Thursday, February 9, 2012

The Nature of Government by Ayn Rand


The Nature of Government

by Ayn Rand

A government is an institution that holds the exclusive power to enforce certain rules of social conduct in a given geographical area.
Do men need such an institution—and why?
Since man’s mind is his basic tool of survival, his means of gaining knowledge to guide his actions-the basic condition he requires is the freedom to think and to act according to his rational judgment. This does not mean that a man must live alone and that a desert island is the environment best suited to his needs. Men can derive enormous benefits from dealing with one another. A social environment is most conducive to their successful survival—but only on certain conditions.
“The two great values to be gained from social existence are: knowledge and trade. Man is the only species that can transmit and expand his store of knowledge from generation to generation; the knowledge potentially available to man is greater than any one man could begin to acquire in his own lifespan; every man gains an incalculable benefit from the knowledge discovered by others. The second great benefit is the division of labor: it enables a man to devote his effort to a particular field of work and to trade with others who specialize in other fields. This form of cooperation allows all men who take part in it to achieve a greater knowledge, skill and productive return on their effort than they could achieve if each had to produce everything he needs, on a desert island or on a self-sustaining farm.
“But these very benefits indicate, delimit and define what kind of men can be of value to one another and in what kind of society: only rational, productive, independent men in a rational, productive, free society.” (“The Objectivist Ethics,” The Virtue of Selfishness)
A society that robs an individual of the product of his effort, or enslaves him, or attempts to limit the freedom of his mind, or compels him to act against his own rational judgment-a society that sets up a conflict between its edicts and the requirements of man’s nature—is not, strictly speaking, a society, but a mob held together by institutionalized gang-rule. Such a society destroys all the values of human coexistence, has no possible justification and represents, not a source of benefits, but the deadliest threat to man’s survival. Life on a desert island is safer than and incomparably preferable to existence in Soviet Russia or Nazi Germany.
If men are to live together in a peaceful, productive, rational society and deal with one another to mutual benefit, they must accept the basic social principle without which no moral or civilized society is possible: the principle of individual rights.
To recognize individual rights means to recognize and accept the conditions required by man’s nature for his proper survival.
Man’s rights can be violated only by the use of physical force. It is only by means of physical force that one man can deprive another of his life, or enslave him, or rob him, or prevent him from pursuing his own goals, or compel him to act against his own rational judgment.
The precondition of a civilized society is the barring of physical force from social relationships—thus establishing the principle that if men wish to deal with one another, they may do so only by means of reason: by discussion, persuasion and voluntary, uncoerced agreement.
The necessary consequence of man’s right to life is his right to self-defense. In a civilized society, force may be used only in retaliation and only against those who initiate its use. All the reasons which make the initiation of physical force an evil, make the retaliatory use of physical force a moral imperative.
If some “pacifist” society renounced the retaliatory use of force, it would be left helplessly at the mercy of the first thug who decided to be immoral. Such a society would achieve the opposite of its intention: instead of abolishing evil, it would encourage and reward it.
If a society provided no organized protection against force, it would compel every citizen to go about armed, to turn his home into a fortress, to shoot any strangers approaching his door—or to join a protective gang of citizens who would fight other gangs, formed for the same purpose, and thus bring about the degeneration of that society into the chaos of gang-rule, i.e., rule by brute force, into perpetual tribal warfare of prehistoric savages.
The use of physical force—even its retaliatory use—cannot be left at the discretion of individual citizens. Peaceful coexistence is impossible if a man has to live under the constant threat of force to be unleashed against him by any of his neighbors at any moment. Whether his neighbors’ intentions are good or bad, whether their judgment is rational or irrational, whether they are motivated by a sense of justice or by ignorance or by prejudice or by malice-the use of force against one man cannot be left to the arbitrary decision of another.
Visualize, for example, what would happen if a man missed his wallet, concluded that he had been robbed, broke into every house in the neighborhood to search it, and shot the first man who gave him a dirty look, taking the look to be a proof of guilt.
The retaliatory use of force requires objective rules of evidence to establish that a crime has been committed and to prove who committed it, as well as objective rules to define punishments and enforcement procedures. Men who attempt to prosecute crimes, without such rules, are a lynch mob. If a society left the retaliatory use of force in the hands of individual citizens, it would degenerate into mob rule, lynch law and an endless series of bloody private feuds or vendettas.
If physical force is to be barred from social relationships, men need an institution charged with the task of protecting their rights under an objective code of rules.
This is the task of a government—of a proper government—its basic task, its only moral justification and the reason why men do need a government.
A government is the means of placing the retaliatory use of physical force under objective controli.e., under objectively defined laws.
The fundamental difference between private action and governmental action—a difference thoroughly ignored and evaded today—lies in the fact that a government holds a monopoly on the legal use of physical force. It has to hold such a monopoly, since it is the agent of restraining and combating the use of force; and for that very same reason, its actions have to be rigidly defined, delimited and circumscribed; no touch of whim or caprice should be permitted in its performance; it should be an impersonal robot, with the laws as its only motive power. If a society is to be free, its government has to be controlled.

Wednesday, February 8, 2012

"The Roots Of War" - Ayn Rand


"The Roots Of War"

Ayn Rand

1. Tribalism and statism hold that men achieve goals by "initiating" force against other men for some notion of public "good."

2. Rand: "Statism is a system of institutionalized violence and perpetual civil war."

3. Statism is "gang rule." It is not a system conducive to security and peace.

4. Rand: "Statism needs war; a free country does not. Statism survives by looting; a free country survives by production."

5. The period from the end of Napoleonic power (1815) to the beginnings of World War I -- the period the Left abhors because of its unbridled (though not necessarily "pure") capitalism -- was a period of relative peace.

6. Rand: "During the nineteenth century, it was free trade that liberated the world...wrecking the remnants of feudalism...and statist absolute monarchies."
7. War profiteers of mixed economies curry favor with custodians of government largess; in free markets, fortunes from death would not occur.

8. Both Roosevelts and Woodrow Wilson believed that the "benighted" areas of the world needed varying doses of freedom (in FDR's case, four).

9. Rand: "If men want to oppose war, it is statism that they must oppose."

10. For war to be outlawed, the "rule of force" must cease.

Being Single Is a Luxury Bryan Caplan

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Being Single Is a Luxury



I'm baffled by people who blame declining marriage rates on poverty.  Why?  Because being single is more expensive than being married.  Picture two singles living separately.  If they marry, they sharply cut their total housing costs.  They cut the total cost of furniture, appliances, fuel, and health insurance.  Even groceries get cheaper: think CostCo.

These savings are especially blatant when your income is low.  Even the official poverty line acknowledges them.  The Poverty Threshold for a household with one adult is $11,139; the Poverty Threshold for a household with two adults is $14,218.  When two individuals at the poverty line maintain separate households, they're effectively spending 2*$11,139-$14,218=$8,060 a year to stay single.

But wait, there's more.  Marriage doesn't just cut expenses.  It raises couples' income.  In the NLSY, married men earn about 40% more than comparable single men; married women earn about 10% less than comparable single women.  From a couples' point of view, that's a big net bonus.  And much of this bonus seems to be causal.

If you're rich, admittedly, you have to consider the marriage tax.  But weighed against all the financial benefits of marriage, it's usually only modest drawback.

Yes, you can capture some these benefits simply by cohabitating.  But hardly all.  And cohabitation is far less stable than marriage.  Long-term joint investments - like buying a house - are a lot more likely to blow up in your face.  And while there may be some male cohabitation premium, it's smaller than the marriage premium.

If being single is so expensive, why are the poor far less likely to get married and stay married?  I'm sure you could come up with a stilted neoclassical explanation.  But this is yet another case where behavioral economics and personality psychology have a better story.  Namely: Some people are extremely impulsive and short-sighted.  If you're one of them, you tend to mess up your life in every way.  You don't invest in your career, and you don't invest in your relationships.  You take advantage of your boss and co-workers, and you take advantage of your romantic partners.  You refuse to swallow your pride - to admit that the best job and the best spouse you can get, though far from ideal, are much better than nothing.  Your behavior feels good at the time.  But in the long-run people see you for what you are, and you end up poor and alone.



