Friday, April 26, 2013

Freedom vs. Planning

By Richard Ebeling

As the 20th century began, the most widely held vision of the future was socialist: capitalism would be replaced by central planning and the state would own all the means of production.
The 20th century is ending with the socialist ideal in complete disarray. The heads of socialist governments everywhere declare that economic progress requires individual initiative and private enterprise. They admit that only competition and a market price system can bring economic coordination to a complex system of division of labor.
All of this was anticipated by Ludwig von Mises almost 70 years ago in his famous 1920 article, “Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth” and in his monumental treatise, Socialism: An Economic and Sociological Analysis (1922).
Mises conclusively demonstrated that without market-generated prices, expressed in terms of a common medium of exchange, it is impossible to use society’s scarce resources in a rational manner. A central planner might know the technological potentials of the resources at his disposal, but he has no way to know what economic values to assign to those resources. He cannot know how to allocate resources among alternative lines of production, and thus cannot rationally service consumers’ demands. This insight means that our choice of economic systems can only be between free-market capitalism and “planned chaos.” “There is no third solution, no middle way,” says Mises.
It is clear that socialism has lost the war on the battlefield of ideas. But free-market capitalism has not yet won. Both in the United States and around the world, policy-makers promote the “mixed economy,” a hodgepodge of competition and state control. Intellectuals on both the collectivist left and the conservative right have enshrined the idea of state intervention.
Capitalism delivers the goods, they say, but the distribution of these goods is “unfair.” The profit motive is a powerful engine for individual initiative and creativity, but too often the commodities produced are “socially undesirable” and exist only at the expense of the good society. And while competition is desirable to keep producers on their toes, too much of a good thing can be bad. Thus government needs to protect competitors from “unfair” competition, domestic and foreign.
Free market replies to every one of these arguments for state intervention can be found in the writings of Ludwig von Mises: in Liberalism (1927), Critique of Interventionism (1929), Human Action (1949), Planning for Freedom (1952), The Anti-capitalist Mentality (1956), and Economic Policy (1979).
What about the argument that capitalism “unfairly” distributes the goods produced by it? Mises demonstrates that the argument is based on a false conception of the free-market process. Production and distribution are two sides of the same coin. Production requires the combined use of various factors of production, and labor is one of those resources. Each resource is offered a price, through entrepreneurial judgments, for its service equal to its relative value as a contribution to the production of commodities. Each factor of production contracts for the services it will render before there is a product available for sale.
The entrepreneur develops expectations about what consumers would be willing to pay in the future for the product being considered, and offers wages to laborers and payment for services of other resources.
But who are the consumers? Ultimately, they are the very same laborers and resource owners whom the entrepreneur is considering hiring. It is thus the laborers and resource owners, in their roles as consumers, who determine what their own relative income shares will be. They do so through their decisions about what they wish to buy and what prices they are willing to pay for them.
Thus, if some groups of workers believe they are “unfairly” paid, they have no one to accuse but themselves and the other laborers. They have failed to spend a greater percentage of their income on the particular products that the workers produce.
“Producers” and “consumers” are really the same people. And because this is always true in the free market, the second charge against free-market capitalism, that it produces “socially undesirable” products, also fails.
First, as Mises forcefully argued, there is no dichotomy between “society” and the individuals comprising it. Nothing happens to or for “society” that doesn’t originate with the individuals whose actions create societal relationships.
Second, in the free market, competition makes the entrepreneur the servant and not the master of the economic process. The entrepreneur must ultimately supply what individuals in their role as consumers demand. An entrepreneur who fails to do this will be driven from business and other entrepreneurs more sensitive to consumer wishes will replace him.
Finally, when people say that some product is “socially undesirable,” they really mean that people in society are demanding things of which they disapprove. But rather than attempt to use reason to persuade others to change their buying preferences, they want to use government to coerce them into abstinence. To answer this, Mises argued that freedom is indivisible. Once it is admitted that government has the right to infringe on the peaceful and personal preferences of individuals in one area, state interference cannot logically be excluded from other spheres. At the end of this road is the totalitarian state (see Liberalism, pp. 52-57).
In Human Action, Mises showed that free markets mean social cooperation, not social conflict. It is through this process of competition that we know who, among the various suppliers, can most successfully satisfy consumers’ demands at the least cost and, therefore, at the lowest price. And through this process each individual finds his most efficient and profitable place in the social system of the division of labor.
He who asks for state protection from the rigors of competition, Mises explains, is asking for special privilege at the expense of the other members of society. He is demanding special regulations, tariffs, or subsidies in order to receive a higher relative income than what others in the free-market economy are willing to pay him for his products or services.
If the government grants the special privilege, the results are disruptive of the peaceful free market process of economic change and progress. When other members of society begin to obtain government privileges and protections, the cumulative effect is declining production, less innovation, higher prices, and a lower standard of living for the members of the whole society.
Mises’s most important contribution to understanding the fallacies of state intervention is his demonstration that “the Middle-of-the-Road Leads to Socialism.” All government interventions and regulations are inherently destabilizing and disruptive. And the logical consequences of one set of interventions is that the government will extend its controls to more and more sectors of the economy to “repair” the damage created by the first set of controls.
If, for example, the government imposes price controls in one part of the economy, the controls will distort the existing free-market relationships between prices and the costs of production. If the controlled price is set below the costs of production, sellers in that part of the economy will no longer be able to produce the same amount of the product as before. If the government wants high production levels, it must extend the price controls to the prices of the factors that go into making that product. But those factors of production have, in turn, been produced with other resources whose prices will also have to be controlled.
The interdependency of all prices and all markets in a system of division of labor means that if the government decides to control one part of the economy, it must end up controlling all of it. Finally, when the controls and regulations pervade every portion of the economy, the free market is completely supplanted by the state, and socialism replaces capitalism through piecemeal interventionism. In short, as Mises says, “the middle-of-the-road policy is not an economic system that can last. It is a method for the realization of socialism by installments.”
But what would logically happen if government remains on the interventionist road is different from what must happen.
Mises repeatedly observed that the Western world was moving toward collectivism. But he also emphasized that “the trend can be reversed as was the case with many other trends in history.” In the realm of human action no choices are “inevitable.” History is made by men, and men are ultimately guided by ideas.
A victory for free-market capitalism is possible. Just as theory and experience refuted the case for socialism, the same can happen to state intervention and the “mixed economy.”
In fact, in terms of practical results, state intervention is already defunct. But people must be shown how to read the signs left behind by a controlled, taxed, and welfarist “mixed economy.” People must understand why it happened and what it demonstrates, that if we want peace, prosperity, and liberty, there is no alternative to free-market capitalism.
Thanks to Ludwig von Mises, we have the arguments and insights to lead us in the battle of ideas.

Thursday, April 25, 2013

Mises and the Soviet Free Market

By Lawrence W. Reed
Not many Soviet citizens have ever read Ludwig von Mises’s great Socialism. The Soviet government doesn’t want the people to know the truth about a command economy. They are supposed to be good, little citizens—pacified and rendered docile by the benevolence of the omnipotent state.
But even if the Soviet public doesn’t understand exactly why the official economy doesn’t work, they want as little to do with it as possible. In their own actions, they show consistent preference for free markets over government markets, even though demonstrating that preference is risky.
The reason that Soviet socialism has flopped is—as Mises proved in 1922—that all centrally “planned” economies must, by their very nature, fail.
Given the fact of nature that everybody can’t have everything they want—that is, that there is economic scarcity—there must be some means of directing resources to their most efficient uses.
One way to do this is to have central planners set prices and production, telling people what to buy, how much to buy, and when to buy. But, as Mises pointed out in Socialism:
In any social order, even under Socialism, it can very easily be decided which kind and what number of consumption goods should be produced. No one has ever denied that. But once this decision has been made, there still remains the problem of ascertaining how the existing means of production can be used most effectively to produce these goods in question. In order to solve this problem it is necessary that there should be economic calculation. And economic calculation can only take place by means of money prices established in the market for production goods in a society resting on private property in the means of production. That is to say, there must exist money prices of land, raw materials, semimanufactures; that is to say, there must be money wages and interest rates.
For calculation to occur, says Mises, there must be money prices. Those can only come from free markets, never governments. Socialism is thus always doomed to fail.
The problem of this argument for socialists is it doesn’t rely on ethical standards or political ideologies. Neither does it say, like so many arguments in favor of markets, that markets are better because they make people richer. (Although it is, of course, true that socialism is immoral, and that it makes people poor.) It rather says of socialism the most damning thing of all to these alleged scientists: that their “scientific socialism” makes rational economic calculation impossible.
Mises simply argues that all exchange relationships established by the government are necessarily arbitrary. In fact, any government intervention hinders economic calculation, and makes the allocation of resources an irrational process.
We take the miracle of market pricing for granted. But notice what happens when government hampers the pricing mechanism. Think of the times that the U.S. government has put price controls on goods like oil. Pandemonium ensues. The Soviet economy is under constant price controls. How do they know, for example, in clothing production what the proper ratio is between ties and socks? The only way to know is to allow people to freely buy and sell, thus expressing their own subjective valuations and personal preferences, and allow the market to establish the proper ratio.
If there is a problem at the tie-sock level, how could a socialist economy run? It has no pricing system upon which to base judgments about production. How do you make any decisions without market pricing? How are production costs figured? How do you know if you’re making profits or losses? There is no way without a market. Prices in the Soviet Union are approximated from their own black market or from other countries.
A spokesman for the Soviet Foreign Ministry, in an unintended tribute to Mises, recently told some visiting Americans that his dream was to have “the entire world Communist. Except New Zealand.” Why the exception? “We have to have somebody to tell us the prices.”
Mises wrote his critique in 1922. It was the most telling blow socialism ever received, and socialists are still trying to answer it. Mises forced socialists to think about how socialism works in practice. After more than 65 years, he has not been answered.
Socialists of all stripes, from Marx to Galbraith, typically wax eloquent on the alleged evils of capitalism, but never spell out how their version of society would operate. If the economy is to be planned, what’s the plan? This is the socialist mystery of the missing blueprints, and Mises was the first to call their bluff.

