position must then assume, at least implicitly, that certain insights, i.e., those relating to normative statements, cannot simply be understood and meaningful, but can also be given justification as statements with specific meanings. Hence, one must conclude that emotivism falters, because if it were true, then it could not even say and mean what it says—it simply would not exist as a position that could be discussed and evaluated with regard to its validity. But if it is a meaningful position which can be discussed, then this fact belies its very own basic premise. Moreover, the fact that it is indeed such a meaningful position, it should be noted, cannot even be disputed, as one cannot communicate and argue that one cannot communicate and argue. Rather, it must be presupposed of any intellectual position, that it is meaningful and can be argued with regard to its cognitive value, simply because it is presented in a language and communicated. To argue otherwise would already implicitly admit its validity. One is forced, then, to accept a rationalist approach towards ethics for the very same reason that one was forced to adopt a rationalist instead of an empiricist epistemology.115 Yet with emotivism so rebuffed, I am still far away, or so it seems, from my set goal, which I share with the Marxist and conservative socialists, of demonstrating that a principled case in favor of or against socialism or capitalism can be made. What I have reached so far is the conclusion that the question of whether or not normative statements are cognitive ones is itself a cognitive problem. However, it still seems to be a far cry from there to the proof that actual norm proposals can indeed be shown to be either valid or invalid.
Fortunately, this impression is wrong and there is already much more won here than might be suspected. The above argument shows us that any truth claim—the claim connected with any proposition that it is true, objective, or valid (all terms used synonymously here)—is and must be raised and decided upon in the course of an argumentation. And since it cannot be disputed that this is so (one cannot communicate and argue that one cannot communicate and argue), and it must be assumed that everyone knows what it means to claim something to be true (one cannot deny this statement without claiming its negation to be true), this has been aptly called “the a priori of communication and argumentation.”116
Now, arguing never just consists of free-floating propositions claiming to be true. Rather, argumentation is always an activity, too. But given that truth claims are raised and decided upon in argumentation and that argumentation, aside from whatever is said in its course, is a practical affair, it follows that intersubjectively meaningful norms must exist—precisely those which make some action an argumentation—which have special cognitive status in that they are the practical preconditions of objectivity and truth.
Hence, one reaches the conclusion that norms must indeed be assumed to be justifiable as valid. It is simply impossible to argue otherwise, because the ability to argue so would in fact presuppose the validity of those norms which underlie any argumentation whatsoever.117 The answer, then, to the question of which ends can or cannot be justified is to be derived from the concept of argumentation. And with this, the peculiar role of reason in determining the contents of ethics is given a precise description, too. In contrast to the role of reason in establishing empirical laws of nature, reason can claim to yield results in determining moral laws which can be shown to be valid a priori. It only makes explicit what is already implied in the concept of argumentation itself; and in analyzing any actual norm proposal, its task is merely confined to analyzing whether or not it is logically consistent with the very ethics which the proponent must presuppose as valid insofar as he is able to make his proposal at all.118
But what is the ethics implied in argumentation whose validity cannot be disputed, as disputing it would implicitly have to presuppose it? Quite commonly it has been observed that argumentation implies that a proposition claims universal acceptability, or, should it be a norm proposal, that it is “universalizable.” Applied to norm proposals, this is the idea, as formulated in the Golden Rule of ethics or in the Kantian Categorical Imperative, that only those norms can be justified that can be formulated as general principles which are valid for everyone without exception.119 Indeed, as argumentation implies that everyone who can understand an argument must in principle be able to be convinced of it simply because of its argumentative force, the universalization principle of ethics can now be understood and explained as grounded in the wider “a priori of communication and argumentation.” Yet the universalization principle only provides a purely formal criterion for morality. To be sure, checked against this criterion all proposals for valid norms which would specify different rules for different classes of people could be shown to have no legitimate claim of being universally acceptable as fair norms, unless the distinction between different classes of people were such that it implied no discrimination, but could instead be accepted as founded in the nature of things again by everyone. But while some norms might not pass the test of universalization, if enough attention were paid to their formulation, the most ridiculous norms, and what is of course even more relevant, even openly incompatible norms could easily and equally well pass it. For example, “everybody must get drunk on Sundays or be fined” or “anyone who drinks alcohol will be punished” are both rules that do not allow discrimination among groups of people and thus could both claim to satisfy the condition of universalization.