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Tuesday, February 7, 2012

Gold and Economic Freedom by Alan Greenspan


Gold and Economic Freedom
by Alan Greenspan

An almost hysterical antagonism toward the gold standard is one issue which unites statists of all persuasions. They seem to sense — perhaps more clearly and subtly than many consistent defenders of laissez-faire — that gold and economic freedom are inseparable, that the gold standard is an instrument of laissez-faire and that each implies and requires the other.
In order to understand the source of their antagonism, it is necessary first to understand the specific role of gold in a free society.
Money is the common denominator of all economic transactions. It is that commodity which serves as a medium of exchange, is universally acceptable to all participants in an exchange economy as payment for their goods or services, and can, therefore, be used as a standard of market value and as a store of value, i.e., as a means of saving.
The existence of such a commodity is a precondition of a division of labor economy. If men did not have some commodity of objective value which was generally acceptable as money, they would have to resort to primitive barter or be forced to live on self-sufficient farms and forgo the inestimable advantages of specialization. If men had no means to store value, i.e., to save, neither long-range planning nor exchange would be possible.
What medium of exchange will be acceptable to all participants in an economy is not determined arbitrarily. First, the medium of exchange should be durable. In a primitive society of meager wealth, wheat might be sufficiently durable to serve as a medium, since all exchanges would occur only during and immediately after the harvest, leaving no value-surplus to store. But where store-of-value considerations are important, as they are in richer, more civilized societies, the medium of exchange must be a durable commodity, usually a metal. A metal is generally chosen because it is homogeneous and divisible: every unit is the same as every other and it can be blended or formed in any quantity. Precious jewels, for example, are neither homogeneous nor divisible. More important, the commodity chosen as a medium must be a luxury. Human desires for luxuries are unlimited and, therefore, luxury goods are always in demand and will always be acceptable. Wheat is a luxury in underfed civilizations, but not in a prosperous society. Cigarettes ordinarily would not serve as money, but they did in post-World War II Europe where they were considered a luxury. The term "luxury good" implies scarcity and high unit value. Having a high unit value, such a good is easily portable; for instance, an ounce of gold is worth a half-ton of pig iron.
In the early stages of a developing money economy, several media of exchange might be used, since a wide variety of commodities would fulfill the foregoing conditions. However, one of the commodities will gradually displace all others, by being more widely acceptable. Preferences on what to hold as a store of value will shift to the most widely acceptable commodity, which, in turn, will make it still more acceptable. The shift is progressive until that commodity becomes the sole medium of exchange. The use of a single medium is highly advantageous for the same reasons that a money economy is superior to a barter economy: it makes exchanges possible on an incalculably wider scale.
Whether the single medium is gold, silver, seashells, cattle, or tobacco is optional, depending on the context and development of a given economy. In fact, all have been employed, at various times, as media of exchange. Even in the present century, two major commodities, gold and silver, have been used as international media of exchange, with gold becoming the predominant one. Gold, having both artistic and functional uses and being relatively scarce, has significant advantages over all other media of exchange. Since the beginning of World War I, it has been virtually the sole international standard of exchange. If all goods and services were to be paid for in gold, large payments would be difficult to execute and this would tend to limit the extent of a society's divisions of labor and specialization. Thus a logical extension of the creation of a medium of exchange is the development of a banking system and credit instruments (bank notes and deposits) which act as a substitute for, but are convertible into, gold.
A free banking system based on gold is able to extend credit and thus to create bank notes (currency) and deposits, according to the production requirements of the economy. Individual owners of gold are induced, by payments of interest, to deposit their gold in a bank (against which they can draw checks). But since it is rarely the case that all depositors want to withdraw all their gold at the same time, the banker need keep only a fraction of his total deposits in gold as reserves. This enables the banker to loan out more than the amount of his gold deposits (which means that he holds claims to gold rather than gold as security of his deposits). But the amount of loans which he can afford to make is not arbitrary: he has to gauge it in relation to his reserves and to the status of his investments.
When banks loan money to finance productive and profitable endeavors, the loans are paid off rapidly and bank credit continues to be generally available. But when the business ventures financed by bank credit are less profitable and slow to pay off, bankers soon find that their loans outstanding are excessive relative to their gold reserves, and they begin to curtail new lending, usually by charging higher interest rates. This tends to restrict the financing of new ventures and requires the existing borrowers to improve their profitability before they can obtain credit for further expansion. Thus, under the gold standard, a free banking system stands as the protector of an economy's stability and balanced growth. When gold is accepted as the medium of exchange by most or all nations, an unhampered free international gold standard serves to foster a world-wide division of labor and the broadest international trade. Even though the units of exchange (the dollar, the pound, the franc, etc.) differ from country to country, when all are defined in terms of gold the economies of the different countries act as one — so long as there are no restraints on trade or on the movement of capital. Credit, interest rates, and prices tend to follow similar patterns in all countries. For example, if banks in one country extend credit too liberally, interest rates in that country will tend to fall, inducing depositors to shift their gold to higher-interest paying banks in other countries. This will immediately cause a shortage of bank reserves in the "easy money" country, inducing tighter credit standards and a return to competitively higher interest rates again.
A fully free banking system and fully consistent gold standard have not as yet been achieved. But prior to World War I, the banking system in the United States (and in most of the world) was based on gold and even though governments intervened occasionally, banking was more free than controlled. Periodically, as a result of overly rapid credit expansion, banks became loaned up to the limit of their gold reserves, interest rates rose sharply, new credit was cut off, and the economy went into a sharp, but short-lived recession. (Compared with the depressions of 1920 and 1932, the pre-World War I business declines were mild indeed.) It was limited gold reserves that stopped the unbalanced expansions of business activity, before they could develop into the post-World War I type of disaster. The readjustment periods were short and the economies quickly reestablished a sound basis to resume expansion.
But the process of cure was misdiagnosed as the disease: if shortage of bank reserves was causing a business decline — argued economic interventionists — why not find a way of supplying increased reserves to the banks so they never need be short! If banks can continue to loan money indefinitely — it was claimed — there need never be any slumps in business. And so the Federal Reserve System was organized in 1913. It consisted of twelve regional Federal Reserve banks nominally owned by private bankers, but in fact government sponsored, controlled, and supported. Credit extended by these banks is in practice (though not legally) backed by the taxing power of the federal government. Technically, we remained on the gold standard; individuals were still free to own gold, and gold continued to be used as bank reserves. But now, in addition to gold, credit extended by the Federal Reserve banks ("paper reserves") could serve as legal tender to pay depositors.
When business in the United States underwent a mild contraction in 1927, the Federal Reserve created more paper reserves in the hope of forestalling any possible bank reserve shortage. More disastrous, however, was the Federal Reserve's attempt to assist Great Britain who had been losing gold to us because the Bank of England refused to allow interest rates to rise when market forces dictated (it was politically unpalatable). The reasoning of the authorities involved was as follows: if the Federal Reserve pumped excessive paper reserves into American banks, interest rates in the United States would fall to a level comparable with those in Great Britain; this would act to stop Britain's gold loss and avoid the political embarrassment of having to raise interest rates. The "Fed" succeeded; it stopped the gold loss, but it nearly destroyed the economies of the world, in the process. The excess credit which the Fed pumped into the economy spilled over into the stock market, triggering a fantastic speculative boom. Belatedly, Federal Reserve officials attempted to sop up the excess reserves and finally succeeded in braking the boom. But it was too late: by 1929 the speculative imbalances had become so overwhelming that the attempt precipitated a sharp retrenching and a consequent demoralizing of business confidence. As a result, the American economy collapsed. Great Britain fared even worse, and rather than absorb the full consequences of her previous folly, she abandoned the gold standard completely in 1931, tearing asunder what remained of the fabric of confidence and inducing a world-wide series of bank failures. The world economies plunged into the Great Depression of the 1930's.
With a logic reminiscent of a generation earlier, statists argued that the gold standard was largely to blame for the credit debacle which led to the Great Depression. If the gold standard had not existed, they argued, Britain's abandonment of gold payments in 1931 would not have caused the failure of banks all over the world. (The irony was that since 1913, we had been, not on a gold standard, but on what may be termed "a mixed gold standard"; yet it is gold that took the blame.) But the opposition to the gold standard in any form — from a growing number of welfare-state advocates — was prompted by a much subtler insight: the realization that the gold standard is incompatible with chronic deficit spending (the hallmark of the welfare state). Stripped of its academic jargon, the welfare state is nothing more than a mechanism by which governments confiscate the wealth of the productive members of a society to support a wide variety of welfare schemes. A substantial part of the confiscation is effected by taxation. But the welfare statists were quick to recognize that if they wished to retain political power, the amount of taxation had to be limited and they had to resort to programs of massive deficit spending, i.e., they had to borrow money, by issuing government bonds, to finance welfare expenditures on a large scale.
Under a gold standard, the amount of credit that an economy can support is determined by the economy's tangible assets, since every credit instrument is ultimately a claim on some tangible asset. But government bonds are not backed by tangible wealth, only by the government's promise to pay out of future tax revenues, and cannot easily be absorbed by the financial markets. A large volume of new government bonds can be sold to the public only at progressively higher interest rates. Thus, government deficit spending under a gold standard is severely limited. The abandonment of the gold standard made it possible for the welfare statists to use the banking system as a means to an unlimited expansion of credit. They have created paper reserves in the form of government bonds which — through a complex series of steps — the banks accept in place of tangible assets and treat as if they were an actual deposit, i.e., as the equivalent of what was formerly a deposit of gold. The holder of a government bond or of a bank deposit created by paper reserves believes that he has a valid claim on a real asset. But the fact is that there are now more claims outstanding than real assets. The law of supply and demand is not to be conned. As the supply of money (of claims) increases relative to the supply of tangible assets in the economy, prices must eventually rise. Thus the earnings saved by the productive members of the society lose value in terms of goods. When the economy's books are finally balanced, one finds that this loss in value represents the goods purchased by the government for welfare or other purposes with the money proceeds of the government bonds financed by bank credit expansion.
In the absence of the gold standard, there is no way to protect savings from confiscation through inflation. There is no safe store of value. If there were, the government would have to make its holding illegal, as was done in the case of gold. If everyone decided, for example, to convert all his bank deposits to silver or copper or any other good, and thereafter declined to accept checks as payment for goods, bank deposits would lose their purchasing power and government-created bank credit would be worthless as a claim on goods. The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves.
This is the shabby secret of the welfare statists' tirades against gold. Deficit spending is simply a scheme for the confiscation of wealth. Gold stands in the way of this insidious process. It stands as a protector of property rights. If one grasps this, one has no difficulty in understanding the statists' antagonism toward the gold standard.