Whatever kind of economy they want, socialists inevitably claim that the Soviet economy isn’t it. That’s not real socialism, they say. But no matter what socialists want, when the means of production are put in the hands of the state, the Soviet economy is what they’re going to get: rich politicians, impoverished masses, and irrational use of resources. The Soviet Union is socialism in action.
I have visited the Soviet Union three times since March 1985, and I have always been impressed by the size and vitality of the underground economy, the vast and murky world of the “black” market—the free network of illegal production and trade that enables millions of dissatisfied comrades to meet their needs.
Ordinary Russians have taught themselves to dodge and weave around the state with surprising skill and daring, as Hedrick Smith notes in his bestseller, The Russians:
This counter-economy has become an integral part of the Soviet system, a built-in permanent feature of Soviet society. It encompasses everything from petty bribing, black marketing, wholesale thieving from the state, and underground private manufacturing, all the way up to a full-fledged godfather operation which was exposed and led to the downfall of a high Communist Party figure. . . . It operates on an almost oriental scale and with a brazen normality that would undoubtedly incense the original Bolshevik revolutionaries.
On more than one occasion, I have been propositioned for my blue jeans or tennis shoes (once even in Red Square) by young Russians who seem to appear out of nowhere, quickly arrange a time and place to consummate the transaction, then disappear into the crowd.
A vast market in American dollars bubbles beneath the surface of official life in Russia, despite harsh penalties. A short walk down the street from one’s hotel usually brings one or two currency traders to your side, whispering “rubles for dollars” at three and four times the legal rate.
One young man in Leningrad told me he earns about 400 rubles a month, but less than a quarter of it is legal. The rest he earns by marketing contraband books and other items smuggled in from the West. Last year he bought a car—rarely a private possession in the workers’ paradise—for about 8,000 rubles. He registered it in his father’s name, so the state wouldn’t question where he got the money.
Russian dentists, he told me, do not use Novocain, even when pulling teeth, thanks to state misallocation. But he pays his dentist a little extra under the table. Many dentists have their own illegal private practices—complete with painkillers—during off-hours, and that’s when the quality of care goes up.
American movies are popular in the Soviet underground. People duplicate copies and sell dozens all over Leningrad. If you’re caught, you get years in the slammer.
Practically everybody in the Soviet Union is trading and exchanging on the free market. Still, empty official slogans are plastered on buildings or mounted on rooftops all over the place proclaiming “The Plan of the 27th Party Congress Will Be Fulfilled” or, even more laughable, “The Party and the People Are One!”
The Soviet state has been successful so far in keeping articles and books by Ludwig von Mises and other free-market thinkers extremely rare. Still people grumble about the state, then go about their private and profitable affairs. But I’d like to change that. If the insights of Socialism became widely known, Gorbachev would be staring a real revolution in the face.

Wednesday, April 24, 2013

Mises and Gorbachev: Why Socialism Still Doesn’t Work

By Tom Bethell
Last summer, the following headline appeared over a page-one story by Dusko Doder in the Washington Post:
Gorbachev’s Vigor Raises ExpectationsNew Soviet Leader Focuses on Economy
Mr. Doder proceeded to inform us that the new Soviet “leader” (what an odd word to use, by the way) had been showing an “almost breathtaking determination to make changes in the Soviet economy.”
Two weeks later Serge Schmemann of the New York Times wrote of “the depth of excitement and hope that Mr. Gorbachev seems to have tapped across the land in his first 100 days in office.”
Since Gorbachev’s accession, there have been many similar stories, conveying a ventriloquized media enthusiasm for the new “leader.” There can be no doubt that, in the opinion of many U.S. journalists, the socialist economic system of state-controlled resources and central command has not worked well lately in the Soviet Union because the men in charge have been elderly and incompetent. In other words, there is nothing wrong with the system itself—provided it is managed by a skillful, vigorous elite.
Robert Kaiser of the Washington Post put it this way in an article headlined “Now Russia Will Change.” Gorbachev, he said, is a “new kind of Soviet man.” He is “young, well-educated, vital, relaxed and by all outward appearances self-confident.” True, Kaiser conceded, there were problems in the economy—“corruption,” for example, and “inefficiency.” Also an “entrenched bureaucracy.” But all this would no doubt soon change with the vigorous Mr. G. at the helm.
Well, Mr. Kaiser (who was the Post’s correspondent in Moscow in the early 1970s) is in for a big disappointment. And so are the poor, long-suffering Russian people. Nothing is likely to change, although it is possible that Gorbachev will make things worse.
The great difficulty for Mr. Gorbachev is this: socialist economies all have a serious defect which cannot be resolved by vigor or good intentions. This defect was spelled out by Ludwig von Mises as long ago as 1920—before the evidence of socialist failure was available. His analysis amounted to a prediction that has been verified.
The problem is this: It is one thing for central planners to draw up a plan of production. It is quite another thing to carry it out. Here we encounter the famous “problem of economic calculation” formulated by Mises. How can you (the planners) know what should be produced, before you know what people want? And people cannot know what they want unless they first know the price of things. But prices themselves can only be established when people are permitted to own things and to exchange them among themselves. But people do not have these rights in centrally planned economies.
The planners can, of course, decide beforehand what goods are to be manufactured, whether or not the people really want them. But as Trygve Hoff points out in his book Economic Calculation in the Socialist Society, only the most primitive planning can proceed in this way. In real life the planners and their subordinate factory managers bump up against the central fact of economic life—scarcity. There is not enough of everything to go around. One is tempted to say that there is not enough of anything to go around—if it is both desirable and free. (Air seems to be the only exception.)
It is worth noting that when, in the 1920s and 1930s economists tried to rebut Mises, some of them went so far as to challenge the assumption of scarcity, suggesting that it was a chimera stage-managed by nefarious monopolists. But if we assume that scarcity is a reality, as we must, then we are forced to conclude that goods must be priced. And yet the central planners do not know how to price them in the absence of markets.
Prices depend for their formation on the real possibility of personal profit or loss. Try to imagine a serious game of poker played with Monopoly money. All psychological incentive is removed by the knowledge that at the end of the evening, no one playing is really going to lose or gain anything.
In The Foundations of Morality, Henry Hazlitt made one of the clearest statements of the problem of socialist pricing:
“If I am a government commissar selling something I don’t really own, and you are another government commissar buying it with money that isn’t really yours, then neither of us really cares what the price is. When, as in a socialist or communist country, the heads of mines and factories, or stores and collective farms, are mere salaried government bureaucrats, and sell their finished products to still other bureaucrats, the so-called prices at which they buy and sell are mere book-keeping fictions. Such bureaucrats are merely playing an artificial game called ‘free market.’ They cannot make a socialist system work like a free-market system merely by imitating prices while ignoring private property.”
The Polish economist Oskar Lange tried to save the day for the socialist by claiming that prices could be established by trial and error: set prices at a given level and then move it up or down depending on whether it yields a shortage or a surplus. But here the socialist run into their second great difficulty—the transmission of information to the central planning authority. How do the central planners know where things are in shortage and where they are in surplus? (This problem was first elucidated by F. A. Hayek.) The point is that it is difficult and expensive to move information to a central point.
Alternatively, one could say that only a comparatively small amount of information can be crammed into a central point. Here we may think of another analogy. How do you get a message onto President Reagan’s desk? Obviously you can’t just call him up, and if you write, your message will compete with the thousands of letters that arrive each day. A lot of money is spent in Washington trying to solve this problem. The same problem exists for Soviet commissars trying to get the attention of the people in Moscow who have decision-making authority.
In response to these various difficulties there are, I believe, three options open to the planning authority (over which Mr. Gorbachev presides). It can turn a blind eye on the various underling officials and managers as they make transactions and exchanges among themselves without getting permission from Moscow. This option—de facto decentralization—is labeled “corruption,” however, and it is very unpopular with those who think that socialism should be made to work according to the prescriptions of Lenin. Leonid Brezhnev evidently used the “blind-eye” method. But with Yuri Andropov there was a crackdown. Various officials were shot to discourage the others.
“Crackdown” is in fact the second option, and the one preferred by reformers everywhere, including, of course, American liberals. Gorbachev is Andropov’s protégé and he may well try to go this route. Apparently he already tried it in agriculture, over which he earlier presided. Grain production declined from 237 million tons in 1978 to 170 million tons in 1984. (Such declines are normally attributed to “bad weather.”) Nonetheless Gorbachev was promoted, and he may well now attempt a more general crackdown. If he does, he would provoke a more general decline in Soviet production.
The third option is for Gorbachev to attempt to decentralize the system—i.e. to legalize many of the actions previously labeled corrupt. This in effect is a movement away from socialism. It would be the best thing Gorbachev could attempt, but here he will run up against the “entrenched bureaucracy” that Robert Kaiser alluded to. Decentralizing the Soviet economy depends on issuing orders that are the functional equivalent of telling captains that they no longer need to obey majors, and corporals that they are on a par with sergeants.
The point is that it is very difficult to get such unpopular orders to pass down the chain of command. Colonels will always find ways of obstructing commands that have the effects of denying their own authority. (In the reverse direction, the Soviet economy suffers from an equally serious problem: just as unpopular orders won’t travel downhill, so unpopular information won’t travel uphill. Reports of unfulfilled plans and quotas tend to be ameliorated as they move closer to the center.)
Of the various problems associated with the Soviet economy (and all socialist economies) the “entrenched bureaucracy” is the one that U.S. journalists are beginning to appreciate and describe. For example in late May David Ignatius wrote in the Wall Street Journal:
It may prove impossible to both increase the independence of individual Soviet enterprises and retain full central control of the economy. Says Arnold Horelick, the director of the Rand-UCLA Center for the Study of Soviet International Behaviour: “I would describe Gorbachev’s reforms as trying to have his cake and eat it, too.”
Maybe China will prove me wrong. I hope so. But at present the evident suggests that communism cannot be reformed from within. My guess is that of the three options listed here, the “Brezhnev-blind-eye” is the only one that is remotely workable—not that it produces brilliant results—and Mr. Gorbachev will almost certainly resort to it if he stays in his office for any length of time.