Clearly then, the universalization principle alone would not provide one with any positive set of norms that could be demonstrated to be justified. However, there are other positive norms implied in argumentation aside from the universalization principle. In order to recognize them, it is only necessary to call three interrelated facts to attention. First, that argumentation is not only a cognitive but also a practical affair. Second, that argumentation, as a form of action, implies the use of the scarce resource of one’s body. And third, that argumentation is a conflict-free way of interacting. Not in the sense that there is always agreement on the things said, but in the sense that as long as argumentation is in progress it is always possible to agree at least on the fact that there is disagreement about the validity of what has been said. And this is to say nothing else than that a mutual recognition of each person's exclusive control over his own body must be presupposed as long as there is argumentation (note again, that it is impossible to deny this and claim this denial to be true without implicitly having to admit its truth).
Hence, one would have to conclude that the norm implied in argumentation is that everybody has the right of exclusive control over his own body as his instrument of action and cognition. Only if there is at least an implicit recognition of each individual's property right in his own body can argumentation take place.120 Only as long as this right is recognized is it possible for someone to agree to what has been said in an argument and hence can what has been said be validated, or is it possible to say “no” and to agree only on the fact that there is disagreement. Indeed, anyone who would try to justify any norm would already have to presuppose the property right in his body as a valid norm, simply in order to say, “This is what I claim to be true and objective.” Any person who would try to dispute the property right in his own body would become caught up in a contradiction, as arguing in this way and claiming his argument to be true, would already implicitly accept precisely this norm as being valid.
Thus it can be stated that whenever a person claims that some statement can be justified, he at least implicitly assumes the following norm to be justified: “Nobody has the right to uninvitedly aggress against the body of any other person and thus delimit or restrict anyone’s control over his own body.” This rule is implied in the concept of justification as argumentative justification. JustifyingThe last four chapters have provided systematic reasons and empirical evidence for the thesis that socialism as a social system that is not thoroughly based on the “natural theory of property” (the first-use-first-own rule) which characterizes capitalism must necessarily be, and in fact is, an inferior system with respect to the production of wealth and the average standard of living. This may satisfy the person who believes that economic wealth and living standards are the most important criteria in judging a society—and there can be no doubt that for many, one’s standard of living is a matter of utmost importance—and because of this it is certainly necessary to keep all of the above economic reasoning in mind. Yet there are people who do not attach much importance to economic wealth and who rank other values even higher—happily, one might say, for socialism, because it can thus quietly forget its original claim of being able to bring more prosperity to mankind, and instead resort to the altogether different but even more inspiring claim that whereas socialism might not be the key to prosperity, it would mean justice, fairness, and morality (all terms used synonymously here). And it can argue that a tradeoff between efficiency and justice, an exchange of “less wealth” for “more justice” is justified, since justice and fairness, are fundamentally more valuable than economic wealth.
This claim will be examined in some detail in this chapter. In so doing, two separate but related claims will be analyzed: (1) the claim made in particular by socialists of the Marxist and the social-democratic camp, and to a lesser degree also by the conservatives, that a principled case in favor of socialism can be made because of the moral value of its principles and, mutatis mutandis, that capitalism cannot be defended morally; and (2) the claim of empiricist socialism that normative statements (“should” or “ought” statements)—since they neither solely relate to facts, nor simply state a verbal definition, and thus are neither empirical nor analytical statements—are not really statements at all, at least not statements that one could call “cognitive” in the widest of all senses, but rather mere “verbal expressions” used to express or arouse feelings (such as ‘Wow” or “grrrrr”).112
The second, empiricist or, as its position applied to the field of morals is called, “emotivist” claim will be dealt with first, as in a way it is more far-reaching.113 The emotivist position is derived by accepting the central empiricist-positivist claim that the dichotomous distinction between empirical and analytical statements is of an all-inclusive nature; that is, that any statement whatsoever must be empirical or analytical and never can be both. This position, it will be seen, turns out to be self-defeating on closer inspection, just as empiricism in general turned out to be self-defeating.114 If emotivism is a valid position, then its basic proposition regarding normative statements must itself be analytical or empirical, or else it must be an expression of emotions. If it is taken to be analytical, then it is mere verbal quibble, saying nothing about anything real, but rather only defining one sound by another, and emotivism would thus be a void doctrine. If, instead, it is empirical, then the doctrine would not carry any weight, as its central proposition could well be wrong. In any case, right or wrong, it would only be a proposition stating a historical fact, i.e., how certain expressions have been used in the past, which in itself would not provide any reason whatsoever why this would have to be the case in the future, too, and hence why one should or rather should not look for normative statements that are more than expressions of emotions in that they are meant to be justifiable. And the emotivist doctrine would also lose all its weight if it adopted the third alternative and declared its central tenet itself a “wow” statement, too. For if this were the case, then it would not contain any reason why one should relate to and interpret certain statements in certain ways, and so if one’s own instincts or feelings did not happen to coincide with somebody else’s “wowing,” there would be nothing that could stop one from following one’s own feelings instead. Just as a normative statement would be no more than the barking of a dog, so the emotivist position then is no more than a barking comment on barking.