http://www.constitution.org/mon/greenspan_gold.htm

Monday, February 6, 2012

The Justice of Economic Efficiency - Hans-Hermann Hoppe

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The Justice of Economic Efficiency - 




The central problem of political economy is how to organize society so as to promote the production of wealth. The central problem of political philosophy is how to arrange society so as to make it a just social order.
The first question regards matters of efficiency: What means are appropriate for achieving a specific result, in this case, wealth?
The second question falls outside the realm of the so-called positive sciences. It asks whether or not the goal political economy assumes to be given can be justified as a goal, and whether or not, then, the means which political economy recommends can be regarded as efficient means for just ends.
In the following I present an a priori justification for the thesis that those means recommended by political economy are indeed efficient means for just ends.
I begin by describing the means recommended by political economy and explain the systematic reasons the production of wealth attained by adopting them is greater than that produced by choosing any other means. Since my main task is to demonstrate the justice of these means of producing wealth, my description and explanation of economic efficiency will be brief.
Political economy begins with the recognition of scarcity. It is only because we do not live in the Garden of Eden that we are concerned about the problem of economic efficiency. According to political economy, the most efficient means of alleviating, if not overcoming, scarcity is the institution of private property. The rules underlying this institution have been correctly identified for the most part by John Locke. They are as follows:
Every person owns his own body as well as all scarce goods which he puts to use with the help of his body before anyone else does. This ownership implies the right to employ these scarce goods however one sees fit so long as in so doing one does not aggress against anyone else's property, i.e., so long as one does not uninvitedly change the physical integrity of another's property or delimit another's control over it without his consent. In particular, once a good has first been appropriated or homesteaded by mixing one's labor with it (Locke's phrase) then ownership in it can only be acquired by means of a contractual transfer of property title from a previous to a later owner.
The reason this institution leads to the greatest possible production of wealth is straightforward. Any deviation from this set of rules implies, by definition, a redistribution of property titles (and hence of income) away from user-producers and contractors of goods and onto non-user-producers and noncontractors. As a consequence, any such deviation implies that there will be relatively less original appropriation of resources whose scarcity is realized, there will be less production of new goods, less maintenance of existing goods, and less mutually beneficial contracting and trading. This naturally implies a lower standard of living in terms of exchangeable goods and services.
Further, the provision that only the first user (not a later one) of a good acquires ownership assures that productive efforts will be as high as possible at all times. Further, the provision that only the physical integrity of property (not property values) be protected guarantees that every owner will undertake the greatest possible value-productive efforts, i.e., efforts to promote favorable changes in property values and to prevent or counter any unfavorable changes in property values (as they might result from another person's actions regarding his property). Thus, any deviation from these rules also implies reduced levels of value productive efforts at all times.
Now on to my main task of demonstrating that the institution of private property as just characterized is just — in fact, that only this institution is just and that any deviation from it is not only economically inefficient but unethical as well.
First, however, let me clarify an essential similarity between the problem facing political economy and that facing political philosophy — a similarity that political philosophers in their widespread ignorance of economics generally overlook only to wind up in endless ad hoceries. The recognition of scarcity is not only the starting point for political economy; it is the starting point of political philosophy as well. Obviously, if there were a superabundance of goods, no economic problem whatsoever would exist. With a superabundance of goods such that my present use of them would neither reduce my own future supply nor the present or future supply of them for any other person, ethical problems of right or wrong, just or unjust would not emerge either since no conflict over the use of such goods could possibly arise. Only insofar as goods are scarce are economics and ethics required.
In the same way, just as the answer to the problem of political economy must be formulated in terms of rules constraining the possible uses of resources qua scarce resources, political philosophy too must answer in terms of property rights. In order to avoid inescapable conflicts, it must formulate a set of rules assigning rights of exclusive control over scarce goods. (Note that even in the Garden of Eden, a person's body, the space occupied by that body, and time would still be scarce and to that extent political economy and philosophy would still have a task, however limited, to fulfill.)
Now to the actual proof of the thesis that out of the infinitely conceivable ways of assigning rights of exclusive ownership to people, only the previously described rules of private property are actually justifiable. I will present my argument in a step-by-step fashion.
First, while scarcity is a necessary condition for the emergence of the problem of political philosophy, it is not sufficient. For obviously we could have conflicts regarding the use of scarce resources with, let us say, an elephant or a mosquito, yet we would not consider it possible to resolve these conflicts by means of proposing property norms. In such cases, the avoidance of possible conflicts is merely a technological, not an ethical, problem. For it to become an ethical problem, it is also necessary that the conflicting actors be capable, in principle, of argumentation. In fact, this is undeniably so because we are also engaged in argumentation here. Denying that political philosophy presupposes argumentation is contradictory, as the very denial would itself be an argument.
Only with argumentation does the idea of validity and truth emerge and by no means only the idea of truth in ethical matters but of truth in general. Only within argumentation are truth claims of any kind made, and it is only in the course of argumentation that truth claims are decided. This proposition, it turns out, is itself undeniably true: one cannot argue that one cannot argue, and one cannot dispute knowing what it means to make a truth claim without implicitly claiming at least the very negation of this proposition to be true. My very first step in the following chain of reasoning, then, has been called "the a priori of argumentation" by such philosophers as Jürgen Habermas and K.O. Apel.[1]
In the same way as it is undeniably true that ethics requires argumentation, it is also undeniably true that any argument requires an arguing person. Arguing does not consist of free-floating propositions. It is an activity. If aside from whatever is said in its course, however, argumentation is also a practical affair and if argumentation is the presupposition of truth-claiming and possibly true propositions, then it follows that intersubjectively meaningful norms must exist — namely those which make an action argumentation — which must have a special cognitive status in that they are the practical preconditions of truth. Once more, this is true a priori, so that anyone, such as an empiricist-positivist-emotivist who denied the possibility of a rational ethics and who declared the acceptance or rejection of norms an arbitrary affair would invariably get caught in a practical contradiction. For contrary to what he would say, he would in fact have to presuppose the norms which underlie any argumentation whatsoever as valid simply in order to say anything at all.
With this step I lose, once and for all, the company of philosophers like Habermas and Apel. [2] Yet, as will become clear immediately, it is directly implied in the previous step. That Habermas and Apel are unable to take this step is, I submit, due to the fact that they, too, suffer, as do many other philosophers, from a complete ignorance of economics, and a corresponding blindness towards the fact of scarcity. The step is simply this: To recognize that argumentation is a form of action and does not consist of free-floating sounds implies the recognition of the fact that all argumentation requires that a person have exclusive control over the scarce resource of his body. As long as there is argumentation, there is mutual recognition of each other's property right in his own body. It is this recognition of each other's exclusive control over one's own body, presupposed by all argumentation, which explains the unique feature of verbal communication that while one may disagree about what has been said, it is still possible to agree at least on the fact that there is such disagreement.
Again, such a property right in one's own body must be said to be justified a priori, for anyone who would try to justify any norm whatsoever would already have to presuppose the exclusive right to control over his body as a valid norm simply in order to say, "I propose such and such." Further, any person who tried to dispute the property right in his body would become caught up in a practical contradiction since arguing in this way would already imply acceptance of the very norm which he was disputing. He would not even open his mouth if he were right.
The final argument extends the idea of private property as justified, and justified a priori, from the very prototype of a scarce good (a person's body) to other goods. It consists of two parts. I first demonstrate that argumentation, and argumentative justification of anything, presupposes not only the right to exclusively control one's body but the right to control other scarce goods as well, for if no one had the right to control anything except his own body, then we would all cease to exist and the problem of justifying norms — as well as all other human problems — simply would not exist. We do not live on air alone; hence, simply by virtue of the fact of being alive, property rights to other things must be presupposed to be valid, too. No one who is alive could argue otherwise.
The second part of the argument demonstrates that only the Lockean idea of establishing property claims through homesteading is a just principle of property acquisition. The proof employs a simple argumentum e contrario: If a person did not acquire the right of exclusive control over other, nature-given goods by his own work, that is, if other people, who had not previously used such goods, had the right to dispute the homesteader's ownership claim, then this would only be possible if one would acquire property titles not through labor, i.e., by establishing some objective link between a particular person and a particular scarce resource, but simply by means of verbal declaration.
This solution — apart from the obvious fact that it would not even qualify as a solution in a purely technical sense in that it would not provide a basis for deciding between rivaling declarative claims — is incompatible with the already justified ownership of a person over his body. For if one could indeed appropriate property by decree, this would imply that it would also be possible for one to simply declare another person's body to be one's own. However, as we have seen, to say that property is acquired not through homesteading action but through declaration involves a practical contradiction: nobody can say and declare anything, unless his right to use his body is already assumed to be valid simply because of the very fact that regardless of what he says, it is he, and nobody else, who has homesteaded it as his instrument of saying anything.
With this, my a priori justification of the institution of private property is essentially complete. Only two supplementary arguments may be needed in order to point out why and where all other ethical proposals (let me call them socialist) are argumentatively indefensible.
According to the private-property ethics, scarce resources that are under the exclusive control of their owners are defined in physical terms, and, mutatis mutandis, aggression, is defined as an invasion of the physical integrity of another person's property. As indicated, the economic effect of this provision is that of maximizing value-productive efforts. A popular deviation from this is the idea of defining aggression as an invasion of the value or psychic integrity of another person's property instead. This idea underlies John Rawls's "difference principle" that all inequalities have to be expected to be to everyone's advantage regardless of how such inequalities have come about,[3] Robert Nozick's claim that a "dominant protection agency" has the right to outlaw competitors regardless of their actual actions, and his related claim that "nonproductive exchanges" in which one party would be better off if the other one did not exist may be outlawed, again regardless of whether or not such exchange involved any physical aggression.[4]
Such proposals are absurd as well as indefensible. While every person can have control over whether or not his actions cause the physical integrity of something to change, control over whether or not one's actions affect the value of someone's property to change rests with other people and their evaluations. One would have to interrogate and come to an agreement with the entire world population to make sure that one's planned actions would not change another person's evaluations regarding his property. Everyone would be long dead before this could ever be accomplished.
Moreover, the idea that property value should be protected is argumentatively indefensible, for even in order to argue, it must be presupposed that actions must be allowed prior to any actual agreement because if they were not, one could not even argue so. Yet if one can, then this is only possible because of objective borders of property, i.e., borders which every person can recognize as such on his own, without having to agree first with anyone else with respect to one's system of values and evaluations. Rawls and Nozick could not even open their mouths if it were otherwise. The very fact, then, that they do open them proves what they say is wrong.
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Sunday, February 5, 2012