Tuesday, April 23, 2013

The Politics of Famine


By Murray N. Rothbard


The media focuses primarily on the horrifying shots of the starving children, and secondarily on the charges and counter-charges about which governments—the Western or the Ethiopian—are responsible for relief not getting to the starving thousands on time. In the midst of the media blitz, the important and basic questions get lost in the shuffle. For example, why does Nature seem to frown only on socialist countries? If the problem is drought, why do the rains only elude countries that are socialist or heavily statist? Why does the United States never suffer from poor climate?
The root of famine lies not in the gods or in our stars but in the actions of man. Climate is not the reason that Russia before Communism was a heavy exporter of grain, while now the Soviet Union is a grain importer. Nature is not responsible for the fact that, of all the countries of East Africa, the Marxist-Leninist nations of Ethiopia and Mozambique are now the major sufferers from mass famine and starvation. Given causes yield given effects, and it is an ineluctable law of nature and of man that if agriculture is systematically crippled and exploited, food production will collapse, and famine will be the result.
The root of the problem is the Third World, where (a) agriculture is overwhelmingly the most important industry, and (b) the people are not affluent enough, in any crisis, to purchase food from abroad. Hence, to Third World people, agriculture is the most precious activity, and it becomes particularly important that it not be hobbled or discouraged in any way. Yet, wherever there is production, there are also parasitic classes living off the producers. The Third World in our century has been the favorite arena for applied Marxism, for revolutions, coups, or domination by Marxist intellectuals. Whenever such new ruling classes have taken over, and have imposed statist or full socialist rule, the class most looted, exploited, and oppressed has been the major productive class: the farmers or peasantry. Literally tens of millions of the most productive farmers were slaughtered by the Russian and Chinese Communist regimes, and the remainder were forced off their private lands and onto cooperative or state farms, where their productivity plummeted, and food production gravely declined.
And even in those countries where land was not directly nationalized, the new burgeoning state apparatus flourished on the backs of the peasantry, by levying heavy taxes and by forcing peasants to sell grain to the state at far below market prices. The artificially cheap food was then used to subsidize foods supplies for the urban population which formed the major base of support for the new bureaucratic class. The standard paradigm in African and in Asian countries has been as follows: British, French, Portuguese, or whatever imperialism carved out artificial boundaries of what they dubbed “colonies,” and established capital cities to administer and rule over the mass of peasantry. The new class of higher and lower bureaucrats lived off the peasants by taxing them and forcing them to sell their produce artificially cheaply to the state. When the imperial powers pulled out, they turned over these new nations to the tender mercies of Marxist intellectuals, generally trained in London, Paris, or Lisbon, who imposed socialism or far greater statism, thereby aggravating the problem enormously. Furthermore, a vicious spiral was set up, similar to the one that brought the Roman Empire to its knees. The oppressed and exploited peasantry, tired of being looted for the sake of the urban sector, decided to leave the farm and go sign up in the welfare state provided in the capital city. This makes the farmer’s lot still worse, hence more of them leave the farm, despite brutal measures trying to prevent them from leaving. The result of this spiral is famine.
Thus, most African governments force farmers to sell all their crops to the state at only a half or even a third of market value. Ethiopia, as a Marxist-Leninist government, also forced the farmers onto highly inefficient state farms, and tried to keep them working there by brutal oppression.
The answer to famine in Ethiopia or elsewhere is not international food relief. Since relief is invariably under the control of the recipient government, the food generally gets diverted from the farms to line the pockets of government officials to subsidize the already well-fed urban population. The answer to famine is to liberate the peasantry of the Third World from the brutality and exploitation of the state ruling class. The answer to famine is freedom and private property.