On the other hand, if the central statement of empiricism-emotivism, i.e., that normative statements have no cognitive meaning but are simply expressions of feelings, is itself regarded as a meaningful statement communicating that one should conceive of all statements that are not analytical or empirical as mere expressive symbols, then the emotivist position becomes outrightly contradictory. This position must then assume, at least implicitly, that certain insights, i.e., those relating to normative statements, cannot simply be understood and meaningful, but can also be given justification as statements with specific meanings. Hence, one must conclude that emotivism falters, because if it were true, then it could not even say and mean what it says—it simply would not exist as a position that could be discussed and evaluated with regard to its validity. But if it is a meaningful position which can be discussed, then this fact belies its very own basic premise. Moreover, the fact that it is indeed such a meaningful position, it should be noted, cannot even be disputed, as one cannot communicate and argue that one cannot communicate and argue. Rather, it must be presupposed of any intellectual position, that it is meaningful and can be argued with regard to its cognitive value, simply because it is presented in a language and communicated. To argue otherwise would already implicitly admit its validity. One is forced, then, to accept a rationalist approach towards ethics for the very same reason that one was forced to adopt a rationalist instead of an empiricist epistemology.115 Yet with emotivism so rebuffed, I am still far away, or so it seems, from my set goal, which I share with the Marxist and conservative socialists, of demonstrating that a principled case in favor of or against socialism or capitalism can be made. What I have reached so far is the conclusion that the question of whether or not normative statements are cognitive ones is itself a cognitive problem. However, it still seems to be a far cry from there to the proof that actual norm proposals can indeed be shown to be either valid or invalid.
Fortunately, this impression is wrong and there is already much more won here than might be suspected. The above argument shows us that any truth claim—the claim connected with any proposition that it is true, objective, or valid (all terms used synonymously here)—is and must be raised and decided upon in the course of an argumentation. And since it cannot be disputed that this is so (one cannot communicate and argue that one cannot communicate and argue), and it must be assumed that everyone knows what it means to claim something to be true (one cannot deny this statement without claiming its negation to be true), this has been aptly called “the a priori of communication and argumentation.”116
Now, arguing never just consists of free-floating propositions claiming to be true. Rather, argumentation is always an activity, too. But given that truth claims are raised and decided upon in argumentation and that argumentation, aside from whatever is said in its course, is a practical affair, it follows that intersubjectively meaningful norms must exist—precisely those which make some action an argumentation—which have special cognitive status in that they are the practical preconditions of objectivity and truth.
Hence, one reaches the conclusion that norms must indeed be assumed to be justifiable as valid. It is simply impossible to argue otherwise, because the ability to argue so would in fact presuppose the validity of those norms which underlie any argumentation whatsoever.117 The answer, then, to the question of which ends can or cannot be justified is to be derived from the concept of argumentation. And with this, the peculiar role of reason in determining the contents of ethics is given a precise description, too. In contrast to the role of reason in establishing empirical laws of nature, reason can claim to yield results in determining moral laws which can be shown to be valid a priori. It only makes explicit what is already implied in the concept of argumentation itself; and in analyzing any actual norm proposal, its task is merely confined to analyzing whether or not it is logically consistent with the very ethics which the proponent must presuppose as valid insofar as he is able to make his proposal at all.118
But what is the ethics implied in argumentation whose validity cannot be disputed, as disputing it would implicitly have to presuppose it? Quite commonly it has been observed that argumentation implies that a proposition claims universal acceptability, or, should it be a norm proposal, that it is “universalizable.” Applied to norm proposals, this is the idea, as formulated in the Golden Rule of ethics or in the Kantian Categorical Imperative, that only those norms can be justified that can be formulated as general principles which are valid for everyone without exception.119 Indeed, as argumentation implies that everyone who can understand an argument must in principle be able to be convinced of it simply because of its argumentative force, the universalization principle of ethics can now be understood and explained as grounded in the wider “a priori of communication and argumentation.” Yet the universalization principle only provides a purely formal criterion for morality. To be sure, checked against this criterion all proposals for valid norms which would specify different rules for different classes of people could be shown to have no legitimate claim of being universally acceptable as fair norms, unless the distinction between different classes of people were such that it implied no discrimination, but could instead be accepted as founded in the nature of things again by everyone. But while some norms might not pass the test of universalization, if enough attention were paid to their formulation, the most ridiculous norms, and what is of course even more relevant, even openly incompatible norms could easily and equally well pass it. For example, “everybody must get drunk on Sundays or be fined” or “anyone who drinks alcohol will be punished” are both rules that do not allow discrimination among groups of people and thus could both claim to satisfy the condition of universalization.