Civil Disobedience - Henry David Thoreau

Civil Disobedience - Henry David Thoreau



  I have never declined paying the highway tax, because I am as desirous of being a good neighbor as I am of being a bad subject; and as for supporting schools, I am doing my part to educate my fellow-countrymen now. It is for no particular item in the tax-bill that I refuse to pay it. I simply wish to refuse allegiance to the State, to withdraw and stand aloof from it effectually. I do not care to trace the course of my dollar, if I could, till it buys a man or a musket to shoot one with- the dollar is innocent- but I am concerned to trace the effects of my allegiance. In fact, I quietly declare war with the State, after my fashion, though I will still make what use and get what advantage of her I can, as is usual in such cases.
If others pay the tax which is demanded of me, from a sympathy with the State, they do but what they have already done in their own case, or rather they abet injustice to a greater extent than the State requires. If they pay the tax from a mistaken interest in the individual taxed, to save his property, or prevent his going to jail, it is because they have not considered wisely how far they let their private feelings interfere with the public good.
This, then, is my position at present. But one cannot be too much on his guard in such a case, lest his action be biased by obstinacy or an undue regard for the opinions of men. Let him see that he does only what belongs to himself and to the hour.
I think sometimes, Why, this people mean well, they are only ignorant; they would do better if they knew how: why give your neighbors this pain to treat you as they are not inclined to? But I think again, This is no reason why I should do as they do, or permit others to suffer much greater pain of a different kind. Again, I sometimes say to myself, When many millions of men, without heat, without ill will, without personal feeling of any kind, demand of you a few shillings only, without the possibility, such is their constitution, of retracting or altering their present demand, and without the possibility, on your side, of appeal to any other millions, why expose yourself to this overwhelming brute force? You do not resist cold and hunger, the winds and the waves, thus obstinately; you quietly submit to a thousand similar necessities. You do not put your head into the fire. But just in proportion as I regard this as not wholly a brute force, but partly a human force, and consider that I have relations to those millions as to so many millions of men, and not of mere brute or inanimate things, I see that appeal is possible, first and instantaneously, from them to the Maker of them, and, secondly, from them to themselves. But if I put my head deliberately into the fire, there is no appeal to fire or to the Maker of fire, and I have only myself to blame. If I could convince myself that I have any right to be satisfied with men as they are, and to treat them accordingly, and not according, in some respects, to my requisitions and expectations of what they and I ought to be, then, like a good Mussulman and fatalist, I should endeavor to be satisfied with things as they are, and say it is the will of God. And, above all, there is this difference between resisting this and a purely brute or natural force, that I can resist this with some effect; but I cannot expect, like Orpheus, to change the nature of the rocks and trees and beasts.
I do not wish to quarrel with any man or nation. I do not wish to split hairs, to make fine distinctions, or set myself up as better than my neighbors. I seek rather, I may say, even an excuse for conforming to the laws of the land. I am but too ready to conform to them. Indeed, I have reason to suspect myself on this head; and each year, as the tax-gatherer comes round, I find myself disposed to review the acts and position of the general and State governments, and the spirit of the people, to discover a pretext for conformity.


"We must affect our country as our parents,
And if at any time we alienate
Our love or industry from doing it honor,
We must respect effects and teach the soul
Matter of conscience and religion,
And not desire of rule or benefit."