Monday, April 22, 2013

Protectionism and the Destruction of Prosperity

By Murray N. Rothbard

Protectionism, often refuted and seemingly abandoned, has returned, and with a vengeance. The Japanese, who bounced back from grievous losses in World War II to astound the world by producing innovative, high-quality products at low prices, are serving as the convenient butt of protectionist propaganda. Memories of wartime myths, mixed with discrete anti-Oriental racism, can prove a heady brew, as protectionists warn about this new “Japanese imperialism,” even “worse than Pearl Harbor.” This “imperialism” turns out to consist of selling Americans wonderful Sony TV sets, autos, microchips, etc. at prices more than competitive with backward and lumbering American firms.
Is this “flood” of Japanese products really a menace, to be combated by the U.S. government? Or is the new Japan a godsend to American consumers?
In taking our stand on this issue, we should recognize that all government action means coercion, so that calling upon the U.S. government to intervene means urging it to use force and violence to restrain peaceful trade. One trusts that the protectionists are not willing to pursue their logic of force to the ultimate in the form of another Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Keep Your Eye on the Consumer
As we unravel the tangled web of protectionist argument, we should keep our eye on two essential points: 1) protectionism means force in restraint of trade; and 2) the key is what happens to the consumer. Invariably, we will find that the protectionists are out to cripple, exploit, and impose severe losses not only on foreign consumers but especially on Americans. And since each and every one of us is a consumer, this means that protectionism is out to mulct all of us for the benefit of a specially privileged, subsidized few—and an inefficient few at that: people who cannot make it in a free and unhampered market.
Take, for example, the alleged Japanese menace. All trade is mutually beneficial to both parties—in this case Japanese producers and American consumers—otherwise they would not engage in the exchange. In trying to stop this trade, protectionists are trying to stop American consumers from enjoying high living standards by buying cheap and high-quality Japanese products. Instead, we are to be forced by government to return to the inefficient, higher-priced products we have already rejected. In short, inefficient producers are trying to deprive all of us of products we desire so that we will have to turn to inefficient firms. American consumers are to be plundered.
How To Look at Tariffs and Quotas
The best way to look at tariffs or import quotas or other protectionist restraints is to forget about political boundaries. Political boundaries of nations may be important for other reasons, but they have no economic meaning whatever. Suppose, for example, that each state of the United States were a separate nation. Then we would hear a lot of protectionist bellyaching that we are now fortunately spared. Think of the howls by inefficient, high-priced New York or Rhode Island textile manufacturers who would then be complaining about the “unfair,” “cheap labor” competition from various low-type “foreigners” from Tennessee or North Carolina, or vice versa.
Fortunately, the absurdity of worrying about the balance of payments is made evident by focusing on interstate trade. For nobody worries about the balance of payments between New York and New Jersey, or, for that matter, between Manhattan and Brooklyn, because there are no customs officials recording such trade and such balances.
If we think about it, it is clear that a call by New York firms for a tariff against North Carolina is a pure ripoff of New York (as well as North Carolina) consumers, a naked grab for coerced special privilege by inefficient business firms. If the 50 states were separate nations, the protectionists would then be able to use the trappings of patriotism, and distrust of foreigners, to camouflage and get away with their looting the consumers of their own region.
Fortunately, interstate tariff’s are unconstitutional. But even with this clear barrier, and even without being able to wrap themselves in the cloak of nationalism, protectionists have been able to impose interstate tariffs in another guise. Part of the drive for continuing increases in the federal minimum wage law is to impose a protectionist device against lower-wage, lower-labor-cost competition from North Carolina and other southern states against their New England and New York competitors.
During the 1966 Congressional battle over a higher federal minimum wage, for example, the late Senator Jacob Javits (R-NY) freely admitted that one of his main reasons for supporting the bill was to cripple the southern competitors of New York textile firms. Since southern wages are generally lower than in the north, the business firms (and the workers struck by unemployment) hardest hit by an increased minimum wage will be located in the south.
Another way in which interstate trade restrictions have been imposed has been in the fashionable name of “safety.” Government-organized state milk cartels in New York, for example, have prevented importation of milk from nearby New Jersey under the patently spurious grounds that the trip across the Hudson would render New Jersey milk “unsafe.”
If tariffs and restraints on trade are good for a country, then why not indeed for a state or region? The principle is precisely the same. In America’s first great depression, the Panic of 1819, Detroit was a tiny frontier town of only a few hundred people. Yet protectionist cries arose—fortunately not fulfilled—to prohibit all “imports” from outside of Detroit, and citizens were exhorted to “buy only Detroit.” If this nonsense had been put into effect, general starvation and death would have ended all other economic problems for Detroiters.
So why not restrict and even prohibit trade, i.e. “imports,” into a city, or a neighborhood, or even on a block, or, to boil it down to its logical conclusion, to one family? Why shouldn’t the Jones family issue a decree that from now on, no member of the family can buy any goods or services produced outside the family house? Starvation would quickly wipe out this ludicrous drive for self-sufficiency.
And yet we must realize that this absurdity is inherent in the logic of protectionism. Standard protectionism is just as preposterous, but the rhetoric of nationalism and national boundaries has been able to obscure this vital fact.
The upshot is that protectionism is not only nonsense, but dangerous nonsense, destructive of all economic prosperity. We are not, if we were ever, a world of self-sufficient farmers. The market economy is one vast latticework throughout the world, in which each individual, each region, each country, produces what he or it is best at, most relatively efficient in, and exchanges that product for the goods and services of others. Without the division of labor and the trade based upon that division, the entire world would starve. Coerced restraints on trade—such as protectionism—cripple, hobble, and destroy trade, the source of life and prosperity. Protectionism is simply a plea that consumers, as well as general prosperity, be hurt so as to confer permanent special privilege upon groups of inefficient producers, at the expense of competent firms and of consumers. But it is a peculiarly destructive kind of bailout, because it permanently shackles trade under the cloak of patriotism.
The Negative Railroad
Protectionism is also peculiarly destructive because it acts as a coerced and artificial increase in the cost of transportation between regions. One of the great features of the Industrial Revolution, one of the ways in which it brought prosperity to the starving masses, was by reducing drastically the cost of transportation. The development of railroads in the early 19th century, for example, meant that for the first time in the history of the human race, goods could be transported cheaply over land. Before that, water—rivers and oceans—was the only economically viable means of transport. By making land transport accessible and cheap, railroads allowed interregional land transportation to break up expensive inefficient local monopolies. The result was an enormous improvement in living standards for all consumers. And what the protectionists want to do is lay an axe to this wonderous principle of progress.
It is no wonder that Frederic Bastiat, the great French laissez-faire economist of the mid-19th century, called a tariff a “negative railroad.” Protectionists are just as economically destructive as if they were physically chopping up railroads, or planes, or ships, and forcing us to revert to the costly transport of the past—mountain trails, rafts, or sailing ships.
“Fair” Trade
Let us now turn to some of the leading protectionist arguments. Take, for example, the standard complaint that while the protectionist “welcomes competition,” this competition must be “fair.” Whenever someone starts talking about “fair competition” or indeed, about “fairness” in general, it is time to keep a sharp eye on your wallet, for it is about to be picked. For the genuinely “fair” is simply the voluntary terms of exchange, mutually agreed upon by buyer and seller. As most of the medieval scholastics were able to figure out, there is no “just” (or “fair”) price outside of the market price.
So what could be “unfair” about the free-market price? One common protectionist charge is that it is “unfair” for an American firm to compete with, say, a Taiwanese firm which needs to pay only one-half the wages of the American competitor. The U.S. government is called upon to step in and “equalize” the wage rates by imposing an equivalent tariff upon the Taiwanese. But does this mean that consumers can never patronize low-cost firms because it is “unfair” for them to have lower costs than inefficient competitors? This is the same argument that would be used by a New York firm trying to cripple its North Carolina competitor.
What the protectionists don’t bother to explain is why U.S. wage rates are so much higher than Taiwan. They are not imposed by Providence. Wage rates are high in the U.S. because American employers have bid these rates up. Like all other prices on the market, wage rates are determined by supply and demand, and the increased demand by U.S. employers has bid wages up. What determines this demand? The “marginal productivity” of labor.
The demand for any factor of production, including labor, is constituted by the productivity of that factor, the amount of revenue that the worker, or the pound of cement or acre of land, is expected to bring to the brim. The more productive the factory, the greater the demand by employers, and the higher its price or wage rate. American labor is more costly than Taiwanese because it is far more productive. What makes it productive? To some extent, the comparative qualities of labor, skill, and education. But most of the difference is not due to the personal qualities of the laborers themselves, but to the fact that the American laborer, on the whole, is equipped with more and better capital equipment than his Taiwanese counterparts. The more and better the capital investment per worker, the greater the worker’s productivity, and therefore the higher the wage rate.
In short, if the American wage rate is twice that of the Taiwanese, it is because the American laborer is more heavily capitalized, is equipped with more and better tools, and is therefore, on the average, twice as productive. In a sense, I suppose, it is not “fair” for the American worker to make more than the Taiwanese, not because of his personal qualities, but because savers and investors have supplied him with more tools. But a wage rate is determined not just by personal quality but also by relative scarcity, and in the United States the worker is far scarcer compared to capital than he is in Taiwan.
