Chapter 1. Acting Man.
4. Rationality and Irrationality; Subjectivism and Objectivity of Praxeological Research
Human action is necessarily always rational. The term “rational action” is therefore pleonastic and must be rejected as such. When applied to the ultimate ends of action, the terms rational and irrational are inappropriate and meaningless. The ultimate end of action is always the satisfaction of some desires of the acting man. Since nobody is in a position to substitute his own value judgments for those of the acting individual, it is vain to pass judgment on other people's aims and volitions. No man is qualified to declare what would make another man happier or less discontented. The critic either tells us what he believes he would aim at if he were in the place of his fellow; or, in dictatorial arrogance blithely disposing of his fellow's will and aspirations, declares what condition of this other man would better suit himself, the critic.
It is usual to call an action irrational if it aims, at the expense of “material” and tangible advantages, at the attainment of “ideal” or “higher” satisfactions. In this sense people say, for instance—sometimes with approval, sometimes with disapproval—that a man who sacrifices life, health, or wealth to the attainment of “higher” goods— like fidelity to his religious, philosophical, and political convictions or the freedom and flowering of his nation—is motivated by irrational considerations. However, the striving after these higher ends is neither more nor less rational or irrational than that after other human ends. It is a mistake to assume that the desire to procure the bare necessities of life and health is more rational, natural, or justified than the striving after other goods or amenities. It is true that the appetite for food and warmth is common to men and other mammals and that as a rule a man who lacks food and shelter concentrates his efforts upon the satisfaction of these urgent needs and does not care much for other things. The impulse to live, to preserve one's own life, and to take advantage of every opportunity of strengthening one's vital forces is a primal feature of life, present in every living being. However, to yield to this impulse is not—for man—an inevitable necessity.
While all other animals are unconditionally driven by the impulse to preserve their own lives and by the impulse of prolification, man has the power to master even these impulses. He can control both his sexual desires and his will to live. He can give up his life when the conditions under which alone he. could preserve it seem intolerable. Man is capable of dying for a cause or of committing suicide. To live is for man the outcome of a choice, of a judgment of value.
It is the same with the desire to live in affluence. The very existence of ascetics and of men who renounce material gains for the sake of clinging to their convictions and of preserving their dignity and self-respect is evidence that the striving after more tangible amenities is not inevitable but rather the result of a choice. Of course, the immense majority prefer life to death and wealth to poverty.
It is arbitrary to consider only the
satisfaction of the body's physiological needs as “natural” and
therefore “rational” and everything else as “artificial” and therefore
“irrational.” It is the characteristic feature of
human nature that man seeks not only food, shelter, and cohabitation
like all other animals, but that he aims also at other kinds of
satisfaction. Man has specifically human desires and needs which we may
call “higher” than those which he has in common with the other mammals.
When applied to the means chosen for the attainment of ends, the
terms rational and irrational imply a judgment about the expediency and
adequacy of the procedure employed. The critic approves or disapproves
of the method from the point of view of whether or not it is best suited
to attain the end in question. It is a fact that human reason is not
infallible and that man very often errs in selecting and applying means.
An action unsuited to the end sought falls short of expectation. It is
contrary to purpose, but it is rational, i.e., the outcome of a
reasonable—although faulty—deliberation and an attempt—although an
ineffectual attempt—to attain a definite goal. The doctors who a hundred
years ago employed certain methods for the treatment of cancer which
our contemporary doctors reject were—from the point of view of
present-day pathology—badly instructed and therefore inefficient. But
they did not act irrationally; they did their best. It is probable that
in a hundred years more doctors will have more efficient methods at hand
for the treatment of this disease. They will be more efficient but not
more rational than our physicians.
The opposite of action is not irrational behavior, but a
reactive response to stimuli on the part of the bodily organs and
instincts which cannot be controlled by the volition of the person
concerned. To the same stimulus man can under certain conditions respond
both by reactive response and by action. If a man absorbs a poison, the
organs react by setting up their forces of antidotal defense; in
addition, action may interfere by applying counterpoison.
With regard to the problem involved in the antithesis, rational and
irrational, there is no difference between the natural sciences and the
social sciences. Science always is and must be rational. It is the
endeavor to attain a mental grasp of the phenomena of the universe by a
systematic arrangement of the whole body of available knowledge.
However, as has been pointed out above, the analysis of objects into
their constituent elements must sooner or later necessarily reach a
point beyond which it cannot go. The human mind is not even capable of
conceiving a kind of knowledge not limited by an ultimate
given inaccessible to further analysis and reduction. The scientific
method that carries the mind up to this point is entirely rational. The
ultimate given may be called an irrational fact.
It is fashionable nowadays to find fault
with the social sciences for being purely rational. The most popular
objection raised against economics is that it neglects the irrationality
of life and reality and tries to press into dry rational schemes and
bloodless abstractions the infinite variety of phenomena. No censure
could be more absurd. Like every branch of knowledge economics goes as
far as it can be carried by rational methods. Then it stops by
establishing the fact that it is faced with an ultimate given, i.e., a
phenomenon which cannot—at least in the present state of our
knowledge—be further analyzed.6
The teachings of praxeology and economics are valid for every human
action without regard to its underlying motives, causes, and goals. The
ultimate judgments of value and the ultimate ends of human action are
given for any kind of scientific inquiry; they are not open to any
further analysis. Praxeology deals with the ways and means chosen for
the attainment of such ultimate ends. Its object is means, not ends.
In this sense we speak of the subjectivism of the general science of
human action. It takes the ultimate ends chosen by acting man as data,
it is entirely neutral with regard to them, and it refrains from passing
any value judgments. The only standard which it applies is whether or
not the means chosen are fit for the attainment of the ends aimed at. If
Eudaemonism says happiness, if Utilitarianism and economics say
utility, we must interpret these terms in a subjectivistic way as that
which acting man aims at because it is desirable in his eyes. It is in
this formalism that the progress of the modern meaning of Eudaemonism,
Hedonism, and Utilitarianism consists as opposed to the older material
meaning and the progress of the modern subjectivistic theory of value as
opposed to the objectivistic theory of value as expounded by classical
political economy. At the same time it is in this subjectivism that the
objectivity of our science lies. Because it is subjectivistic and takes
the value judgments of acting man as ultimate data not open to any
further critical examination, it is itself above all strife of parties
and factions, it is indifferent to the conflicts of all schools of
dogmatism and ethical doctrines, it is free from valuations and
preconceived ideas and judgments, it is universally valid and absolutely
and plainly human.
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