I believe that the State will soon be able to take all my work of this sort out of my hands, and then I shall be no better a patriot than my fellow-countrymen. Seen from a lower point of view, the Constitution, with all its faults, is very good; the law and the courts are very respectable; even this State and this American government are, in many respects, very admirable, and rare things, to be thankful for, such as a great many have described them; but seen from a point of view a little higher, they are what I have described them; seen from a higher still, and the highest, who shall say what they are, or that they are worth looking at or thinking of at all?
However, the government does not concern me much, and I shall bestow the fewest possible thoughts on it. It is not many moments that I live under a government, even in this world. If a man is thought-free, fancy-free, imagination-free, that which is not never for a long time appearing to be to him, unwise rulers or reformers cannot fatally interrupt him.
I know that most men think differently from myself; but those whose lives are by profession devoted to the study of these or kindred subjects content me as little as any. Statesmen and legislators, standing so completely within the institution, never distinctly and nakedly behold it. They speak of moving society, but have no resting-place without it. They may be men of a certain experience and discrimination, and have no doubt invented ingenious and even useful systems, for which we sincerely thank them; but all their wit and usefulness lie within certain not very wide limits. They are wont to forget that the world is not governed by policy and expediency. Webster never goes behind government, and so cannot speak with authority about it. His words are wisdom to those legislators who contemplate no essential reform in the existing government; but for thinkers, and those who legislate for all time, he never once glances at the subject. I know of those whose serene and wise speculations on this theme would soon reveal the limits of his mind's range and hospitality. Yet, compared with the cheap professions of most reformers, and the still cheaper wisdom and eloquence of politicians in general, his are almost the only sensible and valuable words, and we thank Heaven for him. Comparatively, he is always strong, original, and, above all, practical. Still, his quality is not wisdom, but prudence. The lawyer's truth is not Truth, but consistency or a consistent expediency. Truth is always in harmony with herself, and is not concerned chiefly to reveal the justice that may consist with wrong-doing. He well deserves to be called, as he has been called, the Defender of the Constitution. There are really no blows to be given by him but defensive ones. He is not a leader, but a follower. His leaders are the men of '87- "I have never made an effort," he says, "and never propose to make an effort; I have never countenanced an effort, and never mean to countenance an effort, to disturb the arrangement as originally made, by which the various States came into the Union." Still thinking of the sanction which the Constitution gives to slavery, he says, "Because it was a part of the original compact- let it stand." Notwithstanding his special acuteness and ability, he is unable to take a fact out of its merely political relations, and behold it as it lies absolutely to be disposed of by the intellect- what, for instance, it behooves a man to do here in America today with regard to slavery- but ventures, or is driven, to make some such desperate answer as the following, while professing to speak absolutely, and as a private man- from which what new and singular code of social duties might be inferred? "The manner," says he, "in which the governments of those States where slavery exists are to regulate it is for their own consideration, under their responsibility to their constituents, to the general laws of propriety, humanity, and justice, and to God. Associations formed elsewhere, springing from a feeling of humanity, or any other cause, have nothing whatever to do with it. They have never received any encouragement from me, and they never will."
They who know of no purer sources of truth, who have traced up its stream no higher, stand, and wisely stand, by the Bible and the Constitution, and drink at it there with reverence and humility; but they who behold where it comes trickling into this lake or that pool, gird up their loins once more, and continue their pilgrimage toward its fountain-head.
No man with a genius for legislation has appeared in America. They are rare in the history of the world. There are orators, politicians, and eloquent men, by the thousand; but the speaker has not yet opened his mouth to speak who is capable of settling the much-vexed questions of the day. We love eloquence for its own sake, and not for any truth which it may utter, or any heroism it may inspire. Our legislators have not yet learned the comparative value of free trade and of freedom, of union, and of rectitude, to a nation. They have no genius or talent for comparatively humble questions of taxation and finance, commerce and manufactures and agriculture. If we were left solely to the wordy wit of legislators in Congress for our guidance, uncorrected by the seasonable experience and the effectual complaints of the people, America would not long retain her rank among the nations. For eighteen hundred years, though perchance I have no right to say it, the New Testament has been written; yet where is the legislator who has wisdom and practical talent enough to avail himself of the light which it sheds on the science of legislation?
The authority of government, even such as I am willing to submit to- for I will cheerfully obey those who know and can do better than I, and in many things even those who neither know nor can do so well- is still an impure one: to be strictly just, it must have the sanction and consent of the governed. It can have no pure right over my person and property but what I concede to it. The progress from an absolute to a limited monarchy, from a limited monarchy to a democracy, is a progress toward a true respect for the individual. Even the Chinese philosopher was wise enough to regard the individual as the basis of the empire. Is a democracy, such as we know it, the last improvement possible in government? Is it not possible to take a step further towards recognizing and organizing the rights of man? There will never be a really free and enlightened State until the State comes to recognize the individual as a higher and independent power, from which all its own power and authority are derived, and treats him accordingly. I please myself with imagining a State at least which can afford to be just to all men, and to treat the individual with respect as a neighbor; which even would not think it inconsistent with its own repose if a few were to live aloof from it, not meddling with it, nor embraced by it, who fulfilled all the duties of neighbors and fellow-men. A State which bore this kind of fruit, and suffered it to drop off as fast as it ripened, would prepare the way for a still more perfect and glorious State, which also I have imagined, but not yet anywhere seen.
THE END

Understanding "Austrian" Economics, Part 2


Henry Hazlitt

Understanding "Austrian" Economics, Part 2

A Few Basic Insights

After the passing of its three founders—Carl Menger, Friedrich von Wieser, and Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk—Austrian economics fell for a long time into eclipse. It was not so much refuted as neglected. English-speaking economists began devoting themselves to such matters as mathematical treatment of problems of “general equilibrium.” The Austrian view was revived mainly by one man, an Austrian by birth as well as an “Austrian” by conviction—Ludwig von Mises (1881–1973). He made his influence felt both by his written works and by his oral teachings. Among his early distinguished students and followers were Gottfried Haberler, Fritz Machlup, Oskar Morgenstern, Lionel (subsequently Lord) Robbins, and, most influential of all, F. A. Hayek.
Ludwig von Mises was prolific, but his principal contributions were made in three masterpieces. These were The Theory of Money and Credit, first published in German in 1912, Socialism: An Economic and Sociological Analysis, also first published in German in 1922, and Human Action, which grew out of a first German version appearing in 1940, but was not published in Mises’s own rewritten English version until 1949.