Putting it another way, the fact that American wage rates are on the average twice that of the Taiwanese, does not make the cost of labor in the U.S. twice that of Taiwan. Since U.S. labor is twice as productive, this means that the double wage rate in the U.S. is offset by the double productivity, so that the cost of labor per unit product in the U.S. and Taiwan tends, on the average, to be the same. One of the major protectionist fallacies is to confuse the price of labor (wage rates) with its cost, which also depends on its relative productivity.
Thus, the problem faced by American employers is not really with the “cheap labor” in Taiwan, because “expensive labor” in the U.S. is precisely the result of the bidding for scarce labor by U.S. employers. The problem faced by inefficient U.S. textile or auto firms is not so much cheap labor in Taiwan or Japan, but the fact that other U.S. industries are efficient enough to afford it, because they bid wages that high in the first place.
So, by imposing protective tariffs and quotas to save, bail out, and keep in place inefficient U.S. textile or auto or microchip firms, the protectionists are injuring the American consumer. They are also harming efficient U.S. firms and industries, which are prevented from employing resources now locked into incompetent firms, and who would otherwise be able to expand and sell their efficient products at home and abroad.
“Dumping”
Another contradictory line of protectionist assault on the free market asserts that the problem is not so much the low costs enjoyed by foreign firms, as the “unfairness” of selling their products “below costs” to American consumers, and thereby engaging in the pernicious and sinful practice of “dumping.” By such dumping they are able to exert unfair advantage over American firms who presumably never engage in such practices and make sure that their prices are always high enough to cover costs. But if selling below costs is such a powerful weapon, why isn’t it ever pursued by business firms within a country?
Our first response to this charge is, once again, to keep our eye on consumers in general and on American consumers in particular. Why should it be a matter of complaint when consumers so clearly benefit? Suppose, for example, that Sony is willing to injure American competitors by selling TV sets to Americans for a penny apiece. Shouldn’t we rejoice at such an absurd policy of suffering severe losses by subsidizing us, the American consumers? And shouldn’t our response be: “Come on, Sony, subsidize us some more!” As far as consumers are concerned, the more “dumping” that takes place, the better.
But what of the poor American TV firms, whose sales will suffer so long as Sony is virtually willing to give their sets away? Well, surely, the sensible policy for RCA, Zenith, etc. would be to hold back production and sales until Sony drives itself into bankruptcy. But suppose that the worst happens, and RCA, Zenith, etc. are themselves driven into bankruptcy by the Sony price war? Well, in that case, we the consumers will still be better off, since the plants of the bankrupt firms, which would still be in existence, would be picked up for a song at auction, and the American buyers at auction would be able to enter the TV business and outcompete Sony because they now enjoy far lower capital costs.
For decades, indeed, opponents of the free market have claimed that many businesses gained their powerful status on the market by what is called “predatory price-cutting,” that is, by driving their smaller competitors into bankruptcy by selling their goods below cost, and then reaping the reward of their unfair methods by raising their prices and thereby charging “monopoly prices” to the consumers. The claim is that while consumers may gain in the short-run by price wars, “dumping,” and selling below costs, they lose in the long-run from the alleged monopoly. But, as we have seen, economic theory shows that this would be a mug’s game, losing money for the “dumping” firms, and never really achieving a monopoly price. And sure enough, historical investigation has not turned up a single case where predatory pricing, when tried, was successful, and there are actually very few cases where it has even been tried.
Another charge claims that Japanese or other foreign firms can afford to engage in dumping because their governments are willing to subsidize their losses. But again, we should still welcome such an absurd policy. If the Japanese government is really willing to waste scarce resources subsidizing American purchases of Sony’s, so much the better! Their policy would be just as self-defeating as if the losses were private.
There is yet another problem with the charge of “dumping,” even when it is made by economists or other alleged “experts” sitting on impartial tariff commissions and government bureaus, there is no way whatever that outside observers, be they economists, businessmen, or other experts, can decide what some other firm’s “costs” may be. “Costs” are not objective entities that can be gauged or measured. Costs are subjective to the businessman himself, and they vary continually, depending on the businessman’s time horizon or the stage of production or selling process he happens to be dealing with at any given time.
Suppose, for example, a fruit dealer has purchased a case of pears for $20, amounting to $1 a pound. He hopes and expects to sell those pears for $1.50 a pound. But something has happened to the pear market, and he finds it impossible to sell most of the pears at anything near that price. In fact, he finds that he must sell the pears at whatever price he can get before they become overripe. Suppose he finds that he can only sell his stock of pears at 70 cents a pound. The outside observer might say that the fruit dealer has, perhaps “unfairly,” sold his pears “below costs,” figuring that the dealer’s costs were $1 a pound.
“Infant” Industries
Economists agree on very little. But economists agree virtually unanimously on one thing: their oppostion to protectionism. Classically, they made one unfortunate exception, an exception which the specially privileged were able to use and magnify to become an enormous hole in the free-trade case. This argument held that the government should provide a temporary protective tariff to aid, or to bring into being, an “infant industry.” Then, when the industry was well established, the government would and should remove the tariff and toss the now “mature” industry into the competitive swim.
The theory was fallacious, and the policy proved disastrous in practice. For there is no more need for government to protect a new, young, industry from foreign competition than there is to protect it from domestic competition.
In the last few decades, the “infant” plastics, television, and computer industries made out very well without such protection. Any government subsidizing of a new industry will funnel too many resources into that industry as compared to older firms, and will also inaugurate distortions that may persist and render the firm or industry permanently inefficient and vulnerable to competition. As a result, “infant-industry” tariffs have tended to become permanent, regardless of the “maturity” of the industry. The proponents were carried away by a misleading biological analogy to “infants” who need adult care. But a business firm is not a person, young or old.
Older Industries
Indeed, in recent years, older industries that are notoriously inefficient have been using what might be called a “senile-industry” argument for protectionism. Steel, auto, and other outcompeted industries have been complaining that they “need a breathing space” to retool and become competitive with foreign rivals, and that this breather could be provided by several years of tariffs or import quotas. This argument is just as full of holes as the hoary infant-industry approach, except that it will be even more difficult to figure out when the “senile” industry will have become magically rejuvenated. In fact, the steel industry has been inefficient ever since its inception, and its chronological age seems to make no difference. The first protectionist movement in the U.S. was launched in 1820, headed by the Pennsylvania iron (later iron and steel) industry, artificially force-fed by the War of 1812 and already in grave danger from far more efficient foreign competitors.
The Non-Problem of the Balance of Payments
A final set of arguments, or rather alarms, centers on the mysteries of the balance of payments. Protectionists focus on the horrors of imports being greater than exports, implying that if market forces continued unchecked, Americans might wind up buying everything from abroad, while selling foreigners nothing, so that American consumers will have engorged themselves to the permanent ruin of American business firms. But if the exports really fell to somewhere near zero, where in the world would Americans still find the money to purchase foreign products? The balance of payments, as we said earlier, is a pseudo-problem created by the existence of customs statistics.
During the day of the gold standard, a deficit in the national balance of payments was a problem, but only because of the nature of the fractional-reserve banking system. If U.S. banks, spurred on by the Fed or previous forms of central banks, inflated money and credit, the American inflation would lead to higher prices in the U.S., and this would discourage exports and encourage imports. The resulting deficit had to be paid for in some way, and during the gold standard era this meant being paid for in gold, the international money. So as bank credit expanded, gold began to flow out of the country, which put the fractional-reserve banks in even shakier shape. To meet the threat to their solvency posed by the gold outflow, the banks eventually were forced to contract credit, precipitating a recession and reversing the balance of payment deficits, thus bringing gold back into the country.
But now, in the fiat-money era, balance of payments deficits are truly meaningless. For gold is no longer a “balancing item.” In effect, there is no deficit in the balance of payments. It is true that in the last few years, imports have been greater than exports by $150 billion or so per year. But no gold flowed out of the country. Neither did dollars “leak” out. The alleged “deficit” was paid for by foreigners investing the equivalent amount of money in American dollars: in real estate, capital goods, U.S. securities, and bank accounts.
In effect, in the last couple of years, foreigners have been investing enough of their own funds in dollars to keep the dollar high, enabling us to purchase cheap imports. Instead of worrying and complaining about this development, we should rejoice that foreign investors are willing to finance our cheap imports. The only problem is that this bonanza is already coming to an end, with the dollar becoming cheaper and exports more expensive.
We conclude that the sheaf of protectionist arguments, many plausible at first glance, are really a tissue of egregious fallacies. They betray a complete ignorance of the most basic economic analysis. Indeed, some of the arguments are almost embarrassing replies of the most ridiculous claims of 17th century mercantilism: for example, that it is somehow a calamitous problem that the U.S. has a balance of trade deficit, not overall, but merely with one specific country, e.g. Japan.
Must we even relearn the rebuttals of the more sophisticated mercantilists of the 18th century: namely, that balance with individual countries will cancel each other out, and therefore that we should only concern ourselves with the overall balance? (Let alone realize that the overall balance is no problem either.) But we need not reread the economic literature from Adam Smith to the present-day to realize that the impetus for protectionism comes not from preposterous theories, but from the quest for coerced special privilege and restraint of trade at the expense of efficient competitors and consumers.
In the host of special interests using the political process to repress and loot the rest of us, the protectionists are among the most venerable. It is high time that we get them, once and for all, off our backs, and treat them with the righteous indignation they so richly deserve.