Clearly then, the universalization principle alone would not provide one with any positive set of norms that could be demonstrated to be justified. However, there are other positive norms implied in argumentation aside from the universalization principle. In order to recognize them, it is only necessary to call three interrelated facts to attention. First, that argumentation is not only a cognitive but also a practical affair. Second, that argumentation, as a form of action, implies the use of the scarce resource of one’s body. And third, that argumentation is a conflict-free way of interacting. Not in the sense that there is always agreement on the things said, but in the sense that as long as argumentation is in progress it is always possible to agree at least on the fact that there is disagreement about the validity of what has been said. And this is to say nothing else than that a mutual recognition of each person's exclusive control over his own body must be presupposed as long as there is argumentation (note again, that it is impossible to deny this and claim this denial to be true without implicitly having to admit its truth).
Hence, one would have to conclude that the norm implied in argumentation is that everybody has the right of exclusive control over his own body as his instrument of action and cognition. Only if there is at least an implicit recognition of each individual's property right in his own body can argumentation take place.120 Only as long as this right is recognized is it possible for someone to agree to what has been said in an argument and hence can what has been said be validated, or is it possible to say “no” and to agree only on the fact that there is disagreement. Indeed, anyone who would try to justify any norm would already have to presuppose the property right in his body as a valid norm, simply in order to say, “This is what I claim to be true and objective.” Any person who would try to dispute the property right in his own body would become caught up in a contradiction, as arguing in this way and claiming his argument to be true, would already implicitly accept precisely this norm as being valid.
Thus it can be stated that whenever a person claims that some statement can be justified, he at least implicitly assumes the following norm to be justified: “Nobody has the right to uninvitedly aggress against the body of any other person and thus delimit or restrict anyone’s control over his own body.” This rule is implied in the concept of justification as argumentative justification. Justifying actions are justifiable, control over whether or not one’s actions affect the value of someone else’s property does not rest with the acting person, but rather with other people and their subjective evaluations. Thus no one could determine ex ante if his actions would be classified as justifiable or unjustifiable. One would first have to interrogate the whole population to make sure that one’s planned actions would not change another person’s evaluations regarding his own property. And even then nobody could act until universal agreement was reached on who is supposed to do what with what, and at which point in time. Clearly, for all the practical problems involved, one would be long dead and nobody would argue anything any longer long before this was ever accomplished.129 But more decisively still, the socialist position regarding property and aggression could not even be effectively argued, because arguing in favor of any norm, socialist or not, implies that there is conflict over the use of some scarce resource, otherwise there would simply be no need for discussion. However, in order to argue that there is a way out of such conflicts, it must be presupposed that actions must be allowed to be performed prior to any actual agreement or disagreement, because if they were not, one could not even argue so. Yet if one can do this—and socialism too must assume that one can, insofar as it exists as an argued intellectual position—then this is only possible because the existence of objective borders of property i.e., borders which every person can recognize as such on his own, without having to agree first with anyone else with respect to one’s system of values and evaluations. Socialism, too, then, in spite of what it says, must in fact presuppose the existence of objective property borders, rather than of borders determined by subjective evaluations, if only in order to have any surviving socialist who can make his moral proposals.
The socialist idea of protecting value instead of physical integrity also fails for a second, related reason. Evidently, the value of a person, for example, on the labor or marriage market, can be and indeed is affected by other people’s physical integrity or degree of physical integrity. Thus, if one wanted property values to be protected, one would have to allow physical aggression against people. However, it is only because of the very fact that a person’s borders—that is, the borders of a person’s property in his body as his domain of exclusive control with which another person is not allowed to interfere unless he wishes to become an aggressor—are physical borders (intersubjectively ascertainable, and not just subjectively fancied borders) that everyone can agree on anything independently (and, of course, agreement means agreement of independent decision-making units!). Only because the protected borders of property are objective then, i.e., fixed and recognizable as fixed prior to any conventional agreement, can there at all be argumentation, and possibly agreement, between independent decision-making units. There simply could not be anyone arguing anything unless his existence as an independent physical unit was first recognized. No one could argue in favor of a property system defining borders of property in subjective, evaluative terms—as does socialism—because simply to be able to say so presupposes that, contrary to what the theory says, one must in fact be a physically independent unit saying it.