Mises on Human Action

Though there is now a gratifying number of able young American economists writing in the Austrian tradition,Human Action still stands as the most complete, powerful, and unified presentation of Austrian economics in any single volume. Mises always generously acknowledged his indebtedness to his predecessors. He recalled in a short autobiography Notes and Recollections, 1978) that around Christmas 1903 he read Menger’s Principles of Economics for the first time. “It was the reading of this book,” he wrote, “that made an ‘economist’ of me.”
It would carry me to too great length to itemize and explain all the contributions to economics that Mises made, and I will content myself with mentioning only two. He was the first to prove that it was impossible for socialism to undertake “economic calculation”; and he made one of the most important contributions of any economist toward solving the problem of “the trade cycle.”
Because Mises so uncompromisingly rejected government interventionism in all its forms, he acquired the reputation of a “laissez-faire extremist” during most of his lifetime, and was scandalously neglected by the majority of academic economists. But because Hayek elaborated his own ideas in a more conciliatory form, his writings attracted more attention from the academic world, and he leapt into prominence in 1931 with his own contribution to the theory of the trade cycle, Prices and Production, along lines similar to Mises’s. The result is entitled to be called the “Mises-Hayek” theory.
Hayek is also a prolific writer, but though he has written volumes on money, on the trade cycle, on inflation, and onThe Pure Theory of Capital (1941), he has never attempted a comprehensive book on economic principles. Of late years he has turned his attention mainly to the realms of politics, ethics, and law, and has written profound and widely discussed treatises on The Constitution of Liberty (1960) and a three-volume work on Law, Legislation and Liberty, completed in 1979. He has been more widely influential in his own lifetime than was Mises, and was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1974.
Today’s zealous group of younger “Austrian” economists, though all acknowledging their great debt to Mises, do not treat his Human Action as the final word on the subject, but are exploring a whole range of economic problems with a new vigor. Murray Rothbard [1926–1995], a student of Mises, produced a two-volume treatise, Man, Economy, and State (1962), along Misesian lines, with notable clarity of exposition, and making important contributions of his own, pointing out the fallacies, for example, in the prevailing theories of “monopoly price.”
Israel M. Kirzner (b. 1930), professor of economics at New York University, another former Mises student, although he has not undertaken a comprehensive book of “principles,” has explored individual problems in five separate volumes: The Economic Point of View (1960), Market Theory and the Price System (1963), An Essay on Capital(1966), Competition and Entrepreneurship (1973), and Perception, Opportunity, and Profit (1979). His work is distinguished by great scholarship, systematic thoroughness, and precision of statement. He has brought further illumination to every problem he has dealt with.
Finally, no reference to individual writers would be adequate that did not include Professor Ludwig M. Lachmann [1906–1990]. Though he is one of the most original and profound among living Austrian economists, his work has not yet nearly achieved the recognition it merits. Among his principal books are Capital and Its Structure (1956; republished in 1978), The Legacy of Max Weber (1971) and Capital, Expectations, and the Market Process(1977). His writings are notable for their emphasis on the role of expectations and for their thoroughgoing application of a “radical subjectivism.”
Restrictions of space permit me merely to list the names of half a dozen of the now- increasing group of important “Austrian” economists: S. C. Littlechild, Gerald P. O’Driscoll, Jr., Mario J. Rizzo, Hans Sennholz, Sudha R. Shenoy, and Lawrence H. White. But so arbitrarily short a list must omit a number of names unjustly.
The “Austrian” economists, more consistently than those of any other school, have criticized nearly all forms of government intervention in the market—especially inflation, price controls, and schemes for redistribution of wealth or incomes—because they recognize that these always lead to erosions of incentives, to distortions of production, to shortages, to demoralization, and to similar consequences deplored even by the originators of the schemes. But personal value judgments of government policy are of course not an essential part of Austrian theory.
The present vigorous Austrian School is not content merely to keep re-expounding the principles developed by Menger and Mises, but is addressing itself constantly to new problems, or a more thorough probing of old ones. This is dramatically evident in a recent volume, New Directions in Austrian Economics (1978), edited by Louis M. Spadaro, with contributions from eleven writers. Professor Spadaro himself, in his concluding essay, outlines some of the still unresolved problems that Austrians ought to explore. In some sense, however, practically all eleven contributions do the same thing.
I have heard it said (by an economist of another school) that there is no such thing as Austrian economics; there is only good economics or bad. But in the same way we could say that there is no such thing as Ricardian economics, Marxist economics, Keynesian economics, and so on. This sort of statement, though true in one sense, is false in another. It is fallacious in implying that if anything is classified in accordance with one characteristic, it cannot be classified in accordance with any other. It is like saying that there are no such persons as Americans or Japanese; there are only men and women. Those who call themselves “Austrian” economists give themselves this label because of its historic origins; but they happen also to believe that its fundamental theses are true, and offer more promise than any other for further progress in economic science.
Perhaps something should be said about the chief differences today between Austrian economics and what we may call “orthodox” or “mainstream” economics. The difficulty here is that “mainstream” economics itself would be hard to define. Economists are still divided into a number of recognizable “schools”—neoclassicists, Keynesians, the Chicago school, the Lausanne school, and so on. The limits of space forbid me to go into the distinguishing doctrines of each of these schools. But one outstanding difference of the Austrians from all of these lies in their method of reasoning. The Austrians emphasize methodological individualism. That is, they not only begin by emphasizing human actions, preferences, and decisions, but individual actions, preferences, and initiatives. Mainstream economists are concerned with “macroeconomics,” with averages and aggregates; and those of the Lausanne school, trying to reduce economics to an “exact” science, and therefore seeking to quantify everything, are obsessed with complicated mathematical equations that try to stipulate the conditions of “general equilibrium.”

Equilibrium a Useful Concept, Though Never a Reality

Now “general equilibrium” is defined by these economists (when it ever is) in highly abstract and obscure phrases; but for laymen it might be defined as a condition in which all the tens of thousands or millions of commodities and services are being turned out in the exact quantities and proportions in which they are relatively wanted by producers or consumers, so that there are no “shortages” or “surpluses.” All prices reflect costs, and there is no more profit in making one commodity than any other. (In fact, there is no “pure” profit at all.) These economists admit that at any moment this condition does not exist, but they contend that there is a constant long-run tendency toward equilibrium, because when there is an unusual profit in turning out some one product, producers will turn out more of it, and when there is a loss in turning out some other product, producers will make less of it, or transfer to making something else.
Now the concept of equilibrium (or much better, the Mises concept of an “evenly rotating economy”) can have great usefulness as a tool of thought. We are often better able to analyze the problems of change if we begin with the fictitious assumption of a state of affairs in which certain changes are hypothetically eliminated. But this is a purely imaginary construction, a useful fiction. It should never be confused with reality.
While a true “equilibrium” between the marginal cost of production and the market price of any one commodity is a condition that is seldom reached, even momentarily, a “general equilibrium” in the relative production, supply price, and demand price of all commodities and services is a condition that is never reached, even for an instant of time.
The concept itself is extremely nebulous. Neoclassical economists seem obsessed today with setting up complicated algebraic equations stipulating the conditions of equilibrium or functional relations under “perfect competition” and the like, but it is difficult to specify precisely what their x’s and y’s stand for. They cannot refer to physical quantities, because you cannot add apples to horses, or a ton of gold watches to a ton of sand. One might add or compare quantities times prices, but what would be the meaning of the total, or any of the parts that make it up? The price, even of one commodity, differs from hour to hour, place to place, and transaction to transaction. The value of the currency itself fluctuates and constantly changes its exchange ratio with commodities. If we simply add or compare “values,” then we must recognize that values are purely subjective. They are impossible to measure or to total because they differ with each individual.
If we pass over these fundamental difficulties, where do we arrive? Even if we assume that there may be a persistent long-run tendency toward general equilibrium, we must admit that there is also a persistent short-run and long-run tendency toward the persistence of disequilibrium.
This is not only because there is a tendency of entrepreneurs, in increasing or reducing production in response to market and profit signals, to overshoot the mark, but because individual entrepreneurs, so far from making merely automatic responses, are constantly gaining new knowledge, alert to new opportunities, changing methods and reducing production costs, improving products, innovating—turning out entirely new products or inventions. And consumers too are constantly learning, changing tastes, and demanding new products to meet new wants. So Austrian economists seldom speak of market equilibrium, but of the market process.
My own suspicion is that the enormous attention now being devoted to stipulating the mathematical conditions of “general equilibrium” is a pursuit of a will-o’-the-wisp, of questionable help in solving any real economic problem.
But space forbids me to go into too many detailed contrasts. Let me sum up briefly the main Austrian theses once again, this time not in my own words or in Menger’s, but in those of two prominent living [1981] “Austrians.”
“Beginning in the 1870′s in Vienna, Austria,” writes Professor Kirzner, “the school was distinguished by its emphasis on the subjective elements in economic analysis, on the significance of time in production processes, and on the role of error and uncertainty in economic phenomena” (his italics).
The summarization by Professor Lachmann is remarkably similar: “The first, and most prominent, feature in Austrian economics is a radical subjectivism, today no longer confined to human preferences but extended to expectations. . . . Secondly, Austrian economics displays an acute awareness of the many facets of time that are involved in the complex network of interindividual relations. . . . In the subjective revolution of the 1870′s the first step in the direction of subjectivism was taken when it was realized that value, so far from being inherent in goods, constitutes a relationship between an appraising mind and the object of its appraisal” (New Directions in Austrian Economics, pp. 1–3).
All the rest of Austrian economics follows from these basic insights. Let me conclude with my own opinion that any economic analysis that fails to embody such insights cannot be entirely sound.

Recommended Reading

Those who have no previous acquaintance with Austrian economics, and would like a short and simple text written along Austrian lines, might begin with Essentials of Economics by Faustino Ballvé (126 pages; Irvington-on-Hudson, N.Y.: Foundation for Economic Education). A more advanced . . . introduction (1979), specifically explaining the Austrian point of view, is The Fallacy of the Mixed Economy, by Stephen C. Littlechild [out of print].
Surprisingly, the original Principles of Economics, first published in 1871 by Carl Menger, the founder of Austrian economics (328 pages), still makes an excellent, very readable, and not too technical introduction to the school’s basic principles.
Of course, the authoritative and most complete work on modern Austrian theory is Human Action, by Ludwig von Mises (907 pages, first published in 1949 [fourth edition, FEE, 1996]). Some may find this difficult reading. A very clear two-volume work written thirteen years after Human Action by a student of Mises is Murray N. Rothbard’sMan, Economy, and State [Ludwig von Mises Institute, 987 pages].
For the reader interested in the latest developments in Austrian economics I can highly recommend two books: One is The Foundations of Modern Austrian Economics, edited by Edwin G. Dolan, which contains contributions by half a dozen writers [1976, 238 pages, out of print]. The other is New Directions in Austrian Economics, edited by Louis M. Spadaro (1978), 239 pages, with contributions by eleven writers [out of print].
Most of these foregoing books have already been mentioned in the text. The reader may also profitably consult others mentioned there, especially the volumes by Kirzner and Lachmann.