Sunday, April 21, 2013

Economic Warfare Hurts Us More Than Them


By Robert Higgs and Charlotte Twight





During the past decade the United States has repeatedly waged war, not with guns, missiles, and bombs, but with economic sanctions restricting the international transactions and travel of Americans.
Economic warfare—prohibitions of travel and commercial and financial dealings imposed selectively in order to alter the behavior of other governments—has been waged at one time or another since 1979 against Iran, Libya, Nicaragua, South Africa, and Syria as well as various communist countries.
Sanctions usually fail to attain their ostensible objective: they do not alter the conduct of other governments. But they do have significant domestic consequences. Americans suffer economic losses, both short-term and long-term. In effect, sanctions impose the costs of U.S. foreign policy on Americans interested in certain international commercial and financial deals or travel to certain countries.
Sanctions imposed after the Iranians took American hostages in Tehran in 1979 illustrate the erratic and arbitrary character of this instrument of foreign policy. President Carter first blocked all Iranian property in the United States and forbade most commercial and financial dealings with Iran. Then, as part of the deal to gain freedom for the hostages, Carter rescinded the sanctions, nullified attachments of Iranian property issued by federal courts, and suspended the legal claims of Americans against Iran. An Iran-United States Claims Tribunal was established in the Netherlands, and Americans were forbidden to press their claims in U.S. courts.
This extraordinary setting-aside of the judicial system by the president was challenged in an important 1981 Supreme Court case, Dames & Moore V. Regan. The Court’s decision gave broad scope to the president’s powers under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, sustaining his nullification of courts’ attachments of Iranian property. Moreover, the Court held that, even without explicit statutory authority, the president has constitutional power to suspend American claims in federal courts because of “a history of congressional acquiescence” in similar instances. Whatever Executive action Congress has never overtly disapproved, it has implicitly approved—a doctrine that would have astonished the Founding Fathers.
In making regulations to implement sanctions, the bureaucrats of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) have extraordinary discretion—the power to act arbitrarily and capriciously. Licenses may be denied, granted, or revoked at will. OFAC is not bound by the Administrative Procedure Act with regard to notice of proposed rule making, opportunity for public participation, or delay in effective date. OFAC officials may, and sometimes do, abruptly alter the rules solely at their pleasure. They often create loopholes for privileged parties, such as wholly-owned foreign subsidiaries of American oil companies that continue business as usual with Libya, notwithstanding the president’s order that Americans cease operations in that country. Administrative officials may, as in the Iranian case, set aside the protections normally afforded private property rights by the U.S. judicial system.
Economic warfare rarely promotes the national interest effectively. Rather, it is a costly form of political theater. Only governmental officials, especially the president, normally benefit from it; and even that benefit is fleeting.
A president wages economic warfare because it enhances his popularity, if only momentarily. It diverts attention from intractable domestic problems and creates an image that he is strong, that he is “doing something” to defend or promote American interests beyond our borders.
The image has little substance. The governments of Iran, Libya, Nicaragua, South Africa, and Syria have not been visibly moved by U.S. sanctions against them. But American citizens have been hurt. Although some firms have found ways to circumvent the sanctions, important business has been lost—computer sales to South Africa, aircraft sales to Syria, all exports to Nicaragua. American reputations for reliable service have suffered in the world market, where alternative foreign suppliers are usually happy to take on the business denied Americans by their own government.
More importantly, economic warfare has shifted rights from private hands into the hands of governmental officials who are free to exercise their newly acquired powers with virtually unchecked discretion. Nothing of genuine public importance has been gained; bad political and legal precedents have become established; a little more liberty has been lost. As Ludwig von Mises pointed out in The Free and Prosperous Commonwealth: “Nationalist policies, which always begin by aiming at the ruination of one’s neighbor, must, in the final analysis, lead to the ruination of all.”




Saturday, April 20, 2013

The Myth of the Trade Deficit


By Sam Wells




Almost daily we read and hear demands from leaders of industry and demagogic politicians to increase restrictions on foreign imports because of the “unfavorable balance of trade” that America is supposed to have with other countries. Although the Reagan administration has paid lip service to free trade, it has drastically increased political obstructions to foreign imports. In 1981, approximately 25% of all goods imported into the United States were subject to some kind of U.S. government restrictions. Today, that figure has risen to 40%.
And now the president has sent to Congress legislation to stiffen restrictions on imports and pile another layer of controls on top of the bunch we already have. Since 1982 the administration has, through government-to-government negotiations and arm-twisting, secured 18 agreements that limit steel exports to the United States. Last year, the administration pressured Japan and Taiwan into agreeing to limit their exports of machine tools to the U.S. for the next five years. After failing to secure “voluntary” trade restraints from Switzerland and Germany, the administration set new quotas which rolled back exports from those countries. Also last year, it used threats to obtain agreements with South Korea, Hong Kong, and Japan that limited the growth in the quantity of textiles they could export to the U.S. to only 1% or less per year. And these are only a few examples of increasingly prevalent protectionism.
In ominous tones, we are told that the United States has incurred a “trade deficit” and that this means disaster. In late January, the government—from whom all such numbers flow—revealed that the trade deficit for 1986 had amounted to $169.8 billion, a record level. Gosh! But what does it mean? Was the president right when he referred to us as “trade patsies”? Are Americans being taken advantage of by the opportunity to buy low-priced, foreign-made products? Are the trade policies of the Japanese “cheating” us? The answer is a clear No.
The great Ludwig von Mises, writing in 1946, showed how free trade works to the benefit of all parties:
Under free trade the Swiss watchmakers would expand their sales on the American market and the sales of their American competitors would shrink. But this is only a part of the consequences of free trade. Selling and producing more, the Swiss would earn and buy more. It does not matter whether they themselves buy more of the products of other American industries or whether they increase their domestic purchases and those in other countries, for instance, in France. Whatever happens, the equivalent of the additional dollars they earned must finally go to the United States and increase the sales of some American industries. If the Swiss do not give away their products as a gift, they must spend these dollars in buying.
So, in the long run, trade can never take jobs away, but only add them to the American economy as a whole.
Moreover, artificially trying to prop up inefficient industries through protectionist trade policies hurts us all by driving up prices and holding down quality. These policies also hurt other, efficient U.S. industries by tying up resources and capital in the protected sectors, which would otherwise flow to more efficient uses and satisfy consumer needs less expensively. How many Americans have any notion of the high costs imposed by auto import restraints? Despite its laudable free-market rhetoric, the current administration pushed for “voluntary” restraints on the number of Japanese automobiles sold to Americans. This had the effect of narrowing the alternatives from which American consumers could choose—and hiked the price by nearly $2,000 per car. That’s a total cost to American consumers of more than $250,000 for each U.S. auto-industry job supposedly saved. If you multiply that example by the number of other “protected” U.S. industries and jobs, the total burden to U.S. consumers amounts to $30-40 billion. And neo-mercantilist policies invite similar measures in retaliation from foreign governments whose leaders are also deluded by mercantilist myths.
Stepped-up protectionism in the U.S. Congress just in the last two years has already resulted in some very harmful foreign reprisals. While all American (and foreign) consumers are hurt by this war between governments, the American farmer has been especially hard hit. An editorial in USA Today noted:
A typical wheat, soybean, or cotton farmer gets fifty percent of his income from foreign sales. And recent U.S. efforts to protect specialty steel, textiles, and other industries have led to heavy retaliation by other countries against our grain exports. We’ve lost farm sales worth many times what we saved in the protected industries.
When Americans choose to buy lower-cost imports, they have more money to spend or invest in other ways. This means they have more of their wants and needs satisfied for a given income.
The freedom of Americans to buy goods made in other countries gives them a wider choice, and that’s all to the good. Not only has buying Japanese products not hurt Americans, but the money earned by the Japanese from their sales to us of VCRs, cars, stereos, cameras, and computer chips has come back to us in the form of Japanese investments.
If it were not for the inflow of this foreign capital (from Europe as well as Japan and elsewhere), the “crowding out” of domestic borrowers in our credit markets by big government’s gargantuan budget deficits would have slammed us into a deep repression long before now. So, it has given us a little more precious time to put our own house in order. Instead of expressing gratitude for this salutary consequence, our demagogic politicians are trying to make the Japanese and other foreigners the scapegoats for ills which the politicos themselves created.
What about “dumping” (selling goods to Americans at prices allegedly “below the cost of production”) or the Japanese keeping out U.S. goods? Japan is actually less protectionist than is the United States. And nobody can sell his products at below-cost for long without going out of business—much less making any profit. Besides, costs can only be subjectively determined, and they cannot be aggregated between or among industries, let alone countries. If “dumping” does occur, it is a great boon to Americans who take advantage of such bargains. (Why, by the way, isn’t Safeway attacked by Giant for dumping when it sells ketchup at a nominal loss to attract customers?)
But what if the Japanese government subsidizes some of its exporting companies so they can increase their American market share by selling at below-cost prices? Since consumption is the end of production, and since consumers clearly benefit by such a good deal, why should we care? If foreigners are foolish enough to allow their governments to tax them to subsidize their exporting companies, we should take full advantage of their generosity. It won’t last forever! (The only thing that apparently lasts forever is the U.S. government’s massive subsidization of our exporting companies through the Export-Import Bank and other examples of corporate welfare.)
One of the most important notions underlying the calls for stifling foreign imports is the “balance of trade” concept and the idea that a “trade deficit” (your country imports more goods than it exports) is bad and that a “trade surplus” (your country exports more than it imports) is good. This is pure superstition and goes back to the mercantilist days of the 17th century.
The terms “deficit” and “surplus” are accounting terms that apply to budgets. But they have been misappropriated from the context in which they have meaning and used to describe international trade. A “trade surplus” means a “favorable balance of trade” (exports greater than imports), while a “trade deficit” is supposed to denote an “unfavorable balance of trade” (imports greater than exports). This is what we are told by the modern mercantilists and Keynesians. But this notion is as false as it is widespread in current discussions on international economics. Although this fallacy was refuted by the great French economist Richard Cantillon 275 years ago, many have not learned the lesson.
There is no reason why trade should “balance out” between countries at any specific moment—any more than it should balance out between individuals or companies doing business with each other. If you walk into a supermarket and buy a loaf of bread by exchanging money for it, you don’t expect that particular supermarket to turn around and buy an equal amount of goods from you. It may take the money you gave for the bread and buy goods from somebody else, like a supplier or a truck farmer; but there’s no reason that goods should balance out in trade between two parties. The buyer gives up money for goods, and the seller gives up goods for money. Both sides benefit. The same applies to people or firms living in different countries.
When Americans buy imports, they are simply accepting payment for the goods they export (sell) to foreigners. Imports pay for exports and exports pay for imports. There is no reason they should always balance. Taking a statistical snapshot of the flow of goods between countries at any single time and calling that the “balance of trade” is artificial, misleading, and irrelevant. We don’t have to be concerned about it since it has no real bearing on the status or health of the economy. Yet, judging from all the media hype, we are supposed to fear a national “trade deficit” (which isn’t even a real deficit at all) more than the very real and definitely harmful federal budget deficit!
Americans who wish to preserve and expand their liberty, and maximize their choices in the market, should work to repeal existing restrictions and taxes on imported goods, and vigorously oppose efforts in Congress to impose still more protectionist legislation. Despite what we hear from the politicians, there is no conflict between the principles of freedom and patriotism: free trade is in the best interests of Americans and America. Instead of clamoring for more political intrusions on our freedom to buy and sell, those genuinely concerned about the struggling sectors of U.S. industry should demand abolition of the taxes and controls which the U.S. government has clamped on our domestic industries. Let American consumers have the freedom to choose to buy Sony and Honda. And liberate American producers from government.