The situation is no less dire for socialism when one turns to the second essential specification of the rulings of the natural theory of property. The basic norms of capitalism were characterized not only by the fact that property and aggression were defined in physical terms; it was of no less importance that in addition property was defined as private, individualized property and that the meaning of original appropriation, which evidently implies making a distinction between prior and later, had been specified. It is with this additional specification as well that socialism comes into conflict. Instead of recognizing the vital importance of the prior-later distinction in deciding between conflicting property claims, socialism proposes norms which in effect state that priority is irrelevant in making such a decision and that late-comers have as much of a right to ownership as first-comers. Clearly, this idea is involved when social-democratic socialism, for instance, makes the natural owners of wealth and/or their heirs pay a tax so that the unfortunate latecomers might be able to participate in its consumption. And this idea is also involved, for instance, when the owner of a natural resource is forced to reduce (or increase) its present exploitation in the interest of posterity. Both times it only makes sense to do so when it is assumed that the person accumulating wealth first, or using the natural resource first, thereby commits an aggression against some late-comers. If they have done nothing wrong, then the late-comers could have no such claim against them.130
What is wrong with this idea of dropping the prior-later distinction as morally irrelevant? First, if the late-comers, i.e., those who did not in fact do something with some scarce goods, had indeed as much of a right to them as the first-comers, i.e., those who did do something with the scarce goods, then literally no one would be allowed to do anything with anything, as one would have to have all of the late-comers’ consent prior to doing whatever one wanted to do. Indeed, as posterity would include one’s children’s children—people, that is, who come so late that one could never possibly ask them—advocating a legal system that does not make use of the prior-later distinction as part of its underlying property theory is simply absurd in that it implies advocating death but must presuppose life to advocate anything. Neither we, our forefathers, nor our progeny could, do, or will survive and say or argue anything if one were to follow this rule. In order for any person—past, present, or future—to argue anything it must be possible to survive now. Nobody can wait and suspend acting until everyone of an indeterminate class of late-comers happens to appear and agree to what one wants to do. Rather, insofar as a person finds himself alone, he must be able to act, to use, produce, consume goods straightaway, prior to any agreement with people who are simply not around yet (and perhaps never will be). And insofar as a person finds himself in the company of others and there is conflict over how to use a given scarce resource, he must be able to resolve the problem at a definite point in time with a definite number of people instead of having to wait unspecified periods of time for unspecified numbers of people. Simply in order to survive, then, which is a prerequisite to arguing in favor of or against anything, property rights cannot be conceived of as being timeless and nonspecific regarding the number of people concerned. Rather, they must necessarily be thought of as originating through acting at definite points in time for definite acting individuals.131
Furthermore, the idea of abandoning the prior-later distinction, which socialism finds so attractive, would again simply be incompatible with the nonaggression principle as the practical foundation of argumentation. To argue and possibly agree with someone (if only on the fact that there is disagreement) means to recognize each other's prior right of exclusive control over his own body. Otherwise, it would be impossible for anyone to first say anything at a definite point in time and for someone else to then be able to reply, or vice versa, as neither the first nor the second speaker would be independent physical decision-making units anymore, at any time. Eliminating the prior-later distinction then, as socialism attempts to do, is tantamount to eliminating the possibility of arguing and reaching agreement. However, as one cannot argue that there is no possibility for discussion without the prior control of every person over his own body being recognized and accepted as fair, a late-comer ethic that does not wish to make this difference could never be agreed upon by anyone. Simply saying that it could implies a contradiction, as one’s being able to say so would presuppose one’s existence as an independent decision-making unit at a definite point in time.
Hence, one is forced to conclude that the socialist ethic is a complete failure. In all of its practical versions, it is no better than a rule such as “I can hit you, but you cannot hit me,” which even fails to pass the universalization test. And if it did adopt universalizable rules, which would basically amount to saying “everybody can hit everybody else,” such rulings could not conceivably be said to be universally acceptable on account of their very material specification. Simply to say and argue so must presuppose a person’s property right over his own body. Thus, only the first-come-first-own ethic of capitalism can be defended effectively as it is implied in argumentation. And no other ethic could be so justified, as justifying something in the course of argumentation implies presupposing the validity of precisely this ethic of the natural theory of property.
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