Austrian Economics Part1
The Freeman Online



Saturday, February 4, 2012

Create Value, Not Jobs


Create Value, Not Jobs



Treat all economic questions from the viewpoint of the consumer for the interests of the consumer are the interests of the human race.
-Frederic Bastiat
Public discourse on matters of the economy is and has always been dominated by the idea that the road to prosperity is to create jobs. In a moment of high unemployment, the “create jobs” rhetoric becomes that much more prevalent. We get a “Jobs Bill“; opponents of Obama’s reform call it “job destroying“; after a brief period of discussing deficits and debt national news outlets turned right back to talking about jobs.
Reading Tyler Cowen’s The Great Stagnation and Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee’s Race Against the Machine, I was surprised to see that they considered lack of jobs to be one of the key problems of our times. Surprised, because I have become accustomed to economists arguing that jobs are not what matter, wealth is. Upon closer examination, however, I think that what they are arguing is consistent with that–they are putting it into the rhetoric of jobs because that is accessible to most people, but what they are saying is different from what a politician means when he calls for job creation.

A Very Human Propensity

This division of labour, from which so many advantages are derived, is not originally the effect of any human wisdom, which foresees and intends that general opulence to which it gives occasion. It is the necessary, though very slow and gradual, consequence of a certain propensity in human nature which has in view no such extensive utility; the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another.
-Adam Smith, Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations
In a barter economy, things are straightforward. I can only get something I want from you if I give you something that you want. I have to provide you with something of value.
This is still how the economy works on a fundamental level; money is just an intermediary between barter exchanges. Instead of giving you something you want, I give my employer or my customer something that they want. They give me money, which I can give to you so that you can turn around and get something you want. The person that you give it to accepts it because they can turn around and exchange it for something that they want.
Sensing a theme? Wealth is merely the ability to get things that we want. Since most of us are not independently wealthy, we have to work to create things that other people want in order to get what we want. The most common way to do this since the dawn of the industrial revolution has been to work for someone who needs human labor to accomplish some end–an end that is valued by consumers.
But it isn’t the only way–Henry Ford wasn’t an “employee”; he was an entrepreneur who developed more efficient ways to provide consumers with something of value at a lower cost. Moreover, he figured out how a little value could be added by large numbers of workers in the process.
There are also freelancers; people who are not employees nor employers, but work for specific clients at specific times. Rather than providing a valued service steadily over time, they do it on a case by case basis, and depending on the industry can face lean seasons and busy seasons.

Value, Not Work

The point is, our goal should never be to “create jobs”. Our goal should be to enable people to contribute something valued by other people. The value is the point, not the work. If someone finds a way to provide value to hundreds of millions of people and it requires no more effort from them than batting their eyelashes, that would be a win.
So why are economists like Cowen and Brynjolfsson talking about jobs? The stories they are telling, while far from the same, have a common theme which I interpret as follows: the forward march of technology has made it very difficult for people who have traditionally had low-skill or even middle-skill occupations to contribute value. As Arnold Kling succinctly put it:
The paradox is this. A job seeker is looking for something for a well-defined job. But the trend seems to be that if a job can be defined, it can be automated or outsourced.
He goes on to say that people who are capable of working in “less structured environments” are going to get a premium at this moment–in other words, people like entrepreneurs and freelancers.
His story, which he used to call the Recalculation but lately has referred to as Patterns of Sustainable Specialization and Trade (PSST), goes like this:
  1. One industry overwhelmingly dominates the economy (first agriculture, then manufacturing).
  2. Rapid technological change enormously increases the productivity of that industry while providing a lot of untapped potential in other areas.
  3. Since many fewer workers are needed now, there’s a period of massive unemployment before entrepreneurs figure out how to make the most valuable use of all the surplus labor.
  4. A new pattern of sustainable specialization and trade emerges that is optimal to the current state of technology.
In Kling and Brynjolfsson’s story, we’re at step 3. Technology has made it easy to replace workers with machines in old industries, but it is not yet obvious how those workers can contribute value in the young industries. Solving that problem is non-trivial.

An Important Distinction

This is not a matter of semantics. If you think the problem is a lack of jobs, all sorts of dangerous “solutions” may come to mind. Anything from having the government hiring en masse to do make-work, valueless jobs, to setting high tariffs and immigration restrictions so that domestic companies and labor do not have any foreign competition.
Frederic Bastiat was a 19th century French economic journalist who spilled a lot of ink attacking such foolish notions. You have to think about wealth from the perspective of the consumer. Yes, there would be more “work” to do if we cut off trade and immigration, but it would also impoverish just about everyone as the cost of getting anything would skyrocket. Getting a job is not an end unto itself; the whole point is to trade our labor for other things that we want. Getting a job at the cost of not being able to afford anything is an absurd proposition.
As for make-work jobs, I would rather the government send the poor a check to do what they want with than to force them to “play real job”. At least then they would have the time to think about how they can contribute something of real value!

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Civil Disobedience - Henry David Thoreau