Friday, April 19, 2013

We the People vs. the Loot Seekers


By Mark D. Hughes



We, the loot-seekers of the United States, in order to form more perfectly protected monopolies, impose injustices, insure domestic servitude, provide for our common defense against competition, promote our own welfare by securing the coercive powers of the state for ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United Special Interest Groups of America.”
Those were not the words penned by the Founding Fathers, but who could tell from today’s America? Over the last two centuries, we have seen our civil and economic liberties thwarted, despite the clear intent of the Founders. They sought to prevent the concentration of power in the hands of a privileged few. But regulatory legislation has enabled loot-seeking special interests to use the coercive powers of the state against the rest of us.
Ludwig von Mises called this a “caste system”:
Our age is full of serious conflicts of economic group interests. But these conflicts are not inherent in the operation of an unhampered capitalist economy. They are the necessary outcome of government policies interfering with the operation of the market. They are not conflicts of Marxian classes. They are brought about by the fact that mankind has gone back to group privileges and thereby to a new caste system. . . .
In a free-market society. . . there are neither privileged nor underprivileged. There are no castes and therefore no caste conflicts. There prevails the full harmony of the rightly understood interests of all individuals and of all groups. . . .
One example of caste privilege began in 1937 when a few large New York dairies successfully lobbied the legislature for protective licensing. Under the law, still in effect, new licenses could be issued only if they do not cause “destructive competition.”
There is, of course, no such thing as destructive competition for the consumer. Competition means lower prices, higher quality, and better service. To be sure, competition may be a nuisance for inefficient, established dairies. But it is not an annoyance to the milk-consuming public.
While the 1937 licensing law does not openly forbid the entry of new dairies into New York, that was its intent and effect. Until this January, the market was controlled by five large dairies. As a result, New York City consumers have traditionally paid a considerably higher price for milk than any other metropolitan area with a similar supply. In November 1986 the average price of a gallon of milk in New York City (except Staten Island) was $2.42. Philadelphia consumers paid $1.93.
Then in December 1985, after trying for seven years to gain access to the New York market, Farmland Dairies of Wallington, New Jersey, was reluctantly granted a license to serve Staten Island. The average price immediately dropped 40 cents per gallon and consistently remained about 30 cents cheaper than milk sold in the rest of New York City.
The New Jersey dairy spent the next year unsuccessfully trying to gain access to the rest of the city. On December 11, 1986, Agricultural Commissioner Gerace rejected Farmland’s request because “it would tend to destructive competition . . . and would not be in the public interest.”
The Commissioner’s decision immediately became the topic of angry editorials throughout the state. Even statist politicians like New York’s Mayor Ed Koch, recognizing the mood of the city’s consumers, jumped on the band wagon.
New York Governor Cuomo claimed that he would like to see increased competition among milk dealers, but said he would not intervene in the Commissioners “quasi-judicial” decision.
The Governor had received $58,700 in campaign contributions from the dairy cartel. But the dairies’ licensed overcharges have earned them more than $50 million a year, so it is not hard to understand the incentive for such donations, nor Governor Cuomo’s decision not to intervene.
Although it is a relatively small example of state intervention, the New York dairy licensing law reflects the isolationist mentality indicative of all loot-seeking interests. It is no different from those seeking tariffs on foreign automobiles, restrictions on foreign investment, or business licensing for entrepreneurs.
The economic isolationists claim that restricting entry into a market will “save jobs.” They argue that added competition from an external source will force local producers out of business and thereby cause irreparable damage to the economy of the region (whether a city, state, or nation). But clearly they know nothing of a market economy. As Henry Hazlitt wrote in his great Economics in One Lesson:
This is the persistent tendency of men to see only the immediate effects of a given policy, or its effects only on a special group, and to neglect to inquire what the long-run effects of that policy will be not only on that special group but on all groups. It is the fallacy of overlooking secondary consequences.
The secondary consequence of economic isolationism is simple—it reduces the actual and potential wealth of the community involved. By preventing competition in the New York dairy industry, the milk licensing law allows the dairy cartel to charge a higher price for milk than would exist in a free market. This is money the consuming public would spend on other goods and services in the community. It is true that added competition might force some of the inefficient dairies out of the market and some dairy workers would then be unemployed. However, contrary to what the economic isolationists claim, the story does not stop there, since more than $50 million a year of added consumer spending translates into new jobs in other businesses.
Even if the new jobs created just replace the old ones lost (probably not the case), the wealth of the community is still increased. After the price of milk is reduced, the consumer can do one of two things: 1) purchase the same amount of milk as usual for less money and spend what’s left on other goods and services, or 2) spend the same amount of money on milk and take more milk home. Regardless of the choice, the amount of goods and services consumed by the public will increase even though the amount spent by each consumer did not change.
Someone understood at least part of this, however. On January 8, 1987, Federal Judge Leonard D. Wexler held that the decision to prohibit Farmland Dairies from distributing milk in all of New York City was unconstitutional. “It is clear,” he said, “from Gerace’s report that this decision to deny Farmland’s license application was based on economic protectionism.”
Farmland started delivering milk to seven supermarkets in the city on January 9. Each immediately lowered the price it charged the consumer by 20 cents a gallon. By January 17, prices had dropped between 30 and 71 cents per gallon.
Unfortunately, Judge Wexler did not declare the law itself unconstitutional, although he did say that this “would not be without foundation.” The judge suggested this be left “to the discretion of the State Legislature.”
So, despite the court’s ruling, the New York City dairy market is still not free. New York has seen the price of milk drop, but we will never know how much more it will drop until the milk licensing law is repealed and all who want to compete are allowed to try.
The economic and civil liberty we still have in America exists not because legislators are concerned for the welfare of “We the people.” Our liberty, and the chance we have to expand it, exists only because a heroic few refuse to stand aside while special interests impose a new two-caste system—the state privileged vs. the rest of us.