Civil Disobedience - Henry David Thoreau



  Under a government which imprisons any unjustly, the true place for a just man is also a prison. The proper place today, the only place which Massachusetts has provided for her freer and less desponding spirits, is in her prisons, to be put out and locked out of the State by her own act, as they have already put themselves out by their principles. It is there that the fugitive slave, and the Mexican prisoner on parole, and the Indian come to plead the wrongs of his race should find them; on that separate, but more free and honorable, ground, where the State places those who are not with her, but against her- the only house in a slave State in which a free man can abide with honor. If any think that their influence would be lost there, and their voices no longer afflict the ear of the State, that they would not be as an enemy within its walls, they do not know by how much truth is stronger than error, nor how much more eloquently and effectively he can combat injustice who has experienced a little in his own person. Cast your whole vote, not a strip of paper merely, but your whole influence. A minority is powerless while it conforms to the majority; it is not even a minority then; but it is irresistible when it clogs by its whole weight. If the alternative is to keep all just men in prison, or give up war and slavery, the State will not hesitate which to choose. If a thousand men were not to pay their tax-bills this year, that would not be a violent and bloody measure, as it would be to pay them, and enable the State to commit violence and shed innocent blood. This is, in fact, the definition of a peaceable revolution, if any such is possible. If the tax-gatherer, or any other public officer, asks me, as one has done, "But what shall I do?" my answer is, "If you really wish to do anything, resign your office." When the subject has refused allegiance, and the officer has resigned his office, then the revolution is accomplished. But even suppose blood should flow. Is there not a sort of blood shed when the conscience is wounded? Through this wound a man's real manhood and immortality flow out, and he bleeds to an everlasting death. I see this blood flowing now.
I have contemplated the imprisonment of the offender, rather than the seizure of his goods- though both will serve the same purpose- because they who assert the purest right, and consequently are most dangerous to a corrupt State, commonly have not spent much time in accumulating property. To such the State renders comparatively small service, and a slight tax is wont to appear exorbitant, particularly if they are obliged to earn it by special labor with their hands. If there were one who lived wholly without the use of money, the State itself would hesitate to demand it of him. But the rich man- not to make any invidious comparison- is always sold to the institution which makes him rich. Absolutely speaking, the more money, the less virtue; for money comes between a man and his objects, and obtains them for him; and it was certainly no great virtue to obtain it. It puts to rest many questions which he would otherwise be taxed to answer; while the only new question which it puts is the hard but superfluous one, how to spend it. Thus his moral ground is taken from under his feet. The opportunities of living are diminished in proportion as what are called the "means" are increased. The best thing a man can do for his culture when he is rich is to endeavor to carry out those schemes which he entertained when he was poor. Christ answered the Herodians according to their condition. "Show me the tribute-money," said he;- and one took a penny out of his pocket;- if you use money which has the image of Caesar on it, and which he has made current and valuable, that is, if you are men of the State, and gladly enjoy the advantages of Caesar's government, then pay him back some of his own when he demands it. "Render therefore to Caesar that which is Caesar's, and to God those things which are God's"- leaving them no wiser than before as to which was which; for they did not wish to know.
When I converse with the freest of my neighbors, I perceive that, whatever they may say about the magnitude and seriousness of the question, and their regard for the public tranquillity, the long and the short of the matter is, that they cannot spare the protection of the existing government, and they dread the consequences to their property and families of disobedience to it. For my own part, I should not like to think that I ever rely on the protection of the State. But, if I deny the authority of the State when it presents its tax-bill, it will soon take and waste all my property, and so harass me and my children without end. This is hard. This makes it impossible for a man to live honestly, and at the same time comfortably, in outward respects. It will not be worth the while to accumulate property; that would be sure to go again. You must hire or squat somewhere, and raise but a small crop, and eat that soon. You must live within yourself, and depend upon yourself always tucked up and ready for a start, and not have many affairs. A man may grow rich in Turkey even, if he will be in all respects a good subject of the Turkish government. Confucius said: "If a state is governed by the principles of reason, poverty and misery are subjects of shame; if a state is not governed by the principles of reason, riches and honors are the subjects of shame." No: until I want the protection of Massachusetts to be extended to me in some distant Southern port, where my liberty is endangered, or until I am bent solely on building up an estate at home by peaceful enterprise, I can afford to refuse allegiance to Massachusetts, and her right to my property and life. It costs me less in every sense to incur the penalty of disobedience to the State than it would to obey. I should feel as if I were worth less in that case.
Some years ago, the State met me in behalf of the Church, and commanded me to pay a certain sum toward the support of a clergyman whose preaching my father attended, but never I myself. "Pay," it said, "or be locked up in the jail." I declined to pay. But, unfortunately, another man saw fit to pay it. I did not see why the schoolmaster should be taxed to support the priest, and not the priest the schoolmaster; for I was not the State's schoolmaster, but I supported myself by voluntary subscription. I did not see why the lyceum should not present its tax-bill, and have the State to back its demand, as well as the Church. However, at the request of the selectmen, I condescended to make some such statement as this in writing:- "Know all men by these presents, that I, Henry Thoreau, do not wish to be regarded as a member of any incorporated society which I have not joined." This I gave to the town clerk; and he has it. The State, having thus learned that I did not wish to be regarded as a member of that church, has never made a like demand on me since; though it said that it must adhere to its original presumption that time. If I had known how to name them, I should then have signed off in detail from all the societies which I never signed on to; but I did not know where to find a complete list.
I have paid no poll-tax for six years. I was put into a jail once on this account, for one night; and, as I stood considering the walls of solid stone, two or three feet thick, the door of wood and iron, a foot thick, and the iron grating which strained the light, I could not help being struck with the foolishness of that institution which treated me as if I were mere flesh and blood and bones, to be locked up. I wondered that it should have concluded at length that this was the best use it could put me to, and had never thought to avail itself of my services in some way. I saw that, if there was a wall of stone between me and my townsmen, there was a still more difficult one to climb or break through before they could get to be as free as I was. I did not for a moment feel confined, and the walls seemed a great waste of stone and mortar. I felt as if I alone of all my townsmen had paid my tax. They plainly did not know how to treat me, but behaved like persons who are underbred. In every threat and in every compliment there was a blunder; for they thought that my chief desire was to stand the other side of that stone wall. I could not but smile to see how industriously they locked the door on my meditations, which followed them out again without let or hindrance, and they were really all that was dangerous. As they could not reach me, they had resolved to punish my body; just as boys, if they cannot come at some person against whom they have a spite, will abuse his dog. I saw that the State was half-witted, that it was timid as a lone woman with her silver spoons, and that it did not know its friends from its foes, and I lost all my remaining respect for it, and pitied it.
Thus the State never intentionally confronts a man's sense, intellectual or moral, but only his body, his senses. It is not armed with superior wit or honesty, but with superior physical strength. I was not born to be forced. I will breathe after my own fashion. Let us see who is the strongest. What force has a multitude? They only can force me who obey a higher law than I. They force me to become like themselves. I do not hear of men being forced to have this way or that by masses of men. What sort of life were that to live? When I meet a government which says to me, "Your money or your life," why should I be in haste to give it my money? It may be in a great strait, and not know what to do: I cannot help that. It must help itself; do as I do. It is not worth the while to snivel about it. I am not responsible for the successful working of the machinery of society. I am not the son of the engineer. I perceive that, when an acorn and a chestnut fall side by side, the one does not remain inert to make way for the other, but both obey their own laws, and spring and grow and flourish as best they can, till one, perchance, overshadows and destroys the other. If a plant cannot live according to its nature, it dies; and so a man.
The night in prison was novel and interesting enough. The prisoners in their shirt-sleeves were enjoying a chat and the evening air in the doorway, when I entered. But the jailer said, "Come, boys, it is time to lock up"; and so they dispersed, and I heard the sound of their steps returning into the hollow apartments. My room-mate was introduced to me by the jailer as "a first-rate fellow and a clever man." When the door was locked, he showed me where to hang my hat, and how he managed matters there. The rooms were whitewashed once a month; and this one, at least, was the whitest, most simply furnished, and probably the neatest apartment in the town. He naturally wanted to know where I came from, and what brought me there; and, when I had told him, I asked him in my turn how he came there, presuming him to be an honest man, of course; and, as the world goes, I believe he was. "Why," said he, "they accuse me of burning a barn; but I never did it." As near as I could discover, he had probably gone to bed in a barn when drunk, and smoked his pipe there; and so a barn was burnt. He had the reputation of being a clever man, had been there some three months waiting for his trial to come on, and would have to wait as much longer; but he was quite domesticated and contented, since he got his board for nothing, and thought that he was well treated.
He occupied one window, and I the other; and I saw that if one stayed there long, his principal business would be to look out the window. I had soon read all the tracts that were left there, and examined where former prisoners had broken out, and where a grate had been sawed off, and heard the history of the various occupants of that room; for I found that even here there was a history and a gossip which never circulated beyond the walls of the jail. Probably this is the only house in the town where verses are composed, which are afterward printed in a circular form, but not published. I was shown quite a long list of verses which were composed by some young men who had been detected in an attempt to escape, who avenged themselves by singing them.
I pumped my fellow-prisoner as dry as I could, for fear I should never see him again; but at length he showed me which was my bed, and left me to blow out the lamp.
It was like travelling into a far country, such as I had never expected to behold, to lie there for one night. It seemed to me that I never had heard the town clock strike before, nor the evening sounds of the village; for we slept with the windows open, which were inside the grating. It was to see my native village in the light of the Middle Ages, and our Concord was turned into a Rhine stream, and visions of knights and castles passed before me. They were the voices of old burghers that I heard in the streets. I was an involuntary spectator and auditor of whatever was done and said in the kitchen of the adjacent village inn- a wholly new and rare experience to me. It was a closer view of my native town. I was fairly inside of it. I never had seen its institutions before. This is one of its peculiar institutions; for it is a shire town. I began to comprehend what its inhabitants were about.
In the morning, our breakfasts were put through the hole in the door, in small oblong-square tin pans, made to fit, and holding a pint of chocolate, with brown bread, and an iron spoon. When they called for the vessels again, I was green enough to return what bread I had left; but my comrade seized it, and said that I should lay that up for lunch or dinner. Soon after he was let out to work at haying in a neighboring field, whither he went every day, and would not be back till noon; so he bade me good-day, saying that he doubted if he should see me again.
When I came out of prison- for some one interfered, and paid that tax- I did not perceive that great changes had taken place on the common, such as he observed who went in a youth and emerged a tottering and gray-headed man; and yet a change had to my eyes come over the scene- the town, and State, and country- greater than any that mere time could effect. I saw yet more distinctly the State in which I lived. I saw to what extent the people among whom I lived could be trusted as good neighbors and friends; that their friendship was for summer weather only; that they did not greatly propose to do right; that they were a distinct race from me by their prejudices and superstitions, as the Chinamen and Malays are; that in their sacrifices to humanity they ran no risks, not even to their property; that after all they were not so noble but they treated the thief as he had treated them, and hoped, by a certain outward observance and a few prayers, and by walking in a particular straight though useless path from time to time, to save their souls. This may be to judge my neighbors harshly; for I believe that many of them are not aware that they have such an institution as the jail in their village.
It was formerly the custom in our village, when a poor debtor came out of jail, for his acquaintances to salute him, looking through their fingers, which were crossed to represent the grating of a jail window, "How do ye do?" My neighbors did not thus salute me, but first looked at me, and then at one another, as if I had returned from a long journey. I was put into jail as I was going to the shoemaker's to get a shoe which was mended. When I was let out the next morning, I proceeded to finish my errand, and, having put on my mended shoe, joined a huckleberry party, who were impatient to put themselves under my conduct; and in half an hour- for the horse was soon tackled- was in the midst of a huckleberry field, on one of our highest hills, two miles off, and then the State was nowhere to be seen.
This is the whole history of "My Prisons."