Thursday, April 18, 2013

The Case for Free Trade


By Ron Paul


In 1981, the Federal Register published a declaration from President Reagan: “I determine that it is in the national interest for the Export-Import Bank of the United States to extend a credit in the amount of $120.7 million to the Socialist Republic of Romania (for) the purchase of two nuclear steam turbine generators.”
This loan carried an interest rate of 7¾% for ten years, but the first payment wasn’t due until July, 1989.
Not too long before this announcement, the administration had made public its “voluntary” restraints on the number of cars Japan can export to the United States.
These two items—subsidization of trade and its restriction—are all too typical of our present trade policy.
Although we think of ourselves as a free-trading nation, it takes more than 700 pages just to list all the tariffs on imported goods, and another 400 to inventory all the non-tariff restraints, such as quotas and “orderly marketing agreements.”
A tariff is a tax levied on a foreign good, to help a special interest at the expense of American consumers.
A trade restraint or marketing agreement—on the number of inexpensive Taiwanese sneakers than Americans can buy, for example—achieves the same goal, at the same cost, in a less forthright manner.
And all the trends are towards more subsidies for U.S. exporters, and more prohibitions and taxes on imports.
Trade is to be subsidized or restrained, not left to the voluntary actions of consumers and producers.
In 1930, Congress passed the Smoot-Hawley tariff bill, imposing heavy tariffs on imports, with the avowed motive of “protecting” U.S. companies and jobs. Within one year, our 25 major trading partners had retaliated with their own tariffs on American goods. World trade declined sharply, and the depression was made world-wide and longer-lasting.
Today the policy of protectionism is again gaining favor in Congress, and in other countries. But it must be fought with all our strength.
Not only does protectionism make everyone poorer—except certain special interests—but it also increases international tensions, and can lead to war.
“If a foreign country can supply us with a commodity cheaper than we ourselves can make it,” wrote Adam Smith in 1776, “better buy it of them with some part of the produce of our own industry employed in a way in which we have some advantage. The general industry of the country will not therefore be diminished . . . but only left to find out the way in which it can be employed to the greater advantage.”
An important economic principle is called the division of labor. It states that economic efficiency, and therefore growth, is enhanced by everyone doing what he does best.
If I had to grow my own food, make my own clothes, build my own house, and teach my own children, our family’s living standard would plummet to a subsistence, or below-subsistence, level.
But if I practice medicine, and allow others with more talent as farmers, builders or tailors to do what they do best, we are all better off. Precious capital and labor are directed to the areas of most productivity, and through voluntary trading, we all benefit.
This principle works just as effectively on a national and world-wide scale, as Adam Smith pointed out.
It may be that Japan can make cars more efficiently than Detroit, at least certain kinds of cars, and that the capital and labor in parts of the U.S. auto industry could be better employed in other areas. With quotas, however, we will never find out. We will only increase the price of those Japanese cars that do get through, and of U.S. cars as well, since competitive pressures will be taken off General Motors and Ford.
Free trade at all levels makes for more prosperity, as the Founding Fathers knew. That’s why they gave Congress power to remove barriers to interstate commerce.
During the period of the Confederation—after our independence but before the adoption of the Constitution—some of the states erected tariff barriers against imports from their neighbors. The resulting economic stagnation and antagonism threatened the unity of our country, and led to the adoption of the interstate commerce clause by the Constitutional convention. The removal of all trade barriers—and not meddling in the economy—was the purpose of the clause.
As a result, we, as Americans, are free to trade with all other Americans, so that resources are put to their most efficient use in our giant domestic market. This happy consequence is no small contributor to our wealth.
Without this constitutional prohibition, state legislatures would listen to lobbyists for special interests, and enact protection against “unfair” out-of-state competition.
Knowing how similar situations come about, we could bet that someone in Minnesota, with idle greenhouses, would lobby the state legislature, pointing out that farmers in Florida, California, and Texas have too easy a time growing oranges. To protect Minnesota farmers, and create jobs, they would call for a heavy tax on out-of-state citrus, so greenhouse growing of oranges would become economic in Minneapolis.
As a result, oranges would drastically increase in price, and the quality would be lower. Minnesotans who like orange juice would be able to afford less, and what they could get would not be as good. But some would reap windfall profits, at the expense of the consumer. And pressure in orange-growing states would grow it retaliate against Minnesota products, to the detriment of everyone in the country. And we could bet that interstate antagonisms would increase as well. International trade barriers work no differently.
But because our Constitution forbids such domestic barriers, a company in Laredo, Texas, can trade freely, easily, and profitably with a firm in Oregon, thousands of miles away. (It’s important to remember that both parties to a non-coerced, non-fraudulent trade benefit from the exchange, or hope to benefit, or the exchange would not take place.)
But let that Laredo firm seek to trade with a Mexican company only a mile away, and tremendous impediments spring up, thanks to government regulations on both sides. “The motive of all these regulations,” wrote Adam Smith, “is to extend our own manufactures, not by their own improvements, but by putting an end, as much as possible, to the troublesome competition of such disagreeable rivals.
No one worries about the balance of trade between Oregon and Texas. That between Mexico and Texas should be of no consequence either. It is a problem only to government planners.
Dr. Murray Rothbard, who lives in New York City, has said that he’s delighted the federal government doesn’t keep interborough trade statistics. “We’d have the Bronx and Brooklyn worried about balance of trade!”
“Nations,” notes Dr. Rothbard, “may be important politically and culturally, but economically they appear only as a consequence of government intervention.”
But doesn’t protection save U.S. jobs? Yes, it can save the jobs of some, but it costs jobs overall, and harms consumers.
Limiting Japanese car imports, for example, does protect the jobs of high-seniority members of the United Auto Workers, who earn twice the average U.S. industrial wage. But it takes away any incentive to correct government-caused productivity problems.
Diverting resources into uneconomic uses takes them away from other, more productive areas and costs jobs. Some jobs are lost; others are never created. The uneconomic effects of protectionism benefit a few—usually well-to-do—at the expense of the great majority, including the poor.
Protectionism cannot be justified on economic or moral grounds. As Frederic Bastiat wrote, tariffs are “legalized plunder.” The law is used to steal.
By what right does the U.S. government tell an American citizen he cannot buy a foreign product? Such action is reprehensible on every ground imaginable, and is totally incompatible with individual freedom. Also inexcusable on any ground is the vast network of U.S. trade subsidies.
The taxpayers subsidize companies through the Export-Import Bank, the Department of Commerce, and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, to name only three.
Such programs contribute to inflation, high taxes, “crowding out” in the capital markets, higher prices, and misallocation of resources.
Exports are only useful economically when they are profitable. Otherwise they represent a net loss.
But don’t we need our own subsidies because other countries have theirs? If the government of France wishes to help impoverish their own citizens to send us cheap products, why should we impoverish ours as well? We can, and should, oppose those policies for France as well as the United States, but we have no right to take away buying opportunities from our own consumers.
Notes the Council for a Competitive Economy: we should consider what would happen if a foreign country decided to give us free cars, TVs, steel, and other products. Would this hurt the American people? To ask the question is to answer it.
Every economic intervention in trade, domestic or foreign, should be abolished, for practical and moral reasons.
Even if other countries maintain tariffs or subsidies, we would be helped, not hurt, by unilaterally ending ours.
We would improve our productivity, shift resources to those areas where we have an advantage, grow more prosperous, and make a greater variety of less-expensive goods available to our people.
And we would serve the cause of peace and set a good example for the world to emulate.
“When people and goods cross borders,” Ludwig von Mises used to quote, “armies do not.” Free and extensive trade, unsubsidized, between the peoples of the Earth lowers tensions and makes us all better off. It is, morally and economically, the only proper policy.